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"For I dipt into the future, far a* human eye could see, 
Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be} 
Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails, 
Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales; 
Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain'd a ghastly dew 
From tho nations' airy navies grappling in the central blue; 
Far along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing warm, 
With the standards of the peoples plunging thro' the thunder-storm; 
Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle-flags were furl'd 
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world. 
There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in we, 
And tb kindly earth shall dumber, lapt in universal law." 

TBNKYIO.N; Lcckthy Halt. 










??-. ie. <i 


First Edition, 1903 

Second Impression, February 191$ 

Third February 1917 


THIS translation of Kant's essay on Perpetual 
Peacf was undertaken by Miss Mary Campbell 
Smith at the suggestion of the late Professor 
Ritchie of St. Andrews, who had promised to write 
for it a preface, indicating the value of Kant's 
work in relation to recent discussions regarding the 
possibility of "making wars to cease." In view 
of the general interest which these discussions have 
aroused and of the vague thinking and aspiration 
which have too often characterised them, it seemed 
to Professor Ritchie that a translation of this wise 
and sagacious essay would be both opportune and 
valuable. * His untimely death has prevented the 
fulfilment of his promise, and I have been asked, 
in his stead, to introduce the translator's work. 

This is, I think, the only complete translation 
into English of Kant's essay, including all the notes 
as well as the text, and the translator has added 
a full historical Introduction, along with numerous 
notes of her own, so as (in Professor Ritchie's words) 
"to meet the needs (i) of the student of Political 

* Cf. his Studies in Political and Social Ethics, pp. 169, 170, 

vi Preface 

Science who wishes to understand the relation of 
Kant's theories to those of Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau etc., and (2) of the general reader who 
wishes to understand the significance of Kant's 
proposals in connection with the ideals of Peace 
Congresses, and with the development of International 
Law from the end of the Middle Ages to the Hague 

Although it is more than 100 years since Kant's 
essay was written, its substantial value is practically 
unimpaired. Anyone who is acquainted with the 
general character of the mind of Kant will expect 
to find in him sound common-sense, clear recogni- 
tion of the essential facts of the case and a remark- 
able power of analytically exhibiting the conditions 
on which the facts necessarily depend. These 
characteristics are manifest in the essay on Perpetual 
Peace. Kant is not pessimist enough to believe 
that a perpetual peace is an unrealisable dream or 
a consummation devoutly to be feared, nor is he 
optimist enough to fancy that it is an ideal which 
could easily be realised if men would but turn 
their hearts to one another. For Kant perpetual 
peace is an ideal, not merely as a speculative 
Utopian idea, with which in fancy we may play, 
but as a moral principle, which ought to be, and 
therefore can be, realised. Yet he makes it perfectly 
clear that we cannot hope to approach the realisation 

Preface vii 

of it unless we honestly face political facts and get 
a firm grasp of the indispensable conditions of a 
lasting peace. To strive after the ideal in contempt 
or in ignorance of these conditions is a labour that 
must inevitably be either fruitless or destructive of 
its own ends. Thus Kant demonstrates the hope- 
lessness of any attempt to secure perpetual peace 
between independent nations. Such nations may 
make treaties; but these are binding only for so 
long as it is not to the interest of either party to 
denounce them. To enforce them is impossible 
while the nations remain independent. "There is," 
as Professor Ritchie put it (Studies in Political and 
Social Ethics, p. 169), "only one way in which war 
between independent '"nations can be prevented; 
and that is by the nations ceasing to be indepen- 
dent." But this does not necessarily mean the 
establishment of a despotism, whether autocratic 
or democratic. On the other hand, Kant maintains 
that just as peace between individuals within a 
state can only be permanently secured by the 
institution of a "republican" (that is to say, a 
representative) government, so the only real guarantee 
-of a permanent peace between nations is the 
establishment of a federation of free "republican" 
states. Such a federation he regards as practically 
possible. ' " For if Fortune ordains that a powerful 
and enlightened people should form a republic 

viii Preface 

which by its very nature is inclined to perpetual 
peace this would serve as a centre of federal 
union for other states wishing to join, and thus 
secure ^conditions of freedom among the states in 
accordance with the idea of the law of nations. 
Gradually, through different unions of this kiud r 
the federation would extend further and further. '" 
Readers who are acquainted with the general 
philosophy of Kant will find many traces of its 
influence in the essay on Perpetual Peace. Those 
who have no knowledge of his philosophy may 
find some of his forms of statement rather difficult 
to understand, and it may therefore not be out of 
place for me to indicate very briefly the meaning^ 
of some terms which he frequently uses, especially* < 
in the Supplements and Appendices. Thus at the 
beginning of the First Supplement, Kant draws a 
distinction between the mechanical and the teleo- 
logical view of things, between "nature " and " Provi-1 
dence", which depends upon his main philosophical 
position. According to Kant, pure reason has two- 
aspects, theoretical and practical. As concerning", 
knowledge, strictly so called, the a priori principles 
of reason (e.g. substance and attribute, cause and' 
effect etc.) are valid only within the realm of' 
possible sense-experience. Such ideas, for instance, 
cannot be extended to God, since He is not a 
possible object of sense-experience. They are limited 

Preface he 


to the world of phenomena. This world of pheno- 
mena ("nature" or the world of sense-experience) 
is a purely mechanical system. But in order to 
understand fully the phenomenal world, the pure 
theoretical reason must postulate certain ideas (the 
ideas of the soul, the world and God), the objects 
of which transcend sense-experience. These ideas 
are not theoretically valid, but their validity is-' 
practically established by the pure practical reason/ 
which does not yield speculative truth, but pre-' 
scribes its principles " dogmatically " in the form of 
imperatives to the will. ~ The will is itself practical 
reason, and thus it imposes its imperatives upon. 
itself. The fundamental imperative of the practical 
reason is stated by Kant in Appendix I. (p. 175): 
" Act so that thou canst will that thy maxim should 
be a universal law, be the end of thy action what 
it will." If the end of perpetual peace is a duty, 
it must be necessarily deduced from this general 
law. And Kant does regard it as a duty. "We 
must desire perpetual peace not only as a material 
good, but also as a state of things resulting fromr 
our recognition of the precepts of duty " (loc. cit.). 
This is further expressed in the maxim (p. 177): 
" Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason 
and its righteousness, and the object of your 
endeavour, the blessing of perpetual peace, will be 
added unto you." The distinction between the 

X Preface 

moral politician and the political moralist, which is 
developed in Appendix I., is an application of the 
general distinction between duty and expediency, 
which is a prominent feature of the Kantian ethics. 
Methods of .expediency, omitting all reference to 
the pure practical reason, can only bring about 
re-arrangements of circumstances in the mechanical 
course of nature. They can never guarantee the 
attainment of their end: they can never make it 
more than a speculative ideal, which may or may 
not be practicable. But if the end can be shown 
to be a duty, we have, from Kant's point of view, 
the only reasonable ground for a conviction that 
it is realisable. We cannot, indeed, theoretically 
know that it is realisable. "Reason is not suffi- 
ciently enlightened to survey the series of predeter- 
mining causes which would make it possible for 
us to predict with certainty the good or bad 
results of human action, as they follow from the 
mechanical laws of nature; although we may hope 
that things will turn out as we should desire" (p. 
163). On the other hand, since the idea of perpetual, 
peace is a moral ideal, an "idea of duty ", we are 
-entitled to believe that it is practicable. - "Nature 
guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, through 
the natural course of human propensities ; not indeed 
with sufficient certainty to enable us to prophesy 
the future of this ideal theoretically, but yet clearly 

Preface x? 

enough for practical purposes " (p. 157). One might 
extend this discussion indefinitely; but what has 
been said may 'suffice for general guidance. 

The "wise and sagacious" thought of Kant is 
not expressed in a simple style, and the translation 
has consequently been a very difficult piece of 
work. But the translator has shown great skill in 
manipulating the involutions, parentheses and 
prodigious sentences of the original. In this she has 
had the valuable help of Mr. David Morrison, M.A. r 
who revised the whole translation with the greatest 
care and to whom she owes the solution of a 
number of difficulties. Her work will have its 
fitting reward if it succeeds in familiarising the 
English-speaking student of politics with a political 
essay of enduring value, written by one of the 
master thinkers of modern times. 


University of Glasgow, May 1903. 














INDEX 197 


THIS is an age of unions. Not merely in the 
economic sphere, in the working world of unworthy 
ends and few ideals do we find great practical 
organizations; but law, medicine, science, art, 
trade, commerce, politics and political economy 
we might add philanthropy standing institutions, 
mighty forces in our social and intellectual life, all 
have helped to swell the number of our nineteenth 
century Conferences and Congresses.-^ It is an age 
of Peace Movements and Peace Societies, of peace- 
loving monarchs and peace-seeking diplomats. This 
is not to say that we are preparing for the millen- 
nium. Men are working together, there is a new- 
born solidarity of interest, but rivalries between 
nation and nation, the bitterne^s^ and hatreds in- 
separable from competition are not less keen; pre- 
judice and misunderstanding not less frequent; 
subordinate conflicting interests are not fewer, are 
perhaps, in view of changing political conditions 
and an ever-growing international commerce, multi- 
plying with every year. The talisman is, perhaps, 
self-interest, but, none the less, the spirit of union is 
there; it is impossible to ignore" a clearly marked 


Perpetual Peace 

tendency towards international federation, towards 
political peace. This slow movement was not born 
with Peace Societies ; its consummation lies perhaps 
far off in the ages to come. History at best moves 
slowly. But something of its past progress we shall 
do well to know. No political idea seems to have 
so great a future before it as this idea of a fede- 
ration of the world. It is bound to realise itself 
some day ; let us consider what are the chances that 
this day come quickly, what that it be long delayed. 
What obstacles lie in the way, and how may they 
be removed? What historical grounds have we for 
hoping that they may ever be removed? What, 
in a. word, is the origin and history of the idea of 
a perpetual peace between nations, and what would 
be the advantage, what is the prospect of realis- 
ing it? 

The international relations of states find their 
expression, we are told, in war and peace. What 
has been the part played by these great coun- 
teracting forces in the history of nations? What 
has it been in pre-historic times, in the life of man 
in what is called the "state of nature"? "It is no 
easy enterprise," says Rousseau, in more than 
usually careful language, " to disentangle that which 
is original from that which is artificial in the actual 
state of man, and to make ourselves well acquainted 
with a state which no longer exists, which perhaps 

Translator's Introduction 

never has existed and which probably never will 
exist in the future." (Preface to the Discourse on 
the Causes of Inequality, 1753, publ. 1754.) This 
is a difficulty which Rousseau surmounts only too 
easily. A knowledge of history, a" scientific spirit 
may fail him: an imagination ever ready to pour 
forth detail never does. Man lived, says he, " without 
industry, without speech, without habitation, without 
war, without connection of any kind, without any 
need of his fellows or without any desire to harm 
them .... sufficing to himself." * (Discourse on the 
Sciences and Arts, 1750.) Nothing, we are now 
certain, is less probable. We cannot paint the life 
of man at this stage of his development with any 
definiteness, but the conclusion is forced upon us 
that our race had no golden age, f no peaceful 
beginning, that this early state was indeed, as 

* For the inconsistency between the views expressed by Rousseau 
on this subject in the Discourses and in the Contrat Social (Cf. I. 
Chs. VI., VHL) see Ritchie's Natural Right, Ch. Ill, pp. 48, 49 ; 
Caird's essay on Rousseau in his Essays on Literature and 
Philosophy, Vol.1.; and Morley's Rousseau, Vol. I., Ch. V.; Vol. 
II., Ch. XII. 

f The theory that the golden age -was identical with the state 
of nature, Professor D. G. Ritchie ascribes to Locke (see Natural 
Right, Ch. H., p. 42). Locke, he says, "has an idea of a golden 
age" existing even after government has come into existence a 
time when people did not need "to examine the original and 
rights of government." \Crutt Government, II., ill.] A little 
confusion on the part of his readers (perhaps in his own mind) 
makes it possible to regard the state of nature as itself the golden 

Perpetual Peace 

Hobbes held, a state of war, of incessant war 
between individuals, families and, finally, tribes. 

The Early Conditions of Society. 

For the barbarian, war is the rule; peace the 
exception. His gods, like those of Greece, are war- 
like gods; his spirit, at death, flees to some Val- 
halla. For him life is one long battle; his arms 
go with him even to the grave. Food and the 
means of existence he seeks through plunder and 
violence. Here right is with might; the battle is 
to the strong. Nature has given all an equal claim 
to all things, but not everyone can have them. 
This state of fearful insecurity is bound to come 
to an end. "Government," says Locke, (On Civil 
Government, Chap. VIII., 105) "is hardly to be 

age, and the way is prepared for the favourite theory of the eigh- 
teenth century: 

"Nor think in nature's state they blindly trod; 

The state of nature was the reign of God: 

Self-love and social at her birth began, 

Union the bond of all things and of man. 

Pride then was not, nor arts that pride to aid} 

Man walk'd with beast, joint tenant of the shade; 

The same his table, and the same his bed; 

No murder cloath'd him, and no murder fed." 

[Essay on Man, HI., 147 seg.] 

In these lines of Pope's the state of nature is identified with 
the golden age of the Greek and Latin poets; and "the reign of 
God" i$ an equivalent for Locke's words, "has a law of nature 
to govern it." 

Translator's Introduction 5 

avoided amongst men that live together." * A con- 
stant dread of attack and a growing consciousness 
of the necessity of presenting a united front against 
it result in the choice of some leader the head of 
a family perhaps who acts, it may be, only as cap- 
tain of the hosts, as did Joshua in Israel, or who 
may discharge the simple duties of a primitive 
governor or king, f Peace within is found to be 
strength without The civil state is established, so 
that "if there needs must be war, it may not yet 

* Cf. Republic, II. 369. "A state," says Socrates, "arises out 
of the needs of mankind : no one is self-sufficing, but all of us 
have many wants." 

t See Hume's account of the origin of government ( Treatise, III., 
Part H, Sect. VIII.). There are, he says, American tribes " where 
men live in concord and amity among themselves without any 
established government; and never pay submission to any of their 
fellows, except in time of war, when their captain enjoys a shadow 
of authority, which he loses after their return from the field, and 
the establishment of peace with the neighbouring tribet. This 
authority, however, instructs them in the advantages of govern- 
ment, and teaches them to have recourse to it, when either by 
the pillage of war, by commerce, or by any fortuitous inventions, 
their riches and possessions have become so considerable as to 
make them forget, on every emergence, the interest they have 

in the preservation of peace and justice Camps are the 

true mothers of cities; and as war cannot be administered, by 
reason of the suddenness of every exigency, without some autho- 
rity in a single person, the same kind of authority naturally 
takes place in that civil government, which succeeds the military." 
Cf. Cowper: The Winter Morning Walk: 

" . . f . . . and ere long, 

When man was multiplied and spread abroad 
In tribes and clans, and had begun to call 
These meadows and that range of bill* his own, 

Perpetual Peace 

be against all men, nor yet without some helps." 
(Hobbes: On Liberty, Chap. I., 13.) This found- 
ation of the state is the first establishment in 
history of a peace institution. It changes the cha- 
racter of warfare, it gives it method and system; 
but it does not bring peace in its train. We have 
now, indeed, no longer a wholesale war of all 
against all, a constant irregular raid and plunder 
of one individual by another; but we have the 
systematic, deliberate war of community against 
community, of nation against nation. * 

War in Classical Times. 

In early times, there were no friendly neigh- 
bouring nations: beyond ^the boundaries of every 

The tasted sweets of property begat 

Desire of more; 

Thus \vars began on earth. These fought for spoil, 

And those in self-defence. Savage at first 

The onset, and irregular. At length 

One eminent above the rest, for strength, 

For stratagem, or courage, or for all, 

Was chosen leader. Him they served in war, 

And him in peace for sake of warlike deeds 

Rev'renced no less . 

Thus kings were first invented." 

* " Among uncivilised nations, there is but one profession 
honourable, that of arms. All the ingenuity and vigour of the 
human mind are exerted in acquiring military skill or address." 
Cf. Robertson's History of Charles V., (IVcrh, 1813, vol. V.) Sect 
I. vii. 

Translator's Introduction 

nation's territory, lay the land of a deadly foe. 
This was the way of thinking, even of so highly 
cultured a people as the Greeks, who believed that 
a law of nature had made every outsider, every 
barbarian their inferior and their enemy. * Their 
treaties of peace, at the time of the Persian War, 
were frankly of the kind denounced by Kant, mere 
armistices concluded for the purpose of renewing 
their fighting strength. The ancient world is a 
world of perpetual war in which defeat meant 
annihilation. In the East no right was recognised 
in the enemy; and even in Greece and Rome the 
fate of the unarmed was death or slavery, f The 

* Similarly we find that the original meaning of the Latin 
word "Aosfis" was "a stranger." 

t In Aristotle we find the high-water mark of Greek thinking 
on this subject. "The object of military training," says he, 
(Politics, Bk. IV. Ch. XIV., Welldon's translation in older editions 
Bk. VII.) "should be not to enslave persons who do not deserve 
slavery, but firstly to secure ourselves against becoming the slaves 
of others; secondly, to seek imperial power not with a view to a 
universal despotic authority, but for the benefit of the subjects whom 
we rule, and thirdly, to exercise despotic power over those who are 
deserving to be slaves. That the legislator should rather make it 
his object so to order his legislation upon military and other 
matters as to promote leisure and peace is a theory borne out by 

the facts of history." (loc. cit. Ch. XV.). ^War, as we 

have remarked several times, has its end in peace." 

Aristotle strongly condemns the Lacedaemonians and Cretans for 
regarding war and conquest as the sole ends to which all law and 
education should be directed. Also in non-Greek tribes like the 
Scythians, Persians, Thracians and Celts he says, only military 

8 Perpetual Peace 

barbaric or non-Grecian states had, according to 
Plato and Aristotle, no claim upon humanity, no 

power is admired by the people and encouraged by the state. 
"There was formerly too a law in Macedonia that any one who 
had never slain an enemy should wear the halter about his neck." 
Among the Iberians too, a military people, " it is the custom to set 
around the tomb of a deceased warrior a number of obelisks 

corresponding to the number of enemies he has killed 

Yet . . it may well appear to be a startling paradox that it should 
be the function of a Statesman to succeed in devising the means 
of rule and mastery over neighbouring peoples whether with or 
against their own will. How can such action be worthy of a 
statesman or legislator, when it has not even the sanction of law ? " 
(op. '/., IV. Ch. 2.) 

We see that Aristotle disapproves of a glorification of war for 
its own sake, and regards it as justifiable only in certain circum- 
stances. Methods of warfare adopted and^approved in the East 
would not have been possible in Greece/ An act of treachery, 
for example, such as that of Jael, (Judges IV. 17) which was 
extolled in songs of praise by the Jews, (loc. cit. V. 24) the Greek 
people would have been inclined to repudiate. The stories of 
Roman history, the behaviour of Fabricius, for instance, or Regulus 
and the honourable conduct of prisoners on various occasions 
released on parole, show that this consciousness of certain principles 
of honour in warfare was still more highly developed in Rome. 

Socrates in the Republic (V. 469, 470) gives expression to a 
feeling which was gradually gaining ground in Greece, that war 
between Hellenic tribes was much more serious than war between 
Greeks and barbarians. In such civil warfare, he considered, the 
defeated ought not to be reduced to slavery, nor the slain despoiled, 
nor Hellenic territory devastated. For any difference between 
Greek and Greek is to "be regarded by them as discord only a 

quarrel among friends, which is not to be called war" " Our 

citizens [*'.*. in the ideal republic] should thus deal with their 
Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal 
with one another." (V. 471.) 

The views of Plato and Aristotle on this and other questions 
were in advance of the custom and practice of thir time. 

Translator's Introduction 

rights in fact of any kind. Among the Romans 
things were little better. According to Mr. T. J. 
Lawrence see his Principles of International Law, 
III., 21, 22 they were worse. For Rome stood 
alone in the world : she was bound by ties of 
kinship to no other state. She was, in other words, 
free from a sense of obligation to other races. 
War, according to Roman ideas, was made by the 
gods, apart altogether from the quarrels of rulers 
or races. To disobey the sacred command, ex- 
pressed in signs and auguries would have been 
to hold in disrespect the law and religion of the 
land. When, in the hour of victory, the Romans 
refrained from pressing , their rights against the 
conquered rights recognised by all Roman jurists 
it was from no spirit of leniency, but in the 
pursuit of a prudent and far-sighted policy, aiming 
at the growth of Roman supremacy and the esta- 
blishment of a world-embracing empire, shutting 
out all war as it blotted out natural boundaries, 
reducing all rights to the one right of imperial 
citizenship. There was no real jus belli, even here 
in the cradle of international law ; the only limits 
to the fury of war were of a religious character. 
The treatment of a defeated enemy among the 
Jews rested upon a similar religious foundation. 
In the East, we find a special cruelty in the conduct 
of war. The wars of the Jews and Assyrians were 

io Perpetual Peace 

wars of extermination. The whole of the Old 
Testament, it has been said, resounds with the clash 
of arms. * " An eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth!" was the command of Jehovah to his chosen 
people. Vengeance was bound up in their very 
idea of the Creator. The Jews, unlike the followers 
of Mahomet, attempted, and were commanded to 
attempt no violent conversion f ; they were then too 
weak a nation; but they fought, and fought with 
success against the heathen of neighbouring lands, 
the Lord of Hosts leading them forth to battle. 
The God of Israel stood to his chosen people 
in a unique and peculiarly - .logical relation. He 
had made a covenant with them; and, in return 
for their obedience and allegiance, cared for their 
interests and advanced their national prosperity. 
The blood of this elect people could not be 
suffered to intermix with that of idolaters. Canaan 
must be cleared of the heathen, on the coming 

* "The Lord is a man of war," said Moses (Exodus XV. 3). 
Cf. Psalms XXIV. 8. He is "mighty in battle." 

f This was bound up with the very essence of Islam ; the devout 
Mussulman could suffer the existence of no unbeliever. Tolerance 
or indifference was an attitude which his faith made impossible. 
"When ye encounter the unbelievers," quoth the prophet (Koran, 
ch. 47), "strike off their heads, until ye have made a great slaughter 

among them Verily if God pleased he could take vengeance 

on them without your assistance; but he commandeth you to fight 
his battles." 

The propagation of the faith by the sword was not only 
commanded by the Mohammedan religion : it was that religion itself. 

Translator's Introduction 1 1 

of the children of Israel to their promised land; 
and mercy to the conquered enemy, even to 
women, children or animals was held by the 
Hebrew prophets to be treachery to Jehovah. (Sam. 
XV.; Josh. VI. 21.) 

Hence the attitude of the Jews to neighbouring 
nations * was still more hostile than that of the 
Greeks. The cause of this difference is bound up 
with the transition from polytheism to monotheism. 
The most devout worshipper of the national gods 
of ancient times could endure to see other gods 
than his worshipped in the next town or by a 
neighbouring nation. There was no reason why 
all should not exist side by side. Religious conflicts 
in polytheistic countries, when they arose, were due 
not to the rivalry of conflicting faiths, but to an 
occasional attempt to put one god above the others 
in importance. There could be no interest here in 
the propagation of belief through the sword. But, 
under the Jews, these relations were entirely altered. 
Jehovah, their Creator, became the one invisible 
God. Such an one can suffer no others near him ; 
their existence is a continual insult to him. Mono- 
theism is, in its very nature, a religion of intolerance. 
Its spirit among the Jews was warlike : it commanded 

* See Acts X. 28:" Ye know that it is an unlawful thing for 
a man that is a Jew to keep company, or come unto one of 
another nation." 

12 Perpetual Peace 

i i i ! ..I 

the subjugation of other nations, but its instrument 
was rather extermination than conversion. 

The Attitude of Christianity and the Early 
Church to War. 

From the standpoint of the peace of nations, 
we may say that the Christian faith, compared 
with other prominent monotheistic religious systems, 
occupies an intermediate position between two ex- 
tremes the fanaticism of Islam, and to a less extent 
of Judaism, and the relatively passive attitude of 
the Buddhist who thought himself bound to propa- 
gate his religion, but held himself justified only in 
the employment of peaceful means. Christianity, 
oh the other hand, contains no warlike principles : 
it can in no sense be called a religion of the sword, 
but circumstances gave the history of the Church, 
after the first few centuries of its existence, a 
character which cannot be called peace-loving. 

This apparent contradiction between the spirit 
of the new religion and its practical attitude to war 
has led to some difference of opinion as to the 
actual teaching of Christ., The New Testament 
seems, at a superficial glance, to furnish support 
as readily to the champions of war as to its 
denouncers. The Messiah is the Prince of Peace 
(/>. IX. 6, 7 ; Heb. VI.), and here lies the way of 

Translator s Introduction 13 

righteousness (Rom. III. 19): but Christ came not 
to bring peace, but a sword (Matth. X. 34). Such 
statements may be given the meaning which we 
wish them to bear the quoting of Scripture is 
ever an unsatisfactory form of evidence; but there 
is no direct statement in the New Testament in 
favour of war, no saying of Christ which, fairly 
interpreted, could be understood to regard this 
proof of human imperfection as less condemnable 
than any other. * .When men shall be without sin, 
nation shall rise up against nation no more. But 
man the individual can attain peace only when 
he has overcome the world, when, in the struggle 
with his lower self, he has come forth victorious. 
This is the spiritual sword which Christ brought 
into the world strife, not with the unbeliever, but 
with the lower self: meekness and the spirit of 
the Word of God are the weapons with which man 
must fight for the Faith. 

An elect people there was no longer: Israel 
had rejected its Messiah. Instead there was a 
complete brotherhood of all men, the bond and 
the free, as children of one God. The aim of the 
Church was a world-empire, bound together by 
a universal religion. In this sense, as sowing 
the first seeds of a universal peace, we may speak 

* Neither, however, is thr iajr which regards the soldier as * 

14 Perpetual Peace 

of Christianity as a re-establishment of peace among 

The later attitude of Christians to war, however, 
by no means corresponds to the earliest tenets of 
the Church. Without doubt, certain sects, from 
the beginning of our era and through the ages up 
to the present time, held, like the Mennonites and 
Quakers in our day, that the divine command, 
"Love your enemies," could not be reconciled 
with the profession of a soldier. The early Chris- 
tians were reproached under the Roman Emperors, 
before the time of Constautine, with avoiding the 
citizen's duty of military service. * " To those 
enemies of our faith,' V v wrote Origen (Contra 
Celsum, VIII., Ch. LXXIIL, Anti-Nicene Christian 
Library), " who require us to bear arms for the 
commonwealth, and to slay men, we can reply : 
'Do not those who are priests at certain shrines, 
and those who attend on certain gods, as you 
account them, keep their hands free from blood, 
that they may with hands unstained and free from 
human blood offer the appointed sacrifices to your 

* In the early centuries of our era Christians seem to have 
occasionally refused to serve in the army from religious scruples. 
But soldiers were not always required to change their profession 
after baptism. And in Acts X., for example, nothing is said to 
indicate that the centurion, Cornelius, would have to leave the 
Roman army. See TertUllian : Dt Corona (Anti-Nicene Christian 
Library), p. 348, 

Translator s Introduction 

gods; and even when war is upon you, you never 
enlist the priests in the army. If that, then, is a 
laudable custom, how much more so, that while 
others are engaged in battle, these too should 
engage as the priests and ministers of God, keeping 
their hands pure, and wrestling in prayers to God 
on behalf of those who are fighting in a righteous 
cause, and for the king who reigns righteously, 
that whatever is opposed to those who act right- 
eously may be destroyed 1' .... And we do take 
our part in public affairs, when along with righteous 
prayers we join self-denying exercises and medita- 
tions, which teach us to despise pleasures, and not 
to be led away by them. And none fight better for 
the king than we do. We do not indeed fight 
under him, although he require it; but we fight 
on his behalf, forming a special army an army of 
piety by offering our prayers to God." The Fathers 
of the Church, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, 
Tertullian, Ambrose and the rest gave the same 
testimony against war. The pagan rites connected 
with the taking of the military oath had no doubt 
some influence in determining the feeling of the 
pious with regard to x this life of bloodshed; but 
the reasons lay deeper. " Shall it be held lawful," 
asked Tertullian, (De Corona, p. 347) "to make 
an occupation of the sword, when the Lord 
proclaims that he who uses the sword shall perish 

1 6 Perpetual Peace 

by the sword? And shall the son of peace take 
part in the battle when it does not become 
him even to sue at law? And shall he apply 
the chain, and the prison, and the torture, and the 
punishment, who is not the avenger even of his 
own wrongs?" 

The doctrine of the Church developed early in 
the opposite direction. It was its righting spirit 
and not a love of peace that made Christianity a 
state religion under Constantine. Nor was Augustine 
the first of the Church Fathers to regard military 
service as permissible, j To come to a later time, 
this change of attitude has been ascribed partly to 
the rise of Mahometan power and the wave of 
fanaticism which broke over Europe. To destroy 
these unbelievers with fire and sword was regarded 
as a deed of piety pleasing to God. Hence the 
wars of the Crusades against the infidel were holy 
wars, and appear as a new element in the history 
of civilisation. The nations of ancient times had 
known only civil and foreign war. * They had 
rebelled at home, and they had fought mainly for 
material interests abroad. In the Middle Ages there 
were, besides, religious wars and, with the rise of 

* There were so-called "Sacred Wars" in Greece, but these 
were due mainly to disputes caused by the Amphictyonic League. 
They were not religious, in the sense in which we apply the 
epithet to the Thirty Years 1 war. 

Translator's Introduction 17 

Feudalism, private war: * among all the powers of 
the Dark Ages and for centuries later, none was 
more aggressive than the Catholic Church, nor 
a more active and untiring defender of its rights 
and claims, spiritual or temporal. It was in some 
respects a more warlike institution than the states 
of Greece and Rome. It struggled through centuries 
with the Emperor : f it pronounced its ban against 
disobedient states and disloyal cities: it pursued 
with its vengeance each heretical or rebellious 
prince: unmindful of its early traditions about 
peace, it showed in every crisis a fiercely military 

For more than a thousand years the Church 

* "The administration of justice among rude illiterate people, 
was not so accurate, or decisive, or uniform, as to induce men to 
submit implicitly to its determinations. Every offended baron 
buckled on his armour, and sought redress at the head of his 
vassals. His adversary met him in like hostile array. Neither of 
them appealed to impotent laws which could afford them no 
protection. Neither of them would submit points, in which their 
honour and their passions were warmly interested, to the slow 
determination of a judicial inquiry. Both trusted to their swords 
for the decision of the contest." Robertson's History of Charhs V. t 
(Works, vol. V.) Sect. I., p. 38. 

t Erasmus in the "'IxdvoQocyiac " (Colloquies, Bailey's ed., Vol. 
II., pp. 55, 56) puts forward the suggestion that a gentral peace 
might be obtained in the Christian world, if the Emperor would 
remit something of his right and the Pope some part of his. 

Cf. Robertson, op. cit., Sect. III., p. 106, sey. 

1 8 Perpetual Peace 

counted fighting clergy * among its most active 
supporters. This strange anomaly was, it must be 
said, at first rather suffered in deference to public 
opinion than encouraged by ecclesiastical canons 
and councils, but it gave rise to great discontent 
at the time of the Reformation, f The whole 
question of the lawfulness of military service for 
Christians was then raised again. "If there be 
anything in the affairs of mortals," wrote Erasmus 
at this time (Opera, lI.,._Pr0v., 951 C) "which it 

* Robertson (op. cit., Note XXI., p. 483) quotes the following 
statement: "flamma, ferro, caede, possessiones ecclesiarum praelati 
defendebant." (Guido Abbas ap. Du Cange, p. 179.) - , 

f J. A. Farrar, in a pamphlet, (reprinted from the Gentleman's 
Magazine, vol. 257, 1884) on War and Christianity, quotes the 
following passage from Wycliffe in which he protests against this 
blot upon the Church and Christian professions. "Frian now say 
that bishops can fight best of all men, and that it falleth most 
properly to them, since they are lords of all this world. They say 
Christ bade His disciples sell their coats, and buy them swords; but 
whereto, if not to fight? Thus friars make a great array, and stir 
up many men to fight. But Christ taught not His apostles to fight 
with a sword of iron, but with the sword of God's Word, and 
which standeth in meekness of heart and in the prudence of man's 

tongue If man-slaying in others be odious to God, much 

more in priests, who should be vicars of Christ." See also the 
passage where Erasmus points out that King David was not per- 
mitted to build a temple to God, because he was a man of blood. 
M Nolo clericos ullo sanguine contaminari. Gravis impietas ! " 
(Opera, IX., 370 B.) 

This question had already been considered by Thomas Aquinas, 
who decided that the clergy ought not to be allowed to fight, 
because the practices of warfare, although right amd meritorious 
in themselves, were not in accordance with a holy calling. (Summa, 
II. 2: Qu. 40.) 

Translator s Introduction 19 

becomes us deliberately to attack, which we ought 
indeed to shun by every possible means, to 
avert and to abolish, it is certainly war, than which 
there is nothing more wicked, more mischievous or 
more widely destructive in its effects, nothing 
harder to be rid of, or more horrible and, in a word, 
more unworthy of a man, not to say of a Chris- 
tian." * The mediaeval Church indeed succeeded, 
by the establishment of such institutions as the 
Truce of God, in setting some limits to the fury 
of the soldier: but its endeavours (and it made 
several to promote peace) f were only to a trifling 
extent successful. Perhaps custom and public 
opinion in feudal Europe were too strong, perhaps 
the Church showed a certain apathy in denouncing 
the evils of a military society: no doubt the 
theoretical tenets of its doctrine did less to hinder 
war than its own strongly military tendency, its 

Aquinas held that war excluding private war is justifiable in 
a just cause. So too did Luther, (cf. his pamphlet : Ob Kriegsleule 
auch in seligem Standc sein konnen .>) Calvin and Zwingli, the last 
of whom died sword iu hand. 

With regard to the question of a fighting clergy, the passage 
quoted from Origen (pp. 14, 15, above) has considerable interest, 
Origen looks upon the active participation of priests in warfare as 
something which everyone would admit to be impossible. 

* See also the Querela Pads, 630 B., (Opera, IV.) :~" Whosoever 
preaches Christ, preaches peace." Erasmus even goes th length 
of saying that the most iniquitious peace is better than the most 
just war (op. dt, t 636 C). 

t Cf. Robertson, op. cit., Note XXI. p. 483 and Sect. I., p. 39. 

2O Perpetual Peace 

lust for power and the force of its example did to 
encourage it. 

Hence, in spite of Christianity and its early 
vision of a brotherhood of men, the history of the 
Middle Ages came nearer to a realization of 
the idea of perpetual war than was possible in 
ancient times. The tendency of the growth of 
Roman supremacy was to diminish the number 
of wars, along with the number of possible causes 
of racial friction. It united many nations in one 
great whole, and gave them, to a certain extent, 
a common culture and common interests; even, 
when this seemed prudent, a common right of 
citizenship. The fewer the number of boundaries, 
the less the likelihood of war. 4 The establishment 
of great empires is of necessity a force, and a 
great and permanent force working on the side 
of peace. With the fall of Rome this guarantee 
was removed. 

The Development of the New Science of 
International Law. 


Out of the ruins of the old feudal system arose 
the modern state as a free independent unity. 
Private war between individuals or classes of society 
was now branded as a breach of the peace: it 
became the exclusive right of kings to appeal to 

Translator s Introduction 21 

force. War, wrote Gentilis * towards the end of 
sixteenth century, is the just or unjust conflict 
between states. Peace was now regarded as the 
normal condition of society. As a result of these 
great developments in which the name "state" 
acquired new meaning, jurisprudence freed itself 
from the trammelling conditions of mediaeval 
Scholasticism. Men began to consider the problem 
of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of war, to 
question even the possibility of a war on rightful 
grounds. Out of these^new ideas partly too as 
one of the fruits of the Reformation, f arose 
the first consciously formulated principles of the 
science of international law, whose fuller, but 
not yet complete, development belongs to modern 

From the beginning of history every age, every 

* It is uncertain in what year the De Jure Belli of Gentilis was 
published a work to which Grotius acknowledges considerable 
indebtedness. Whewell, in the preface to his translation of Grotius, 
gives the date 1598, but some writers suppose it to have been ten 
years earlier. ; 

f This came about in two ways. The Church of Rome discouraged 
the growth of national sentiment. At the Reformation the indepen- 
dence and unity of the different nations were for the first time 
recognised. That is to say, the Reformation laid the foundation 
for a science of international law. But, from another point of 
view, it not only made such a code of rules possible, it made it 
necessary. The effect of the Reformation was not to diminish the 
number of wars in which religious belief could play a part. 
Moreover, it displaced the Pope from his former position as arbiter 
in Europe without setting up any judicial tribunal in his itead. 

22 Perpetual Peace 

people has something to show here, be it only a 
rudimentary sense of justice in their dealings with 
one another. We may instance the Amphictyonic 
League in Greece which, while it had a merely 
Hellenic basis and was mainly a religious survival, 
shows the germ of some attempt at arbitration 
between Greek states. Among the Romans we 
have the jus feciale * and the jus gentium^ as 
distinguished from the civil law of Rome, and 
certain military regulations about the taking of 
booty in war. Ambassadors were held inviolate 

* Cf. Cicero : De OJficiis, I. xC'" Belli quidem aequitas sanctissime 
feciali populi Romani jure perscripta est." (See th reference to 
Lawrence's comments on this subject, p. 9 above.) 

"Wars," says Cicero, "are to be undertaken for this end, that 
we may live in peace without being injured; but when we obtain 
the victory, wo must preserve those enemies who behaved without 
cruelty or inhumanity during the war: for example, our forefathers 
received, even as members of their state, the Tuscans, the ^iqui, 
the Volscians, the Sabines and the Hernici, but utterly destroyed 

Carthage and Numantia And, while we are bound to 

exercise consideration toward those whom we have conquered by 
force, so those should be received into our protection who throw 
themselves upon the honour of our general, and lay down their 

arms," (op. cif. t I. xi., Bonn's Translation) "In engaging 

in war we ought to make it appear that we have no other view 
but peace." (op. cit., I. xxiii.) ^ 

In fulfilling a treaty we muwS not sacrifice the spirit to the letter 
(De Ojficiis, I. x). "There are also rights of war, and the faith 
of an oath is often to be kept with an enemy." (pp. cit., III. xxix.) 

This is the first statement by a classical writer in which the 
idea of justice being due to an enemy appears. Cicero goes 
further. Particular states, he says, {De Legibus, I. i.) are only 
members of a whole governed by reasop, 

Translator's Introduction 23 

in both countries; the formal declaration of war 
was never omitted. Many Roman writers held the 
necessity of a just cause for war. But nowhere do 
these considerations form the subject matter of a 
special science. 

In the Middle Ages the development of these 
ideas received little encouragement. All laws are 
silent in the time of war, * and this was a period 
of war, both bloody and constant. There was no 
time to think of the right or wrong of anything, 
Moreover, the Church emphasised the lack of rights 
in unbelievers, and gave her blessing on their an- 
nihilation, f The whple Christian world was filled 
with the idea of a '-spiritual universal monarchy. 
Not such as that in the minds of Greek and Jew 
and Roman who had been able to picture interna- 
tional peace only under the form of a great national 
and exclusive empire. In this great Christian state 
there were to be no distinctions between nations; 
its sphere was bounded by the universe. But, 
here, there was no room or recognition for inde- 
pendent national states with equal and personal 

rights. This recognition, opposed by the Roman 


* The saying is attributed to Pompey: "Shall I, when I am 
preparing for war, think of the laws?" 

t This implied, however, the idea of a united Christendom as 
against the infidel, with which we maj compare the idea of a 
united Hellas against Persia. In such things we have the germ 
not only of international law, but of the ideal of federation. 

24 Perpetual Peace 

Church, is th real basis of international law. 
The Reformation was the means by which the 
personality of the peoples, the unity and indepen- 
dence of the state were first openly admitted. On 
this foundation, mainly at first in Protestant coun- 
tries, the new science developed rapidly. Like the 
civil state and the Christian religion, international 
law may be called a peace institution. 

GrotiuS) Puffendorf and Vattel. 

In the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
Grotius laid the foundations of a code of universal 
law (Dt Jure Belli ft Pads, 1625) independent of 
differences of religion, in the hope that its recog- 
nition might simplify the intercourse between the 
newly formed nations. The primary object of this 
great work, written during the misery and horrors 
of the Thirty Years' war, was expressly to draw 
attention to these evils and suggest some methods 
by which the severity of warfare might be miti- 
gated. Grotius originally meant to explain only one 
chapter of the law of nations : * his book was to 

* See Maine's Ancient Law, pp. 50 53: pp. 96 101. Grotius 
wrongly understood "Jus Gentium," ("a collection of rules 
and principles, determined by observation to be common to the 
institutions which prevailed among the various Italian tribes") to 
mean "Jus inter gentes." The Roman expression for International 
Law was not "Jus Gentium," but "Jus Feciale." 

"Having adopted from the Antonine jurisconsults/' says Maine, 

Translator s Introduction 

be called De Jure Belli, but there is scarcely any 
subject of international law which he leaves un- 
touched. He obtained, moreover, a general recog- 
nition for the doctrine of the Law of Nature which 
exerted so strong an influence upon succeeding 
centuries; indeed, between these two sciences, as 
between international law and ethics, he draws 
no very sharp line of demarcation, although, on 
the whole, in spite of an unscientific, scholastic use 

of quotation from authorities, his treatment of the 


"the position that the Jus Gentium and the Jus Naturae were identical, 
Grotius, with his immediate predecessors and his immediate successors, 
attributed to the Law of Nature an authority which would never 
perhaps have been claimed for it, if "Law of Nations" had not 
in that age been an ambiguous expression. They laid down 
unresenredly that Natural Law is the code of states, and thus put 
in operation a process which has continued almost down to our 
own day, the process of engrafting on the international system 
rules which are supposed to have been evolve 1 from the unassisted 
contemplation of the conception of Nature. There is, too, one 
consequence of immense practical importance to mankind which, 
though not unknown during the early modern history of Europe, 
was never clearly or universally acknowledged till the doctrines 
of the Grotian school had prevailed. If the society of nations 
is governed by Natural Law, the atoms which compose it must be 
absolutely equal. Men under the sceptre of Nature are all equal, and 
accordingly commonwealths are equal if the international state be 
one of nature. The proposition that independent communities, 
however different in size and power, are all equal in the view of 
the Law of Nations, has largely contributed to the happiness of 
mankind, though it is constantly threatened by the political tendencie* 
of each successive age. It is a doctrine which probably would never 
have obtained a secure footing at all if International Law had 
not been entirely derived from the majestic claims of Nature by the 
Publicists who wrote after the revival of letters." (Of. cit., p. 100.) 

26 Perpetual Peace 

new field is clear and comprehensive. Grotius made 
the attempt to set up an ethical principle of right, 
in the stead of such doctrines of self-interest as 
had been held by many of the ancient writers. 
There was a law, he held, established in each state 
purely with a view to the interests of that state, 
but, besides this, there was another higher law in 
the interest of the whole society of nations. Its 
origin was divine; the reason of man commanded 
his obedience. This was what we call international 

Grotius distinctly holds, like Kant and Rousseau, 
and unlike Hobbes, that the state can never be 
regarded as a unity or institution separable from 
the people; the terms civitas^ communitas, coetus, 
populus, he uses indiscriminately. But these na- 
tions, these independent units of society cannot live 
together side by side just as they like ; they must 
recognise one another as members of a European 
society of states, f Law, he said, stands above 
force even in war, "which may only be begun to 
pursue the right;" and the beginning and manner 
of conduct of war rests on fixed laws and can be 

justified only in certain cases. War is not to be 


* The name " International Law '' was first given to the law of 
nations by Bentham. (Principles of Morals and Legislation t XIX, xxv.; 

t In the Peace of WestphaMa, 1648, the balance of power in 
Europe was recognised on the basis of terms such as these. 

Translator's Introduction 27 

done away with : Grotius accepts it as fact, * (as 
Hobbes did later) as the natural method for set- 
tling the disputes which were bound constantly to 
arise between so many independent and sovereign 
nations. A terrible scourge it must ever remain, 
but as the only available form of legal procedure, 
it is sanctioned by the practice of states and not 
less by the law of nature and of nations. Grotius 
did not advance beyond this position. Every vio- 
lation of the law of nations can be settled but in 
one way by war, the force of the stronger. 

The necessary distinction between law and ethics 
was drawn by Puffendorf, f a successor of Grotius 
who gave an outwardly systematic form to the 
doctrine of the great jurist, without adding to it 

* Grotius, however, is a painstaking student of Scripture, and is 
willing to say something in favour of peace not a permanent peace, 
that is to say, the idea of which would scarcely be likely to occur 
to anyone in the early years of the seventeenth century but a 
plea for fewer, shorter wars. "If therefore," he says, "a peace 
sufficiently safe can be had, it is not ill secured by the condonation 
of offenses, and damages, and expenses: especially among Christians, 
to whom the Lord has given his peace as his legacy. And so 
St. Paul, his best interpreter, exhorts us to live at peace with all 
men. . . . May God write these lessons He who alone can on 
the hearts of all those who have the affairs of Christendom in 
their bands." (De Jure Belli et Pads, III. Ch. XXV., Whewell's 

See also op. ft/., II., Ch. XXIII., Sect. VIII, where Grotius 
recommends t'hat Congresses of Christian Powers should be held 
with a view to the peaceful settlement of international differences. 

t Puffendorfs best known work, De Jure Natura et Gentium^ 
was published in 1672. 

2$ Perpetual Peace 

either ttrength or completeness. Hii views, when 
they were not based upon the system of Grotius, 
were strongly influenced by the speculation of 
Hobbes, his chronological predecessor, to whom we 
shall have later occasion to refer. In the works 
of Vattel, * who was, next to Rousseau, the most 
celebrated of Swiss publicists, we find the theory 
of the customs and practice in war widely devel- 
oped, and the necessity for humanising its methods 
and limiting its destructive effects upon neutral 
countries strongly emphasised. Grotius and Puffen- 
dorf, while they recommend 'acts of mercy, hold 
that there is legally no right which requires that 
a conquered enemy shall be spared. This is a 
matter of humanity alone. It is to the praise of 
Vattel that he did much to popularise among the 
highest and most powerful classes of society, ideas 
of humanity in warfare, and of the rights and obliga- 
tions of nations. He is, moreover, the first to make 
a clear separation between this science and the 
Law of Nature. What, he asks, is international law 
as distinguished from the Law of Nature? What 
are the powers of a state^and the duties of nations 
to one another? What are the causes of quarrel 
among nations, and what the means by which they 
can be settled without any sacrifice of dignity? 

* Le Droit des Gens was published in 1758 and translated into 
English by Joseph Chitty in 1797, ( 2nd ed 

Translator's Introduction 29 

They are, in the first place, a friendly conciliatory 
attitude; and secondly, such means of settlement 
as mediation, arbitration and Peace Congresses. 
These are the refuges of a peace-loving nation, in 
cases where vital interests are not at stake. "Nature 
gives us no right to use force, except where mild 
and conciliatory measures are useless." (Law of 
Nations, II. Ch. xviii. 331.) " Every power owes 
it in this matter to the happiness of human society 
to show itself ready for every means of recon- 
ciliation, in cases where the interests at stake are 
neither vital nor important." (ibid. 332.) At 
the same time, it is never advisable that a Ration 
should forgive an insult which it hai not the power 
to resent. 

The Dream of a Perpetual Peace. 

But side by side with this development and 
gradual popularisation of the new science of Inter- 
national Law, ideas of a less practical, but not less 
fruitful kind had been steadily making their way 
and obtaining a strong hold upon the popular 
mind. The Decree of Eternal Pacification of 1495 
had abolished private war, one of the heavy curses 
of the Middle Ages. ^Why should it not be ex- 
tended to banish warfare between states as well? 
Gradually one proposal after another was made 

30 Perpetual Peace 

to attain this end, or, at least, to smooth the way 
for its future realisation. The first of these in 
point of time is to be found in a somewhat bare, 
vague form in Sully's Memoirs, * said to have been 
published in 1634. Haifa century later the Quaker 
William Penn suggested an international tribunal 
of arbitration in the interests of peace, f But it 
was by the French Abbe" St. Pierre that the problem 
of perpetual peace was fairly introduced into 
political literature: and this, in an age of cabinet 
and dynastic wars, while the dreary cost of the 
war of the Spanish succession was yet unpaid. 
St. Pierre was the first who really clearly realised 
and endeavoured to prove that the establishment 
of a permanent state of peace is not only in the 
interest of the weaker, but is required by the 
European society of nations and by the reason of 
man. From the beginning of the history of humanity, 
poets and prophets had cherished the " sweet 
dream " of a peaceful civilisation : it is in the form 
of a practical project that this idea is new. 

The ancient world actually represented a state 

* Memoires ou (Economies Royales D'Estat, Domestiques , Politiques 
ft Alililaires de Henri le Grand, par Maximilian de Bethune, Due 
de Sully. 

f See International Tribunals (1899), p. 20 seq. Penn's Essay 
towards the Present and Future Peace of Ettrope was written about 
1693, but is not included in all editions of bis works. 

Translators Introduction 31 

of what was almost perpetual war. This was the 
reality which confronted man, his inevitable doom, 
it seemed, as it had been pronounced to the fallen 
sinners of Eden. Peace was something which man 
had enjoyed once, but forfeited. The myth- and 
poetry-loving Greeks, and, later, the poets of Rome 
delighted to paint a state of eternal peace, not as 
something to whose coming they could look forward 
in the future, but as a golden age of purity whose 
records lay buried in the past, a paradise which 
had been, but which was no more. Voices, more 
scientific, were raised even in Greece in attempts, 
such as Aristotle's, to show that the evolution of 
man had been not a course of degeneration from 
perfection, but of continual progress upwards from 
barbarism to civilisation <- and culture. But the 
change in popular thinking on this matter was due 
less to the arguments of philosophy than to a 
practical experience of the causes which operate 
in the interests of peace. The foundation of a 
universal empire under Alexander the Great gave 
temporary rest to nations heretofore incessantly 
at war. Here was a proof that the Divine Will 
had not decreed that man was to work out his 
punishment under unchanging conditions of perpetual 
warfare. This idea of a universal empire became 
the Greek ideal of a perpetual peace. Such aa 
empire was, in the language of th Stoics, a world- 

32 Perpetual Peace 

state in which all men had rights of citizenship, in 
which all other nations were absorbed. 

Parallel to this ideal among the Greeks, we find 
the hope in Israel of a Messiah whose coming was 
to bring peace, not only to the Jewish race, but 
to all the nations of the earth. This idea stands 
out in the sharpest contrast to the early nationalism 
of the Hebrew people, who regarded every stranger 
as an idolater and an enemy. The prophecies of 
Judaism, combined with the cosmopolitan ideas of 
Greece, were the source of the idea, which is 
expressed in the teaching of Christ, of a spiritual 
world-empire, an empire held together solely by 
the tie of a common religion. 

This hope of peace did not actually die during 
the first thousand years of our era, nor even under 
the morally stagnating influences of the Middle 
Ages. When feudalism and private war were 
abolished in Europe, it wakened to a new life. 
Not merely in the mouths of poets and religious 
enthusiasts was the cry raised against war, but 
by scholars like Thomas More and Erasmus, jurists 
like Gentilis and Grotius, men high in the state 
and in the eyes of Europe like Henry IV. of 
France and the Due de Sully or the Abb6 de St. 
Pierre whose Projet de Paix Perpetuelle (1713)* 

* Projet de traitipmtr rendre la paix perp etuelle entre Its souverain* 
chretuns. Th first two volumes of this work were published in 
1713 (trans. London, 1714); a third volume followed in 1717. 

Translator s Introduction 33 

obtained immediate popularity and wide-spread 
fame. The first half of the eighteenth century was 
already prepared to receive and mature a plan of 
this kind. 

Henry IV. and St. Pierre. 

The Grand Dessein of Henry IV. is supposed 
to have been formed by that monarch and repro- 
duced in Sully 's Memoirs^ written in 1634 and 
discovered nearly a century later by St. Pierre. 
The story goes that the Abbe found the book 
buried in an old garden. It has been shewn, 
however, that there is little likelihood that this 
project actually originated with the king, who 
probably corresponded- fairly well to Voltaire's 
picture of him as war Hero of the Henriade. The 
plan was more likely conceived by Sully, and 
ascribed to the popular king for the sake of the 
better hearing and greater influence it might in 
this way be likely to have, and also because, 
thereby, it might be less likely to create offence 
in political circles. St. Pierre himself may or may 
not have been acquainted with the facts. 

The so-called Grand Dessein of Henry IV. was, 
shortly, as follows. * It proposed to divide Europe 


* The main articles of this and other peace projects are to 
be found in International Tribunals, published by the Peace 

34 Perpetual Peace 

between fifteen Powers, * in such a manner that the 
balance of power should be established and pre- 
served. These were to form a Christian republic 
on the basis of the freedom and equality of its 
members, the armed forces of the federation being 
supported by fixed contribution. A general council, 
consisting of representatives from the fifteen states, 
was to make all- laws necessary for cementing the 
union thus formed and for maintaining the order 
once established. It would also be the business 
of this senate to " deliberate on questions that 
might arise, to occupy themselves with discussing 
different interests, to settle quarrels amicably, to 
throw light upon and arrange all the civil, political 
and religious affairs of Europe, whether internal or 
foreign." (Memoires, vol. VI., p. 129 seq.) 

This scheme of the king or his minister was 
expanded with great thoroughness and clear-sighted- 
ness by the Abbe St. Pierre : none of the many later 
plans for a perpetual peace has been so perfect 
in details. He proposes that there should be a 
permanent and perpetual union between, if possible, 
all Christian sovereigns of whom he suggests 
nineteen, excluding the Czar " to preserve unbroken 
peace in Europe," and that a permanent Congress 

* Professor Lorimcr points out that Prussia, then the Duchy of 
Brandenburg, is not mentioned. (Institutes of tJu Law of Nations^ 
H Ch. VTI., p. 219.) 

Translator s Introduction 35 

or senate should be formed by deputies of the 
federated states. The union should protect weak 
sovereigns, minors during a regency, and so on, 
and should banish civil as well as international 
war it should "render prompt and adequate assist- 
ance to rulers and chief magistrates against seditious 
persons and rebels." All warfare henceforth is to 
be waged between the troops of the federation 
each nation contributing an equal number and 
the enemies of European security, whether outsiders 
or rebellious members of the union. Otherwise, 
where it is possible, all disputes occurring within 
the union are to be settled by the arbitration of 
the senate, and the Combined military force of the 
federation is to be applied to drive the Turks out 
of Europe. There is to be a rational rearrangement 
of boundaries, but after this no change is to be 
permitted in the map of Europe. The union should 
bind itself to tolerate the different forms of faith. 
The objections to St. Pierre's scheme are, many 
of them, obvious. He himself produces sixty-two 
arguments likely to be raised . against his plan, and 
he examines these in turn with acuteness and 
eloquence. But there are other criticisms which he 
was less likely to be able to forestall. Of the 
nineteen states he names as a basis of the federa- 
tion, some have disappeared and the governments of 
others have completely changed. Indeed St. Pierre's 

36 Perpetual Peace 

scheme did not look far beyond the present. But 
it has besides a too strongly political character. * 
From this point of view, the Abba's plan amounts 
practically to a European coalition against the 
Ottoman Empire. Moreover, we notice with a smile 
that the French statesman and patriot is not lost 
in the cosmopolitan political reformer. " The king- 
dom of Spain shall not go out of the House of 
Bourbon 1" f France is to enjoy more than the 
privileges of honour ; she is to reap distinct material 
and political advantages from the union. Humanity 
is to be a brotherhood, but, in the federation of 
nations, France is to stand first. 9 We see that 
these "reVes d'un homme de bien," as Cardinal 
Dubois called them, are not without their practical 
element. But the great mistake of St. Pierre is 
this: he actually thought that his plan could be 
put into execution in the near future, that an ideal 
of this kind was realisable at once. ** " I, myself, 

* The same objection was raised by Leibniz (see his Observations 
on St. Pierre's Projet) to the scheme of Henry IV., who, says 
Liebniz, thought more of overthrowing the house of Austria than 
of establishing a society of sovereigns. 

t Project t Art. VI., Eng. trans. (1714), p. 119. 

St. Pierre was not blind to this aspect of the question. Among 
the critical objections which he anticipates to his plan is this, 
that it promises too great an increase of strength to the house of 
France, and that therefore the author would have been wiser to 
conceal his nationality. 

** St. Pierre, in what may be called an apology for the wording 
of the title of his book (above, p. 32, note), justifies his confidence 

Translator's Introduction 37 


form'd it," he says in the preface, " in full expect- 
ation to see it one Day executed." As Hobbes, 
says, " there can be nothing so absurd, but may 
be found in the books of philosophers." * St. Pierre 
was not content to make his influence felt on the 
statesmen of his time and prepare the way for the 
abolition of all arbitrary forms of government. This 
was the flaw which drew down upon the good 
Abbe" Voltaire's sneering epigram f and the irony 
of Leibniz. Here, above all, in this unpractical^ 
enthusiasm his scheme differs. from that of Kant. 

in these words: "The Pilot who himself seems uncertain of the 
Success of his Voyage is not likely to persuade the Passenger to 
embark. . . . I am persuaded, that it is not impossible to find 
out Means sufficient and practicable to settle an Everlasting Peace 
among Christians; and even believe, that the Means which I 
have thought of are of that Nature." (Preface to Project, Eng. 
trans., 1714.) 

* Leviathan, I. Ch. V. 

t See too Voltaire's allusion to St. Pierre in his Dictionary, under 
"Religion." < "* 

Leibniz regarded the project of St. Pierre with an indifference, 
somewhat tinged with contempt. In a letter to Grimarest, {Leibnit. 
Opera, Dutens' ed., 1768, Vol. V., pp. 65, 66: in Epfst., ed. 
Kortholt., Vol. III., p. 327) he writes: "I have seen something 
of M. de St. Pierre's plan for maintaining perpetual peace in 
Europe. It reminds me of an inscription outside of a churchyard 
which ran, 'Pax Perpetua. For the dead, it is true, fight no 
more. But the living, are of another mind, and the mightiest 
among them have little respect for tribunals. 1 This is followed 
by the ironical suggestion that a court of arbitration should be 
established at Rome of which the Pope should be made president; 
while at the same time the old spiritual authority should be 
restored to the Church, and excommunication be the punishment 

38 Perpetual Peace 

Rousseau's Criticism of St. Pierre. 

Rousseau took St. Pierre's project * much more 
seriously than either Leibniz or Voltaire. But 
sovereigns, he thought, are deaf to the voice of 
justice; the absolutism of princely power would 
never allow a king to submit to a tribunal of 
nations. Moreover war was, according to Rous- 
seau's experience, a matter not between nations, 
but between princes and cabinets. It was one of 
the ordinary pleasures of royal existence and one 
not likely to be voluntarily given up. f We know 
that history has not supported Rousseau's conten- 
tion. Dynastic wars are now no more. The Great 
Powers have shown themselves able to impose their 

of non-compliance with the arbitral decree. " Such plans," he 
adds, " are as likely to succeed as that of M. de St. Pierre. But 
as we are allowed to write novels, why should we find fault with 
fiction which would bring back the golden age?" But see also 
Observations sur le Projet d^une Paijc Perpituelle de M. VAbbe dc 
St. Pierre (Dutens, V., esp. p. 56) and the letter to Remond de 
Moutmort (ibid. pp. 20, 21) where Leibniz considers this project 
rather more seriously. 

* " C'est un livre solide et sense," says Rousseau (Jugement mr 
la Paix Perpituelle), "et il est tres important qu'il existe." [This 
yugement is appended to Rousseau's Exirait du Prejet de Paix 
Pcrpctuelle de Monsieur ^Abbc de Saint-Pierre, 1761.] 
I Cf. Cowper: The Winter Morning Walk: 

"Great princes have great playthings. Some have play'd 
At hewing mountains into men, and some 
At building human wonders mountain high. 

Translator's Introduction 39 

own conditions, where the welfare and security of 
Europe have seemed to demand it. Such a develop- 
ment seemed impossible enough in the eighteenth 
century. In the military organisation of the nations 
of Europe and in the necessity of making their 
internal development subordinate to the care for 
their external security, Rousseau saw the cause of 
all the defects in their administration. * The forma- 
tion of unions on the model of the Swiss Confedera- 
tion or the German Bund would, he thought, be 
in the interest of all rulers. f But great obstacles 
seemed to him to lie in the way < of the realisation 
of such a project as that of St Pierre. "Without 
doubt," says Rousseau in conclusion, "the proposal 

of a perpetual peace is at present an absurd one 

It can only be put into effect by methods which are 
violent in themselves and dangerous to humanity. 
One cannot conceive of the possibility of a federative 
union being established, except by a revolution. 

Some seek diversion in the tented field, 
And make the sorrows of mankind their sport. 
But war's a game, which, were their subjects wise, 
Kings should not play at. Nations would do well 
T'extort their truncheons from the puny hands 
Of heroes, whose infirm and baby minds 
Are gratified with mischief, and who spoil, 
Because men suffer it, their toy the world." 
* "Les troupes resides, peste et depopulation del'Eurepe, ne sont 
bonnes qu'a deux fins: ou pour attaquer et conquerir les voisins, 
ou pour enchdiner et avjervir les citoyens." (fiouvtrntnunt de 
, Ch. XII.) 

4<D Perpetual Peace 

And, that granted, who among us would venture to 
say whether this European federation is to be desired 
or to be feared ? It would work, perhaps, more harm 
in a moment than it would prevent in the course 
of centuries." (Jugement sur la Paix Perpttuelle!} 

The Position of Hobbes. 

The most profound and searching analysis of 
this problem comes from Immanuel Kant, whose 
indebtedness in the sphere of politics to Hobbes, 
Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau it is difficult to 
overestimate. Kant's doctrine of the sovereignty of 
the people comes to him from Locke through 
Rousseau. His explanation of the origin of society 
is practically that of Hobbes. ^yThe direct influence 
on politics of this philosopher, apart from his share 
in moulding the Kantian theory of the state, is one 
we cannot afford to neglect. His was a great in- 
fluence on the new science just thrown on the 
world by Grotius, and his the first clear and 
systematic statement we have of the nature of 
society and the establishment of the state. The natural 
state of man, says Hobbes, is a state of war, * a 

* Hobbes realises clearly that there probably never was such a 
state of war all over the world nor a state of nature conforming 
to a common type. The case is parallel to the use of the term 
"original contract" as an explanation of the manner in which the 
civil state came to be formed. (Cf. p. 52, note^ 

See also Hume (Tnquiry concerning the Principles ff 

Translator's Introduction 4! 

bellum omnium contra omnes, where all struggle 
for honour and for preferment and the prizes to 
which every individual is by natural right equally 
entitled, but which can of necessity fall only to the 
few, the foremost in the race. Men hate and fear 
the society of their kind, but through this desire 

Sect. III. Part I.). ''This poetical fiction of the golden age i*, 
in some respects, of a piece with the philosophical fiction of the 
state of nature ; only that the former is represented as the most 
charming and most peaceable condition, which can possibly be 
imagined; whereas the latter is painted out as a state of mutual 
war and violence, attended with the most extreme necessity." 
This fiction of a state of nature as a state of war, says Hume, 
(in a note to this passage) is not the invention of Hobbe. 
Plato (Republic, H III. IV.) refutes a hypothesis very like it, 
and Cicero (Pro Sext. 1. 42) regards it as a fact universally 

Cf. also Spinoza (Tract. Pol. c. ii. 14): "Homines ex natura 
hostes." And (c. T. 2) : " Homines civiles non nascuntur aed fiunt." 
These expressions are to be understood, says Bluntschli (Theory 
of the State, IV. Ch. vi., p. 284, note a), "rather as a logical 
statement of what would be the condition of man apart from civil 
society, than as distinctly implying a historical theory." 

While starting from the same premises, Spinoza carries Hobbes' 
political theories to their logical conclusion. If we admit that 
right lies with might, then right is with the people in any revolu- 
tion successfully carried , y put. (But see Hobbes' Preface to the 
Philosophical Rudiments and Kant's Perpetual Peace, p. 188, 
note.} Spinoza, in a letter, thus alludes to this point of differ- 
ence: "As regards political theories, the difference which you 
inquire about between Hobbes and myself, consists in this, that I 
always preserve natural right intact, and only allot to the chief 
magistrates in every state a right over their subjects commensurate 
v ith the excess of their power over the power of the subjects. 
This is what always takes place in the state of nature." (Epistlt 
50, Works, Bonn's ed., Vol. II.) 

42 Perpetual Peace 

to excel are forced to seek it: only where there 
are many can there be a first. This state of things, 
this apparent sociability which is brought about by 
and coupled with the least sociable of instincts, be- 
comes unendurable. " It is necessary to peace," 
writes Hobbes (On Dominion, Ch. VI. 3) "that a 
man be so far forth protected against the violence 
of others, that he may live securely; that is, that 
he may have no just cause to fear others, so long 
as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men 
altogether safe from mutual harms, so as they cannot 
be hurt or injuriously killed, is impossible; and, 
therefore, comes not within deliberation." But to 
protect them so far as is possible the state is formed. 
Hobbes has no great faith in human contracts or 
promises. Man's nature is malicious and untrust- 
worthy. A coercive power is necessary to guarantee 
this long-desired security within the community. 
"We must therefore," he adds, " provide for our 
security, not by compacts, but by punishments; 
and there is then sufficient provision made, when 
there are so great punishments appointed for every 
injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to 
have done it, than not to have done it. For all 
men, by a necessity of nature, choose that which 
to them appears to be the less evil." (Op. cit. t 
Ch. VI. 4.) 
These precautions secure that relative peace 

Translator's Introduction 43 

within the state which is one of the conditions 
nf the safety of the people. But it is, besides, the 
duty of a sovereign to guarantee an adequate pro- 
tection to his subjects against foreign enemies. A 
state of defence as complete and perfect as possible 
is not only a national duty, but an absolute neces- 
sity. The following statement of the relation of the 
state to other states shows how closely Hobbes has 
been followed by Kant. "There are two things 
necessary," says Hobbes, (On Dominion, Ch. XIII. 
7) " for the people's defence ; to be warned and to 
be forearmed. For the state of commonwealths 
considered in themselves, is natural, that is to say, 
hostile.* Neither,, if they cease from fighting, is it 
therefore to be called peace; but rather a breathing 
time, in which one enemy observing the motion 
and countenance of the other, values his security 
not according to pacts, but the forces and counsels 
of his adversary." 

Hobbes is a practical philosopher: no man was 
less a dreamer, a follower after ideals than he. He 
is, moreover, a pessimist, and his doctrine of the 
state is a political absolutism, f the form of govern- 

* The italics are mine. [Tr.] 

t Professor Paulsen (Inimamtel Kant, 2nd ed., 1899, p. 359 
Eng. trans., p. 353) points out that pessimism and absolutism 
usually go together in the doctrines of philosophers. He gives as 
instances Hobbes, Kant and Schopenhauer. 

Hobbes (On Dominion, Ch. X. 3, sey.} regarded an absolute 

44 Perpetual Peace 

ment which above all has been, and is, favourable 
to war. He would no doubt have ridiculed th<*^ 
idea of a perpetual peace between nations, had 
such a project as that of St. Pierre a practical 
project, counting upon a realisation in the near 
future been brought before him. He might not 
even have accepted it in the very much modified 
form which Kant adopts, that of an ideal an 
unattainable ideal towards which humanity could 
not do better than work. He expected the worst 
possible from man the individual. Homo homini 
lupus. The strictest absolutism, amounting almost 
to despotism, was required to keep the vicious 
propensities of the human animal in check. States 
he looked upon as units of the same kind, members 
also of a society .,. ./They had, and openly exhibited, 
the same faults as individual men. They too 
might be driven with a strong enough coercive 
force behind them, but not without it; and such a 
coercive force as this did not exist in a society of 
nations. Federation and federal troops are terms 
which represent ideas of comparatively recent origin. 

monarchy as the only proper form of government, while in th 
opinion of Locke, (On Civil Govcntmcnt, II. Ch. VII, 90, 91) it 
was no better than a state of nature. Kant would not have gone 
quite so far. As a philosopher, he upheld the sovereignty of the 
people and rejected a monarchy which was not governed in accor- 
dance with republican principles; as a citiren, he denid the right 
of resistance to authority. (Cf. Perpetual Peate, pp. 126, 188, note.) 

Translator s Introduction 45 

Without something of this kind, any enduring peace 
-.Has not to be counted upon. International relations 
were and must remain at least potentially warlike 
in character. Under no circumstances could ideal 
conditions be possible either between the members 
of a state or between the states themselves. Human 
nature could form no satisfactory baiis for a counsel 
of perfection. 

Hence Hobbes never thought of questioning the 
necessity of war. It was in his eyes the natural 
condition of European society; but certain rules 
were necessary both for its conduct and, where 
this was compatible with a nation's dignity and 
prosperity, for its prevention. He held that interna- 
tional law was only a part of the Law of Nature, 
and that this Law of Nature laid certain obligations 
upon nations and their kings. Mediation must be 
employed between disputants as much as possible, 
the person of the mediators of peace being held 
inviolate ; an umpire ought to be chosen to decide 
a controversy, to whose judgment the parties in 
dispute agree to submit themselves ; such an arbiter 
must be impartial.^ These are all what Hobbes 
calls precepts of the Law of Nature. And he appeals 
to the Scriptures in confirmation of his assertion 
that peace is the way of righteousness and that the 
laws of nature of which these are a few are also laws 
of the heavenly kingdom. But peace is like the 

46 Perpetual Peace 

straight path of Christian endeavour, difficult to 
find and difficult to keep. We must seek after 
where it may be found; but, having done this and 
sought in vain, we have no alternative but to fall 
back upon war. Reason requires " that every man 
ought to endeavour peace," (Lev. I. Ch. XIV.) " as 
far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he 
cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all 
helps, and advantages of war." * This, says Hobbes 
elsewhere, (On Liberty, Ch. I. 15) is the dictate of 
right reason, the first and fundamental law of nature. 

Kant's Idea of a Perpetual Peace. 

With regard to the problems of international 
law, Kant is of course a hundred and fifty years 
ahead of Hobbes. But he starts from the same 
point: his theory of the beginning of society is 
practically identical with that of the older philo- 
sopher. Men are by nature imperfect creatures, 
unsociable and untrustworthy, cursed by a love of 
glory, of possession, and of power, passions which 
make happiness something for ever unattainable by 
them. Hobbes is content to leave them here with 
their imperfections, and let a strong government 

* We find the same rule laid down as early as the time of 
Dante. Cf. De Monarchia, Bk. IT 9 '. " When two nations quarrel 
they are bound to try in every possible way to arrange the quarrel 
by means of discussion : it is only when this is hopeless that they 
may declare war." 

Translator's Introduction 47 

help them out as it may. But not so Kant. He 
Jooks beyond man the individual, developing slowly 
by stages scarcely measurable, progressing at one 
moment, and the next, as it seems, falling behind : 
he looks beyond the individual, struggling and 
never attaining, to the race. Here Kant is no 
pessimist. The capacities implanted in man by 
nature are not all for evil: they are, he says, 
" destined to unfold themselves completely in the 
course of time, and in accordance with the end to 
which they are adapted." (Idea of a Universal History 
from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, 1784. Prop, i.) 
This end of humanity is the evolution of man from 
the stage of mere self-satisfied animalism to a high 
state of civilisation. Through his own reason man is 
to attain a perfect culture, intellectual and moral. In 
this long period of struggle, the potential faculties 
which nature or Providence has bestowed upon him 
reach their full development. The process in which 
this evolution takes place is what we call history. 
To man nature has given none of the perfect 
animal equipments for self-preservation and self- 
defence which she has bestowed on others of her 
creatures. Bui she has^given to him reason and 
freedom of will, and has determined that through 
these faculties and without the aid of instinct he 
shall win for himself a complete development of 
his capacities and natural endowments. It is, says 

Perpetual Peace 

Kant, no happy life that nature has marked out 
for man. He is filled with desires which he can 
never satisfy. His life is one of endeavour ivnd 
not of attainment: not even the consciousness of 
the well-fought battle is his, for the struggle is 
more or less an unconscious one, the end unseen. 
Only in the race, and not in the individual, can 
the natural capacities of the human species reach 
full development. Reason, says Kant, (Prop. 2, 
op. tit.) "does not itself work by instinct, but 
requires experiments, exercise and instruction in 
order to advance gradually from one stage of 
insight to another. Hence each individual man 
would necessarily have to live an enormous length 
of time, in order to learn by himself how to make 
a complete use of all his natural endowments. Or, 
if nature should have given him but a short lease 
of life, as is actually the case, reason would then 
require an almost interminable series of genera- 
tions, the one handing down its enlightenment to 
the other, in order that the seeds she has sown in 
our species may be brought at last to a stage of 
development which is in perfect " accordance with 
her design." Man the individual shall travel towards 
the land of promise and fight for its possession, 
but not he, nor his children, nor his children's 
children shall inherit the land. "Only the latest 
comers can have the good fortune of inhabiting 

Translator's Introduction 49 


the dwelling which the long series of their prede- 
cessors have toiled though/' adds Kant, "without 
any conscious intent to build up without even the 
possibility of participating in the happiness which 
they were preparing." (Proposition 3.) 

The means which nature employs to bring about 
this development of all the capacities implanted in 
men is their mutual antagonism in society what 
Kant calls the " unsocial sociableness of men, that 
is to say, their inclination to enter into society, an 
inclination which yet is bound up at every point 
with a resistance which threatens continually to 
break up the society so formed." (Proposition 4.) 
Man hates society, and yet there alone he can 
develop his capacities ; he cannot live there peace- 
ably, and yet cannot live without it. It is the 
resistance which others offer to his inclinations and 
will which he, on his part, shows likewise to the 
desires of others that awakens all the latent powers 
of his nature and the determination to conquer his 
natural propensity to indolence and love of material 
comfort and to struggle for the first place among 
his fellow-creatures, to satisfy, in outstripping them, 
his love of glory and possession and power. "With- 
out those, in themselves by no means lovely, qual- 
ities which set man in social opposition to man, so 
that each finds his selfish claims resisted by the 
selfishness of all the others, men would have lived 


jo Perpetual Peace 

on in an Arcadian shepherd life, in perfect harmony, 
contentment, and mutual love ; but all their talents 
would forever have remained hidden and undevel- 
oped. Thus, kindly as the sheep they tended, they 
would scarcely have given to their existence a 
greater value than that of their cattle. And the 
place among the ends of creation which was 
left for the development of rational beings would 
not have been filled. Thanks be to nature for the 
unsociableness, for the spiteful competition of vanity, 
for the insatiate desires of gain and power 1 Without 
these, all the excellent natural capacities of human- 
ity would have slumbered undeveloped. Man's 
will is for harmony ; but nature knows better what 
is good for his species: her will is for dissension. 
He would like a life of comfort and satisfaction, 
but nature wills that he should be dragged out of 
idleness and inactive content and plunged into 
labour and trouble, in order that he may be made 
to seek in his own prudence for the means of 
again delivering himself from them. The natural 
impulses which prompt this effort, the causes of 
unsociableness and mutual conflict, out of which 
so many evils spring, are also in turn the spurs 
which drive him to the development of his powers. 
Thus, they really betray the providence of a wise 
Creator, and not the interference of some evil spirit 
which has meddled with the world which God has 

Translator's Introduction 

nobly planned, and enviously overturned its order." 
(Proposition 4: Caird's translation in The Critical 
Philosophy of Kant, Vol. II., pp. 550, 551.) 

The problem now arises, How shall men live 
together, each free to work out his own develop- 
ment, without at the same time interfering with a 
like liberty on the part of his neighbour? The 
solution of this problem is the state. Here the 
liberty of each member is guaranteed and its limits 
strictly defined. A perfectly just civil constitution, 
administered according to the principles of right, 
would be that under which the greatest possible 
amount of liberty was left to each citizen within 
these limits. >^ This is the ideal of Kant, and here 
lies the greatest practical problem which has pre- 
sented itself to humanity. An ideal of this kind is 
difficult of realisation. But nature imposes no such 
duty upon us. ''Out of such crooked material as 
man is made," says Kant, " nothing can be hammered 
quite straight." (Proposition 6.) We must make 
our constitution as good as we can and, with that, 
rest content. 

The direct cause of this transition from a state 
of nature and conditions of unlimited freedom to 
civil society with its coercive and restraining forces 
is found in the evils of that state of nature as they 
are painted by Hobbes. A wild lawless freedom 
becomes impossible for man: he is compelled to 

52 Perpetual Peace 

seek the protection of a civil society. He lives in 
uncertainty and insecurity: his liberty is so far 
worthless that he cannot peacefully enjoy it. For 
this peace he voluntarily yields up some part of 
his independence. The establishment of the state 
is in the interest of his development to a higher 
civilisation. It is more the guarantee of his exis- 
tence and self-preservation. This is the sense, 
gays Professor Paulsen, in which Kant like Hobbes 
regards the state as "resting on a contract/ 1 * that 

. Rousseau (Confrat Social: I. vi.) regards the social contract as 
tacitly implied in every actual society: its articles "art the same 
everywhere, and are everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised, 
even though they may never have found formal expression" In 
any constitution. In the same way he speaks of a state of nature 
" which no longer exists, which perhaps never has existed." (Preface 
to the Discourse on the Causes '-yf Inequality) But Rousseau's 
interpretation of these terms is, on the whole, literal in spite of 
these single passages. He speaks throughout the Confrat Sofia/, 
as if history could actually record the signing and drawing up of 
such documents. Hobbes, Hooker, (Ecclesiastical Polity, I. sect. 
10 see also Ritchie: Darwin and Hegel, p. no seq?) Hume and 
Kant use more careful language. "It cannot be denied," writes 
Hume, (Of the Original Contract} "that all government is, at first, 
founded on a contract and that the most ancient rude combinations 
of mankind were formed chiefly by that principle. In vain are 
we asked in what records this charter of our liberties is registered. 
It was not written on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of 
trees. It preceded the use of writing and all the other civilised 
arts of life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and 
in the equality, or something approaching equality, which we find 
in all the individuals of that species." % ?> 

This fine passage expresses admirably the views of Kant on this 
point Of. Wtrkt, (Rosenkranx) IX. 1 60. The original contract 

Translator s Introduction 53 

is to ay, on the free will of all. * Volenti nonfit 
injuria. Only, adds Paulsen, we must remember that 
thii contract is not a historical fact, as it seemed 
to iome writers of the eighteenth century, but an 
"idea of reason" : we are speaking here not of the 
history of the establishment of the state, but of the 
reason of its existence. (Paulsen's Kant, p. 354.) t 

is merely an idea of reason, one of those ideas which we thick 
into things iu order to explain them. 

Hobbes docs not professedly make the contract historical, but 
in Locke's Civil Government (II. Ch. VIII. 102) there is some 
attempt made to give it a historical basis. By consent all were 
equal, "till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves. 
So that their politic societies all began from a voluntary union, 
and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of 
their governors, and forms of government." 

Bluntschli points out (7'heory of the State t IV. ix., p. 294 and 
note) that tht same theory of contract on which Hobbe*' doctrine 
of an absolute government was based was made the justification of 
violent resistance to the government at the time of the French 
Revolution. The theory was differently applied by Hobbes, Locke 
and Rousseau. According to the first, men leave the "state of 
nature" when they surrender their rights to a sovereign, and return 
to that state during revolution. But, for Rousseau, this sovereign 
authority is the people: a revolution would be only a change of 
ministry. (See Cont. Soc., III. Ch. xviii.) Again Locke holds 
revolution to be justifiable in all cases where the government have 
not fulfilled the trust reposed by the people iu them. (Cf. Kant's 
Perpetual Peace, p. 188, note}. 

* "If you unite many men," Writes Rousseau, (Cont. Soc. t IV. I.) 
"and consider them as one body, they will have but one will; 
and that will must be to promote the common safety and general 
well-being of all." This volonti genirale, the common element 
of all particular wills, cannot be in conflict with an/ of them. 
(Op. eit., IL iii.) 

f In Eng. trans., see p. 348. 

54 Perpetual Peace 

In this civil union, self-sought, yet sought reluc- 
tantly, man is able to turn his most unlovable 
qualities to a profitable use. They bind this society 
together. They are the instrument by which he 
wins for himself self-culture. It is here with men, 
says Kant, as it is with the trees in a forest: "just 
because each one strives to deprive the other of 
air and sun, they compel each other to seek both 
above, and thus they grow beautiful and straight. 
Whereas those that, in freedom and isolation from 
one another, shoot out their branches at will, grow 
stunted and crooked and awry." (Proposition 5, 
op. cit.) Culture, art, and all that is best in the 
social order are the fruits of that self-loving un- 
sociableness in man. , 

The problem of the establishment of a perfect 
civil constitution cannot be solved, says this treatise 
(Idea for a Universal History), until the external 
relations of states are regulated in accordance with 
principles of right. For, even if the ideal internal 
constitution were attained, what end would it serve 
in the evolution of humanity, if commonwealths 
themselves were to re nain like individuals in a 
state of nature, each existing in uncontrolled free- 
dom, a law unto himself r - This condition of things 
again cannot be permanent. Nature uses the same 
means as before to bring about a state of law and 
order. War, present or near at hand, the strain 

Translator's Introduction 55 

of constant preparation for a possible future cam- 
paign or the heavy burden of debt and devastation 
left by the last, these are the evils which must 
drive states to leave a lawless, savage state of 
nature, hostile to man's inward development, and 
seek in union the end of nature, peace. All wars 
are the attempts nature makes to bring about new 
political relations between nations, relations which, 
in their very nature, cannot be, and are not desired 
to be, permanent. ,., These combinations will go on 
succeeding each other, until at last a federation of 
all powers is formed for the establishment of per- 
petual peace. This is the end of humanity, demanded 
by reason. Justice will reign, not only in the state, 
but in the whole human race when perpetual peace 
exists between the nations of the world. 

This is the point of view of the Idea for a Uni- 
versal History. But equally, we may say, law and 
justice will reign between nations, when a legally 
and morally perfect constitution adorns the state. 
External perpetual peace pre-supposes internal peace 
peace civil, social, economic, religious. Now, 
when men are perfect and what would this be 
but perfection how can there be war? Cardinal 
Fleury's only objection no light one to St. Pierre's 
project was that, as even the most peace-loving 
could not avoid war, all men must first be men of 
noble character. This seems to be what is required 

$6 Per Ritual Peace 

in the treatise on Perpetual Peace. Kant demands, 
to a certain extent, the moral regeneration of man. 
There must be perfect honesty in international 
dealings, good faith in the interpretation and ful- 
filment of treaties and so on (Art. i) * : and again, 
every state must have a republican constitution a 
term by which Kant understands a constitution as 
nearly as possible in accordance with the spirit of 
right. (Art. i.)f This is to say that we have to 
start with our reformation at home, look first to 
the culture and education and morals of our citizens, 
then to our foreign relations. This is a question 
of self-interest as well as of ethics. On the civil and 
religious liberty of a state depends its commercial 
success. Kant saw the day coming, when industrial 
superiority was to be identified with political pre- 
eminence. The state which does not look to the 
enlightenment and liberty of its subjects must fail 
in the race. But the advantages of a high state 
of civilisation are not all negative. The more highly 
developed the individuals who form a state, the 
more highly developed is its consciousness of its 
obligations to other nations. In the ignorance and 
barbarism of races lies the great obstacle to a reign 
of law among states. Uncivilised states cannot be 
conceived as members of a federation of Europe. 

* See p. 107. ^ 

t See p. lao. 

Translators Introduction $7 

First, the perfect civil constitution according to 
right: then the federation of these law-abiding 
Powers. This ia the path which reason marks 
out. The treatise on Perpetual Peact seems to be 
in this respect more practical than the Idea for 
a Universal History. But it matters little which 
way we take it. The point of view is the same 
in both cases : the end remains the development of 
man towards good, the order of his steps in this 

direction is indifferent. 

> * 

The Political and Social Conditions of Kanfs Time. 

The history of the human race, viewed as a 
whole, Kant regards as the realisation of a hidden 
plan of nature to bring about a political constitu- 
tion internally and externally perfect the only 
condition under which the faculties of man can be 
fully developed. Does experience support this 
theory? Kant thought that, to a certain degree, it 
did. This conviction was not, however, a fruit of 
his experience of citizenship in Prussia, an absolute 
dynastic state, a military monarchy waging perpe- 
tual dynastic wars of the kind he most hotly con- 
demned. Kant had no feeling of love to Prussia, * 
and little of a citizen's patriotic pride, or even in- 

* Unlike Hegel whose ideal was the Prussian state, as it was 
under Frederick the Great. An enthusiastic supporter of the power 
of monarchy, he showed himself comparatively indifferent to the 
progress of constitutional liberty. 

58 Perpetual Peace 

terest, in its political achievements. This was partly 
because of his sympathy with republican doctrines : 
partly due to his love of justice and peculiar hatred 
of war, * a hatred based, no doubt, not less on 
principle than on a close personal experience of 
the wretchedness it brings with it. It was not the 
political and social conditions in which he lived 
which fostered Kant's love of liberty and gave him 
inspiration, unless in the sense in which the mind 
reacts upon surrounding influences. Looking beyond 

* Isolated passages are sometimes quoted from Kant in support 
of a theory that the present treatise is at least half ironical l and 
that his views on the question of perpetual peace did not essenti- 
ally differ from those of Leibniz. "Even war," he says, (Kritik d. 
Urteilskraft* I. Book ii. 28.) "when conducted in an orderly 
way and with reverence for the rights of citizens has something of 
the sublime about it, and the more dangers a nation which wages 
war in this manner is exposed to and can courageously overcome, 
the nobler does its character grow. \Yhile, on the other hand, a 
prolonged peace usually has the effect of giving free play to a 
purely commercial spirit, and side by side with this, to an ignoble 
self-seeking, to cowardice and effeminacy; and the result of this 
is generally a degradation of national character." 

This is certainly an admission that war which does not violate 
the Law of Nations lias a good side as \\ell as a bad. We could 
look for no less in so clear-sighted and unprejudiced a thinker. 
Kant would have been the first to admit that under certain condi- 
tions a nation can have no higher duty than to wage war. War 
is necessary, but it is in contradiction to reason and the spirit of 
right. The "scourge of mankind,*' "making more bad men than 
it takes away," the "destroyer of every good," Kant calls it 
elsewhere. (J^heory of Ethics, Abbott's trans., 4th ed., p. 341, note.) 

1 Cf. K. v. Stengel: Der Ewig* Friede, Munich, 1899; also 
Vaihinger: Kantstudien, Vol. IV., p. 58, 

Translator's Introduction 59 

Prussia to America, in whose struggle for indepen- 
dence he tpok a keen interest, and looking to 
France where the old dynastic monarchy had been 
succeeded by a republican state, Kant seemed to 
see the signs of a coming democratisation of the 
old monarchical society of Europe. In this growing 
influence on the slate of the mass of the people 
who had everything to lose in war and little to 
gain by victory, he saw the guarantee of a future 
perpetual peace. Other forces too were at work 
to bring about this consummation. There was a 
growing consciousness that war, this costly means 
of settling a dispute, is not even a satisfactory 
method of settlement., \ Hazardous and destructive 
in its effect, it is also uncertain in its results. Victory 
is not always gain ; it no longer signifies a land 
to be plundered, a people to be sold to slavery. It 
brings fresh responsibilities to a nation, at a time 
when it is not always strong enough to bear them. 
But, above all, Kant saw, even at the end of the 
eighteenth century, the nations of Europe so closely 
bound together by commercial interests that a war 
and especially a maritim6*war where the scene of 
conflict cannot be to the same extent localised as 
on land between any two of them could not but 
seriously affect the prosperity of the others. * He 

* Cf. Idea for a Universal History, Prop. 8 ; Perpetual Peace, 
pp. 142, 157. 

60 Ptrpttual Peace 

clearly realised that the spirit of commerce was the 
strongest force in the service of the maintenance of 
peace, and that in it lay a guarantee of future union. 
This scheme of a federation of the nations of 
the world, in accordance with principles which 
would put an end to war between them, was one 
whose interest for Kant seemed to increase during 
the last twenty years of his life. * It was accord- 
ing to him an idea of reason, and, in his first essay 
on the subject that of 1784 we see the place this 
ideal of a perpetual peace held in the Kantian 
system of philosophy.- Its realisation is the realisa- 
tion of the highest good the ethical and political 
summum bonum, for here the aims of morals and 
politics coincide : only in a perfect development of 
his faculties in culture and in morals can man at 
last find true happiness. History is working towards 
the consummation of this end. A moral obligation 
lies on man to strive to establish conditions which 
bring its realisation nearer. It is the duty of statesmen 
to form a federative union as it was formerly the 
duty of individuals to enter the state. The moral 
law points the way here as clearly as in the sphere of 
pure ethics : " Thou can'st, therefore thou ought'st." 

The immediate stimulus to Kant's active interest in this 
subject as a practical question was the Peace of Basle (1795) which 
ended the first stag* in the series of wars which followed the 
French Ryoluiion, 

Translator's Introduction 6 1 

Let us be under no misapprehension as to Kant's 
attitude to the problem of perpetual peace. It is 
an ideal. He states plainly that he so regards it * 
and that as such it is unattainable. But this is the 
essence of all ideals : they have not the less value 
in shaping the life and character of men and nations 
on that account. They are not ends to be realised 
but ideas according to which we must live, regulative 
principles. We cannot, says Kant, shape our life 
better than in acting as if such ideas of reason 
have objective validity and there be an immortal 
life in which man shall live according to the laws 
of reason, in peace with his neighbour and in free- 
dom from the trammels of sense. 

Hence we are concerned here, not with an end, 
but with the means by which we might best set 
about attaining it, if it were attainable. This is 
the subject matter of the Treatise on Perpetual 
Peace (1/95), a less eloquent and less purely 
philosophical essay than that of 1784, but through- 
out more systematic and practical. We have to 
do, not with the favourite dream of philanthropists 
like St. Pierre and Rousseau, but with a statement 
of the conditions on the fulfilment of which 
the transition to a reign of peace and law 

* It is tine unausfuhrbabe /ato. See tk passage quoted from 
the Rtfhtsltkre, p. 129, note. 

62 Perpetual Peace 

The Conditions of the Realisation of the 
Kantian Ideal. 

These means are of two kinds. In the first place, 
what evils must we set about removing? What 
are the negative conditions? And, secondly, what 
are the general positive conditions which will make 
the realisation of this idea possible and guarantee 
the permanence of an international peace once 
attained? These negative and positive conditions 
Kant calls Preliminary and Definitive Articles 
respectively, the whole essay being carefully thrown 
into the form of a treaty. QThe Preliminary Articles 
of a treaty for perpetual peace are based on the 
principle that anything that hinders or threatens 
the peaceful co existence of nations must be 
abolished. These conditions have been classified 
by Kuno Fischer. Kant, he points out, * examines 
the principles of right governing the different sets 
of circumstances in which nations find themselves- 
namely, (a) while they are actually at war ; (b) when 
the time comes to conclude a treaty of peace ; (c) 
when they are living in a state of peace. The six 
Preliminary Articles fall naturally into these groups. 
War must not be conducted in such a manner as 
to increase national hatred and embitter a future 

* Gtschichte der tuueren Philosophic, (4th cd., 1899), Vol. V., I. 
Ch. 12, p. 1 68 seq. 

Translator's Introduction 63 

peace. (Art. 6.) * The treaty which brings hc/Stili- 
ties to an end must be concluded in an honest 
desire for peace. (Art. i.)f Again a nation, when in 
a state of peace, must do nothing to threaten the 
political independence of another nation or endanger 
its existence, thereby giving the strongest of all 
motives for a fresh war. A nation may commit 
this injury in two ways: (i) indirectly, by causing 
danger to others through the growth of its stand- 
ing army (Art. 3) always a menace to the state 
of peace or by any unusual war preparations : and 
(2) through too great a supremacy of another kind, 
by amassing money, the most powerful of all 
weapons in warfare. The National Debt (Art. 4) ** is 
another standing danger to the peaceful co-existence 
of nations. But, besides, -we have the danger of 
actual attack. There is no right of intervention 
between nations. (Art. 5.) ft Nor can states be in- 
herited or conquered (Art. 2), or in any way 
treated in a manner subversive of their indepen- 
dence and sovereignty as individuals. For a similar 
reason, armed troops cannot be hired and sold as 

* See p. 114. 

t See p. 107. 

See p. no. 

** See p. in. 

ft S p. ii 2. 

See p. i8. 

64 Perpetual Peace 

These then are the negative conditions of peace. * 
There are, besides, three positive conditions : 

* A large part of Kant's requirements as they art expressed iu 
these Preliminary Articles has already been fulfilled. The first 
(Art. l) is recognised in theory at least by modern international 
law. More cannot be said. A tre.ity of this kind is of necessity 
more or less forced by the stronger on the weaker. The formal 
ratification of peace in 1871 did not prevent France from longing 
for the day when she might win back Alsace-Lorraine and be 
revenged on Prussin. Not the treaty nor a consciousness of defeat 
has kept the peace west of the Rhine, but a reluctant respect for 
the fortress of Metz and the mighty army of united Germany. 

Articles a and 6 are already commonplaces of international law. 
Article 2 refers to practices which have not survived the gradual 
disappearance of dynastic war. Art 6 is the basis of our modem 
law of war. Art. 3 has been fulfilled in the literal sense that 
the standing armies composed of mercenary troops to which Kant 
alludes exist no longer. But it is to be feared that Kant would 
not think that we have made tilings much better, nor regard 
our present system of progressive armaments as a step in the 
direction of perpetual peace. Art. 4 is not likely to be fulfilled 
in the near future. It is long since Cobden denounced th 
institution of National Debts an institution which, as Kant point* 
out, owes its origin to the English, th "commercial people" 
referred to in the text. Art. 5 no doubt came to Kant through. 
Vattel. ''No nation," says the Swiss publicist, (Law of Nations t 
IL Ch. iv. 54) "has the least right to interfere with the government 
of another," unless, he adds, (Ch. v. \ 70) in a case of anarchy or 
where the well-being of the human race demands It. This is a 
recognised principle of modern international law. Intervention is 
held to be justifiable only where the obligation to respect another's 
freedom of action comes into conflict with the duty of self-preservation. 

Puffendorf leaves much more room for the exercise of bene- 
volence. The natural affinity and kinship ^between men is, 
says he, (Lts Devoirs eU Fkomme it du citoien, II. Ch. xvi. \ xi.) 
"a sufficient reason to authorise us to take up defence of every 
person whom one sees unjustly oppressed, when he implore* 
our aid and whm wt can do it conveniently" (The italics are 

Translator's Introduction 65 

(a) The intercourse of nations is to be confined to 
a right of hospitality. (Art. 3.) * There is nothing 
new to us in this assertion of a right of way. 
The right to free means of international com- 
munication has in the last hundred years become 
a commonplace of law. And the change has 
been brought about, as Kant anticipated, not 
through an abstract respect for the idea of right, 
but through the pressure of purely commercial 
interests. Since Kant's time the nations of Europe 
have all been more or less transformed from 
agricultural to commercial states whose interests 
run mainly in the same direction, whose existence 
and development depend necessarily upon "condi- 
tions of universal hospitality." Commerce depends 
upon this freedom of international intercourse, 
and on commerce mainly depends our hope of 

(b] The first Definitive Article f requires that the 
constitution of every state should be republican. 
What Kant understands by this term is that, in 
the state, law should rule above force and that its 

* See p. 137. The main principle involved in this passage comes 
from Vattel (e>p. eit., H Ch. viii. 104, 105: Ch. ix. 123, 125). 
A sovereign, he says, cannot object to a stranger entering his state 
who at the same time respects its laws. No one can be quite 
deprived of the right of way which has been handed down from 
the time when the whole earth was common to all men. 

f See p. 120. 


66 Ptrpttual Peace 

constitution should be a representative one, guar- 
anteeing public justice and based on the freedom 
and equality of its members and their mutual depen- 
dence on a common legislature. Kant's demand is 
independent of the form of the government. A 
constitutional monarchy like that of Prussia in the 
time of Frederick the Great, who regarded himself 
as the first servant of the state and ruled with the 
wisdom and forethought which the nation would 
have had the right to demand from such an one- 
such a monarchy is not in contradiction to the 
idea of a true republic. That the state should 
have a constitution in accordance with the princi- 
ples of right is the essential point. * To make 

* Kant believed that, in the newly formed constitution of the 
United States, his ideal with regard to the external forms of the 
state as conforming to the spirit of justice was most nearly realised. 
Professor Paulsen draws attention, in the following passage, to the 
fact that Kant held the English government of the eighteenth 
century in very low esteem. (fCanf, p. 357, note. See Eng. trans., 
p. 352, note.) It was not the English state, he says, which 
furnished Kant with an illustration of his theory : " Rather in it 
he sees a form of despotism only slightly veiled, not Parliamentary 
despotism, as some people have thought, but monarchical despotism. 
Through bribery of the Commons and .the Press, the King had 
actually absolute power, as was evident, above all, from the fact 
that he had often waged war without, and in defiance of, the will 
of the people. Kant has a very unfavourable opinion of the 
English state in every way. Among the collected notes written by 
him in the last ten years of the century and published by Reicke 
(Lose Blatter > I. 129) the following appears : 'The English nation 
(gens) regarded as a people (populus) and looked upon side by 
side with other races is, as a collection of individuals, of all 

Translator 's Introduction 67 

this possible, the law-giving power must lie with 
the representatives of the people : there must be a 
complete separation, such as Locke and Rousseau 
demand, between the legislature and executive. 
Otherwise we have despotism. Hence, while Kant 
admitted absolutism under certain conditions, he 
rejected democracy where, in his opinion, the mass 
of the people was despot. 

An internal constitution, firmly established on the 
principles of right, would not only serve to kill 
the seeds of national hatred and diminish the 
likelihood of foreign war. It would do more: it 
would destroy sources of revolution and discontent 
within the state. Kant, like many writers on this 
subject, does not directly allude to civil war * and 


mankind the most highly to be esteemed. But as a state, compared 
with other states, it is the most destructive, high-handed and 
tyrannical, and the most provocative of war among them all.'" 
Kuno Fischer (op. cit., Vol. V., I. Ch. II, pp. 150, 151) to 
whom Professor Paulsen's reference may here perhaps allude, states 
that Kant's objection to the English constitution is that it was 
an oligarchy, Parliament being not only a legislative body, but 
through its ministers also executive in the interests of the ruling 
party or even of private individuals in that party; " It seems more 
likely that what most offended a keen observer of the course of 
the American War of Independence was the arbitrary and ill- 
directed power of the king. But see the passage quoted by Fischer 
(pp. 152, 153) from the Rechtslehre (Part II. Sect. I.) which is, he 
says, unmistakeably directed against the English constitution and 
certain temporary conditions in the political history of the country. 

* St. Pierre actually thought that his federation would prevent 
civil war. See Project (1714), p. 16. 

Ptrpttual Peace 

the means by which it may be prevented or 
abolished. Actually to achieve this would be im- 
possible : it is beyond the power of either arbitration 
or disarmament. But in a representative government 
and the liberty of a people lie the greatest safe- 
guards against internal discontent. Civil peace and 
international peace must to a certain extent go 
hand in hand. 

We come now to the central idea of the treatise : 
(c) the law of nations must be based upon a federation 
of free states. (Art. 2.) * This must be regarded as 
the end to which mankind is advancing. The 
problem here is not out of many nations to make 
one. This would be perhaps the surest way to 
attain peace, but it is scarcely practicable, and, in 
certain forms, it is undesirable. Kant is inclined to 
approve of the separation of nations by language 
and religion, by historical and social tradition and 
physical boundaries: nature seems to condemn the 
idea of a universal monarchy, f The only footing 

* See p. 128. 

f This was the ideal of Daute. Cf. De Monq.rchia t Bk. I. 54 : 
"We shall not find at any tune estcept under the divine monarch 
Augustus, when a perfect monarchy existed, that the world was 
everywhere quiet." 

Bluntschli (Theory of ike St*tc t L Ch. ii., p. 26 J*f.) gives an 
admirable account of the different attempts made to realise a 
universal empire in the past the Empire of Alexander the Great, 
ba^4 upon a plan of uniting the races of east and west; the 
Roman Empire which sought vainly to stamp its national character 

Translator's Introduction 69 

on which a thorough-going, indubitable system of 
international law is in practice possible is that of 
the society of nations : not the world-republic * 
the Greeks dreamt of, but a federation of states. 
Such a union in the interests of perpetual peace 
between nations would be the "highest political 
good." The relation of the federated states to one 
another and to the whole would be fixed by cosmo- 
politan law : the link of self-interest which would 
bind them would again be the spirit of commerce. 
This scheme of a perpetual peace had not escaped 
ridicule in the eighteenth century: the name of 

upon mankind; the Prankish Monarchy; the Holy Roman Empire 
which fell to pieces through the want of a central power strong 
enough to overcome the tendency to separation and nationalisation ; 
and finally the attempt of Napoleon I., whose mistake was the 
same as that which wrecked the Roman Empire a neglect of the 
strength of foreign national sentiment. 

* Reason requires a State of nations. This is the ideal, and 
Kant's proposal of a federation of states is a practical substitute 
from which we may work to higher things. Kant, like Fichte, 
(\Verke, VII. 467) strongly disapproves of a unirersal monarchy 
such as that of which Dante dreamed a modern Roman Empire. 
The force of necessity, he says, will bring nations at last to become 
members of a cosmopolitan state, "or if such a state of universal 
peace proves (as has often been the case with too great states) a 
greater danger to freedom from another point of view, in that it 
introduces despotism of the most terrible kind, then this same 
necessity must compel the nations to enter a state which indeed 
has the form not of a cosmopolitan commonweath under one 
sovereign, but of a federation regulated by legal principles determined 
by a common code of international law.'. 1 (Das mag in d. Theorit 
richtig stift, Wetkt, (Rosenkranz) VII., p. 225). Cf. also Thtory cf 
F.tkics, (Abbott), p. 341, note,' Ptrpttual Pt<ut, pp. 155, 156. 

70 Perpetual Peace 

Kant protected it henceforth. The facts of history, 
even more conclusively than the voices of philo- 
sophers, soldiers and princes, show how great has 
been the progress of this idea in recent years. 
But it has not gained its present hold upon the 
popular mind without great and lasting opposition. 
Indeed we have here what must still be regarded 
as a controversial question. There have been, 
and are still, men who regard perpetual peace 
as a state of things as undesirable as it is un- 
attainable. For such persons, war is a necessity 
of our civilisation: it is impossible that it should 
ever cease to exist. All that we can do, and 
there is no harm, nor any contradiction in the 
attempt, is to make wars shorter, fewer and more 
humane : the whole question, beyond this, is without 
practical significance. Others, on the other hand, 
and these perhaps more thoughtful regard war as 
hostile to culture, an evil of the worst kind, although 
a necessary evil. In peace, for them, lies the true 
ideal of humanity, although in any perfect form this 
cannot be realised in the near future. The extreme 
forms of these views are to be sought in what has 
been called in Germany ^." the philosophy of the 
barracks " which comes forward with a glorification of 
war for its own sake, and in the attitude of modern 
Peace Societies which denounce all war wholesale, 
without respect of causes or conditions. 

Translators Introduction 71 

Hegel, Schil^r and Moltke. 

Hegel, the greatest of the champions of war, 
would have nothing to do with Kant's federation 
of nations formed in the interests of peace. The 
welfare of a state, he held, is its own highest 
law ; and he refused to admit that this welfare 
was to be sought in an international peace. Hegel 
lived in an age when all power and order seemed 
to lie with the sword. Something of the charm 
of Napoleonism seems to hang over him. He 
does not go the length of writers like Joseph 
de Maistre, who see in war the finger of God or 
an arrangement for the survival of the fittest a 
theory, as far as regards individuals, quite in 
contradiction with the real facts, which show that 
it is precisely the physically unfit whom war, 
as a method of extermination, cannot reach. But, 
like Schiller and Moltke, Hegel sees in war an 
educative instrument, developing virtues in a 
nation which could not be fully developed other- 
wise, (much as pain and suffering bring patience 
and resignation and other such qualities into play 
in the individual), and drawing the nation together, 
making each citizen conscious of his citizenship, as 
no other influence can. War, he holds, leaves a 
nation always stronger than it was before ; it buries 
causes of inner dissension, and consolidates the 

7 2 Perpetual Peace 

internal power of the state. *> No other trial can, 
in the same way, show what is the real strength 
and weakness of a nation, what it ts, not 
merely materially, but physically, intellectually 
and morally. 

With this last statement most people will be 
inclined to agree. There is only a part of the 
truth in Napoleon's dictum that " God is on the 
side of the biggest battalions " ; or in the old saying 
that war requires three necessaries in the first 
place, money; in the second place, money; and in 
the third, money. Money is a great deal : it is a 
necessity; but what we call national back-bone 
and character is more. So far we are with 
Hegel. But he goes further. In peace, says he, 
mankind would grow effeminate and degenerate in 
luxury. This opinion was expressed in forcible 
language in his own time by Schilier,t and in more 

See the Philosophic <t. R t cktt t (K'trke, Vol. VHJ.) Part iti. 
324 and appendix. 

f Cf. Die Braut von Mtssina.- 

"Denn der Mensch verkiimmert im Frieden, 
Miissige Ruh' 1st das Grab des Muths. 
Das Gesetz ist der Freund des Schwachen, 
Alles will es nur eben machen, 
Mochte gerne die Welt verflachen; 
Aber der Krieg lasst die Kraft erscheinen, 
Alles erhebt er sum Ungemeinen, 
Selber dem Feigen erzeugt er den Muth." 

Thii passage perhaps scarcely give* a fair repr*entatiom of 
Schiller's views on the question, which, if wo jdg from Wilhtlm 

Translator's Introduction 73 

recent years by Count Moltke. " Perpetual peace," 
says a letter of the great general,* "is a dream 
and not a beautiful dream either : war is part of 
the divine order of the world. During war are 
developed the noblest virtues which belong to man 
courage and self-denial, fidelity to duty and the 
spirit of self-sacrifice : the soldier is called upon 
to risk his life. Without war the world would 
sink in materialism." f "Want and misery, disease, 
suffering and war," he says elsewhere, "are all 

TV//, must have been very moderate. War he says, in this oft- 
quoted passage, is sometimes a necessity. There is a limit to the 
power of tyranny and, when the burden becomes unbearable, an 
appeal to Heaven and the sword. 
Wilhelm Tell: Act. II. Sc. 2. 

"Nein, eine Grenze hat Tyrannenmacht. 
Weun der Gedriickte nirgends Recht kanfi. ftnden, 
Wenn unertraglich wird die Last greift er 
Hinauf getrosten Muthes in den Himmel 
Und holt herunter seine ew'gen Rechte, 
Die droben hangen unverausserlich 
Und unzerbrechlich, wie die Sterne selbst 
Der alte Urstand der Natur kehrt wieder. 
Wo Mensch dem Menschen gegenuber iteht 
Zum letzten Mittel, wenn kein andres mehr 
Verfangen will, 1st ihm das Schwert gegeben." 
* Letter to Bluntschli, dated Berlin, nth Dec., 1880 (published 
in Bluntschli's Gesammelte Kleine Schriften, Vol. II., p. 271). 

f Cf. Tennyson's Maud: Part I., vi. and xiii. 
"Why do they prate of the blessings of Peace? we have made 

them a curse, 

Pickpockets, each hand lusting for all that is not its own; 
And lust of gain, In the spirit of Cain, is it better or worse 
Than the hart of the citiien hissing in war om his OWE 


74 Perpetual Peace 

given elements in the Divine order of the uni- 
verse." Moltke's eulogy of war, however, is some- 
what modified by his additional statement that 
"the greatest kindness in war lies in its being 
quickly ended." (Letter to Bluntschli, nth Dec., 

For I trust if an enemy's fleet came yonder round by the hill, 
And the rushing battle-bolt sang from the three-decker out of 

the foam, 
That the tmooth-faced snub-nosed rogue would leap from his 

counter and till, 
And strike, if he could, were it but with his cheating yardwand, 


See too Part I1T., ii. and iv. 

"And it was but a dream, yet it lighten'd my despair 
When I thought that a war would arise in defence of the right, 
That an iron tyranny now should bend or cease, 
The glory of manhood stand on his ancient height, 
Nor Britain's one sole God be the millionaire: 
No more shall commerce be all in all, and Peace 
Pipe on her pastoral hillock a languid note, 
And watch her harvest ripen, her herd increase, 
Nor the cannon-bullet rest on a slothful shore, 
And the cobweb woven across the cannon's throat 
Shall shake its threaded tears in the wind no more. 

Let it go or stay, so I wake to the higher aims 

Of a land that has lost for a little her lust of gold, 

And love of a peace that was full of wrongs and shame*, 

Horrible, hateful, monstrous, not to be told; & 

And hail once more to the banner of battle unroll'd! 

Tho' many a light shall darken, and many shall weep 

For those that are crush'd in the clash of jarring claims, 

For God's just wrath shall be wreak'd on a giant liar; 

And many a darkness into the light shall leap, 

And shine in the sudden making of splendid names, 

And noble thought be freer under the sun, 

And the heart of a people beat with one desire." 

Translator s Introduction 75 

1880.) * The great forces which we recognise as 
factors in the moral regeneration of mankind are 
always slow of action as they are sure. War, if 
too quickly over, could not have the great moral 
influence which has been attributed to it. The 
explanation may be that it is not all that it naturally 
appears to a great and successful general. Hegel, 
Moltke, Trendelenburg, Treitschke f and the others 
not Schiller who was able to sing the blessings of 
peace as eloquently as of war were apt to forget 
that war is as efficient a school for forming vices as 
virtues; and that, moreover, those virtues which 
military life is said to cultivate courage, self-sacri- 
fice and the rest can be at least as perfectly 
developed in other trials. There are in human life 
dangers every day bravely met and overcome which 
are not less terrible than those which face the soldier, 
in whom patriotism may be less a sentiment than a 
duty, and whose cowardice must be dearly paid. 

War under Altered Conditions. 

The Peace Societies of our century, untiring 
supporters of a point of view diametrically opposite 

* Moltke strangely enough was, at an earlier period, of the 
opinion that war, even when it is successful, is a national mis- 
fortune. Cf. Kehrbach's preface to Kant's essay, Zum Ewtge* 
Frieden, p. XVII. 

t See his discussion on constitutional monarchy in Germany. 
(Hist. u. Pol. Au/sM*f, Bd. III., p. 533 stq.) 

See Du Piccokmlni: Act. I. Sc. 4. 

76 Perpetual Peace 

to that of Hegel, owe their existence in the first 
place to new ideas on the subject of the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of war, which again 
were partly due to changes in the character of war 
itself, partly to a new theory that the warfare of 
the future should be a war of free competition for 
industrial interests, or, in Herbert Spencer's language, 
that the warlike type of mankind should make 
room for an industrial type. This theory, amounting 
in the minds of some thinkers to a fervid conviction, 
and itself, in a sense, the source of what has been 
contemptuously styled our British "shopkeeper's 
policy" in Europe, was based on something more 
solid than mere enthusiasm. The years of peace 
which followed the downfall of Napoleon had brought 
immense increase in material wealth to countries 
like France and Britain. Something of the glamour 
had fallen away from the sword of the great Emperor. 
The illusive excitement of a desire for conquest had 
died: the glory of war had faded with it, but the 
burden still remained : its cost was still there, some- 
thing to be calmly reckoned up and not soon 
to be forgotten. Europe was seen to be actually 
moving towards ruin. v"We shall have to get rid 
of war in all civilised countries," said Louis Philippe 
in 1843. "Soon no nation will be able to afford 
it." War was not only becoming more costly. 
New conditions had altered it in other directions. 

Translator's Introduction 

With the development of technical science and its 
application to the perfecting of methods and in- 
struments of destruction every new war was found 
to be bloodier than the last; and the day seemed 
to be in sight, when this very development would 
make war (with instruments of extermination) im- 
possible altogether. The romance and picturesque- 
ness with which it was invested in the days of 
hand-to-hand combat was gone. But, above all, 
war was now waged for questions fewer and more 
important than in the time of Kant. Napoleon's 
successful appeal to the masses had suggested to 
Prussia the idea of ^consciously nationalising the 
army. Our modern national wars exact a sacrifice, 
necessarily much more heavy, much more reluctantly 
made than those of the past which were fought 
with mercenary troops. Such wars have not only 
greater dignity: they are more earnest, and their 
issue, as in a sense the issue of conflict between 
higher and lower types of civilisation, is speedier 
and more decisive. 

In the hundred years since Kant's death, much 
that he prophesied has come to pass, although 
sometimes by different paths than he anticipated. 
The strides made in recent years by commerce 
and the growing power of the people in every 
state have had much of the influence which he 
foretold. There is a greater reluctance to wage 

78 Pirpttual Peace 

war. * But, unfortunately, as Professor Paulsen 
points out, the progress of democracy and the 
nationalisation of war have not worked merely in 
the direction of progress towards peace. War has 
now become popular for the first time. "The 
progress of democracy in states," he says, (Kant, 
p. 364!) "has not only not done away with war, 
but has very greatly changed the feeling of people 
towards it. With the universal military service, 
introduced by the Revolution, war has become the 
people's affair and popular, as it could not be in 
the case of dynastic wars carried on with mercenary 
troops." In the people the love of peace is strong, 
but so too is the love of a fight, the love of victory. 
It is in the contemplation of facts and conflicting 
tendencies like these that Peace Societies have 
been formed. The peace party is, we may say, 
an eclectic body : it embraces many different sections 
of political opinion. There are those who hold, for 
instance, that peace is to be established on a basis 
of communism of property. There are others who 
insist on the establishment throughout Europe of a 
republican form of government, or again, on a 

* An admirable short account of popular feeling on this matter 
is to be found in Lawrence's Principles of International Law, 240. 

f The first Peace Society was founded in London in 1816, and 
the first International Peace Congress held in 1843. 

In Eng. trans, see p. 358. 

Translators Introduction 79 

redistribution of European territory in which Alsace- 
Lorraine is restored to France changes of which 
at least the last two would be difficult to carry 
out, unless through international warfare. But 
these are not the fundamental general principles of 
peace workers. The members of this party agree 
in rejecting the principle of intervention, in demand- 
ing a complete or partial disarmament of the nations 
of Europe, and in requiring that all disputes between 
nations and they admit the prospects of dispute 
should be settled by means of arbitration. In how 
far are these principles useful or practicable? 

The Value of Arbitration. 

There is a strong feeling in favour of arbitration 
on the part of all classes of society. It is cheaper 
under all circumstances than war. It is a judgment 
at once more certain and more complete, excluding 
as far as possible the element of chance, leaving 
irritation perhaps behind it, but none of the 
lasting bitterness which is the legacy of every 
war. Arbitration has an important place in all 
peace projects except that of Kant, whose federal 
union would naturally fulfil the function of a tribu- 
nal of arbitration. St. Pierre, Jeremy Bentham, * 

* See "A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace" in the 
Principles of International Law ( Works, Vol. 11). One of the main 
principles advocated by Bentham in this essay (written between 
1787 and 1789) is that every state should give up its colonies. 

80 Perpetual Peace 

Bluntschli* the German publicist, Professor Lorimerf 
and others among political writers, and among 
rulers, Louis Napoleon and the Emperor Alexan- 
der I. of Russia, have all made proposals more 
or less ineffectual for the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes. A number of cases have 
already been decided by this means. But let us 
examine the questions which have been at issue. 
Of a hundred and thirty matters of dispute settled 
by arbitration since 1815 (cf. International Tri- 
bunals, published by the Peace Society, 1899) it 
will be seen that all, with the exception of one or 
two trifling cases of doubt as to the succession to 
certain titles or principalities, can be classified 
roughly under two heads disputes as to the deter- 
mination of boundaries or the possession of certain 
territory, and questions of claims for compensation 
and indemnities due either to individuals or states, 
arising from the seizure of fleets or merchant ves- 
sels, the insult or injury to private persons and so 
on briefly, questions of money or of territory. 

* See his KUine Sckriften. 

f Institutes of the Law of Nations (1884), Vol. H, Ch. XIV. 

John Stuart Mill holds that the multiplication of federal unions 
would be a benefit to the world. [See his Considerations on 
Representative Government (1865), Ch. XVII., where he discusses 
the conditions necessary to render such unions successful.] But the 
Peace Society is scarcely justified, on the strength of what is here, 
in including Mill among writers who have made definite proposals 
of peace or federation. (See Inter. Trib.) 

Translator's Introduction 8 1 

These may fairly be said to be trifling causes, not 
touching national honour or great political questions. 
That they should have been settled in this way, 
however, shows a great advance. Smaller causes 
than these have made some of the bloodiest wars 
in history. That arbitration should have been the 
means of preventing even one war which would 
otherwise have been waged is a strong reason why 
we should fully examine its claims. "Quand Tin- 
stitution d'une haute cour," writes Laveleye, (Des 
causes actu files de guerre en Europe et de V arbitrage] 
" n'eviterait qu'une guerre sur vingt, il vaudrait 
encore la peine de 1'e'tablir." But history shows 
us that there is no single instance of a supreme 
conflict having been settled otherwise than by war. 
Arbitration is a method admirably adapted to cer- 
tain cases : to those we have named, where it has 
been successfully applied, to the interpretation of 
contracts, to offences against the Law of Nations- 
some writers say to trivial questions of honour 
in all cases where the use of armed force would 
be impossible, as, for instance, in any quarrel in 
which neutralised countries-* like Belgium or Luxem- 
bourg should take a principal part, or in a dif- 
ference between two nations, such as (to take an 
extreme case) the United States and Switzerland, 

* Set what Lawrence says (op ctt., 241) of neutralisation mid 
the limits of its utful*ft as a remedy for war. 


82 Perpetual Peace 

which could not easily engage in actual combat. 
These cases, which we cannot too carefully examine, 
show that what is here essential is that it should 
be possible to formulate a juridical statement of 
the conflicting claims. In Germany the Bundestag 
had only power to decide questions of law. Other 
disputes were left to be fought out. Questions on 
which the existence and vital honour of a state 
depend any question which nearly concerns the 
disputants cannot be reduced to any cut and dry 
legal formula of right and wrong. We may pass 
over the consideration that in some cases (as in 
the Franco-Prussian War) the delay caused by seeking 
mediation of any kind would deprive a nation of 
the advantage its state of military preparation 
deserved. And we may neglect the problem of 
finding an impartial judge on some questions of 
dispute, although its solution might be a matter of 
extreme difficulty, so closely are the interests of 
modern nations bound up in one another. How 
could the Eastern Question, for example, be settled 
by arbitration ? It is impossible that such a means 
should be sufficient for every case. Arbitration in 
other words may prevent war, but can never be a 
substitute for war. We cannot wonder that this is 
so. So numerous and conflicting are the interests 
of states, so various are the grades of civilisation 
to which they have attained and the directions 

Translator's Introduction 83 

along which they are developing, that differences 
of the most vital kind are bound to occur and 
these can never be settled by any peaceful means 
at present known to Europe. This is above all 
true where the self-preservation * or independence 
of a people are concerned. Here the "good-will" 
of the nations who disagree would necessarily be 
wanting: there could be no question of the arbi- 
tration of an outsider. 

But, indeed, looking away from questions so vital 
and on which there can be little difference of 
opinion, we are apt to forget, when we allow 
ourselves to talk extravagantly of the future of 
arbitration, that every nation thinks, or at least 
pretends to think, that it is in the right in every 
dispute in which it appears (cf. Kant: Perpetual 
Peace, p. 120.): and, as a matter of history, there 

* Montesquieu: Esprit des Lois, X. Ch. 2. " The life of govern- 
ments is like that of man. The latter has a right to kill in case 
of natural defence : the former have a right to wage war for their 
own preservation." 

See also Vattel (Law of Nations, II. Ch. XVTIL 332): 'But 
if anyone would rob a nation of one of her essential rights, or a 
right without which she could not hope to support her national 
existence, if an ambitious neighbour threatens the liberty of a 
republic, if he attempts to subjugate and enslave her, she will 
take counsel only from her own courage. She will not even 
attempt the method of conferences, in the case of a contention so 
odious as this. She will, in such a quarrel, exert her utmost efforts, 
exhaust every resource and lavish her blood to the last drop if 
necessary. To listen to the slightest proposal in a matter of this 
kind 13 to risk vrything." 

84 Perpetual 

has never been a conflict between civilised states 
in which an appeal to this " right" on the part of 
each has not been made. We talk glibly of the 
right and wrong of this question or of that, of the 
justice of this war, the iniquity of that. But what 
do these terms really mean ? Do we know, in spite 
of the labour which has been spent on this question 
by the older publicists, which are the causes that 
justify a war? Is it not true that the same war 
might be just in one set of circumstances and unjust 
in another ? Practically all writers on this subject, 
exclusive of those who apply the biblical doctrine 
of non-resistance, agree in admitting that a natioa 
is justified in defending its own existence or in- 
dependence, that this is even a moral duty as it is a 
fundamental right of a state. Many, especially the 
older writers, make the confident assertion that all 
wars of defence are just. But will this serve as a 
standard? Gibbon tells us somewhere, that Livy 
asserts that the Romans conquered the world in 
self-defence. The distinction between wars of ag- 
gression and defence is one very difficult to draw. 
The cause of a nation which waits to be actually 
attacked is often lost: the critical moment in iti 
defence may be past. The essence of a state's 
defensive power may lie in a readiness to strike the 
first blow, or its whole interests may be bound up 
in the necessity of fighting the matUr out in it* 

Translator's Introduction 8$ 

tnemy'a country, rather than at home. It is not 
in the strictly military interpretation of the term 
"defensive", but in its wider ethical and political 
ense that we can speak of wars of defence as just. 
But, indeed, we cannot judge these questions 
abstractly. Where a war is necessary, it matters 
very little whether it is just or not. Only the 
judgment of history can finally decide; and gener- 
ally it seems at the time that both parties have 
something of right on their side, something perhaps 
too of wrong. * 

* The difficulties in the way of hard and fast judgments on a 
complicated problem of this kind are convincingly demonstrated 
in ft recent tssay by Professor D. G. Ritchie (Studies in Political 
and Social EtMct. Sonnenschein, 1902). Professor Ritchie considers 
in detail a number of concrete cases which occurred in the century 
between 1770 and 1870. "Let any one take the judgments he 
would pass on these or any similarly varied cases, and I think he 
will find that we do not restrict our approval to wars of self- 
defence, that we do not approve self-defence under all circum- 
stances, that there are some cases in which we approve of absorption 
of smaller states by larger, that there are cases in which we excuse 
intervention of third parties in quarrels with which at first they 
had nothing to do, and that we sometimes approve war even when 
begun without the authority of any already existing sovereign. 
Can any principles be found underlying such judgments? In the 
first place we ought not to disguise from ourselves the fact that 
our judgments after the result are based largely on success. . - . . . 
I think it will be found that our judgments on the wars of the 
century from 1770 to 1870 turn very largely on the question, Which 
of the conflicting forces was making for constitutional government and 
for social progress ? or, to put it in wider terms, Which represented 
the higher civilisation? And thus it is that we may sometimes 
approve the rise of a new state and sometimes the absorption of 
n old." (Of. cit., pp. 152, 155.) 

86 Perpetual Peace 

A consideration of difficulties like these brings 
us to a realisation of the fact that the chances are 
small that a nation, in the heat of a dispute, will 
admit the likelihood of its being in the wrong. 
To refuse to admit this is generally tantamount to 
a refusal to submit the difficulty to arbitration. 
And neither international law, nor the moral force 
of public opinion can induce a state to act contrary 
to what it believes to be its own interest. More- 
over, as international law now stands, it is not a 
duty to have recourse to arbitration. This was 
made quite clear in the proceedings of the Peace 
Conference at the Hague in 1899. * It was strongly 
recommended that - arbitration should be sought 
wherever it was possible, but, at the same time 
definitely stated, that this course could in no case 
be compulsory. In this respect things have not 
advanced beyond the position of the Paris Congress 
of 1856.1 The wars waged in Europe subsequent 
to that date, have all been begun without previous 
attempt at mediation. 

But the work of the peace party regarding the 

* See Fred. W. Holls: The Peace Conference at the Hague, 
Macmillan, 1900. 

f The feeling of the Congress expressed itself thus cautiously : 
" Messieurs les plnipotentiaires n'hesitent pas a exprimer, au nom 
de leur gouvernements, le voeu, que les Etats entre lesquels 
s'elverait un dissentiment serieux, avail t d'en appeler aux armes, 
eussent recours, en tant que les circonstances I'admeUraient, aux 
bons offices d'une puissance amie." 

Translator's Introduction 87 

humaner methods of settlement is not to be 
neglected. The popular feeling which they have 
been partly the means of stimulating has no doubt 
done something to influence the action of statesmen 
towards extreme caution in the treatment of ques- 
tions likely to arouse national passions and preju- 
dices. Arbitration has undoubtedly made headway 
in recent years. Britain and America, the two 
nations whose names naturally suggest themselves 
to us as future centres of federative union, both 
countries whose industrial interests are numerous 
and complicated, have most readily, as they have 
most frequently, settled disputes in this practical 
manner. It has shown itself to be a policy as 
economical as it is business-like, -its value, in its 
proper place, cannot be overrated by any Peace 
Congress or by any peace pamphlet; but we have 
endeavoured to make it clear that this sphere is 
but a limited one. The "good-will" may not be 
there when it ought perhaps to appear: it will 
certainly not be there when any vital interest is at 
stake. But, even if this were not'so and arbitration 
were the natural sequence of every dispute, no 
coercive force exists to enforce the decree of the 
court. The moral restraint of public opinion is 
here a poor substitute. Treaties, it is often said, 
are in the same position; but treaties have been 
broken, and will no doubt be broken again. We 

38 Ptrpttutl Ptace 

are moved to the conclusion that a thoroughly 
logical peace programme cannot stop short of the 
principle of federation. Federal troops are neces- 
sary to carry out the decrees of a tribunal of 
arbitration, if that court is not to run a risk of 
being held feeble and ineffectual. Except on some 
such basis, arbitration, as a substitute for war, stands 
on but a weak footing. 


The efforts of the Peace Society are directed with 
even less hope of complete success against another 
evil of our time, the crushing burden of modern 
armaments. We have peace at this moment, but 
at a daily increasing cost. The Peace Society is 
rightly concerned in pressing this point. It is not 
enough to keep off actual war: there is a limit to 
the price we can afford to pay even for peace. 
Probably no principle has cost Europe so much 
in the last century as that handed down from 
Rome: "Si vis pacem, pare bellum." It is now a 
hundred and fifty years since Montesquieu * protested 

* Esprit des Lois, XJ3I. Chap. 17. "A new distemper ha* 
spread itself over Europe : it has infected our princes, and induces 
them to keep up an exorbitant number of troops. It has its 
redoublings, and of necessity becomes contagious. For as soon 
as one prince augments v,hat he calls his troops, the rest of course 
do the same: so that nothing is gained thereby but the public 

Translator's Introduction 89 

against this " new distemper " which was spreading 
itself over Europe ; but never, in time of peace, has 
complaint been so loud or so general as now : and 
this, not only against the universal burden of 
taxation which weighs upon all nations alike, but, 
in continental countries, against the waste of pro- 
ductive force due to compulsory military service, 
a discontent which seems to strike at the very 
foundations of society. Vattel relates that in early 
times a treaty of peace generally stipulated that 
both parties should afterwards disarm. And there 
is no doubt that Kant was right in regarding 
standing armies as a danger to peace, not only as 
openly expressing the rivalry and distrust between 
nation and nation which Hobbes regards as the 
basis of international relations, but also as putting 
a power into the hand of a nation which it may 
some day have the temptation to abuse. A war- 
loving, overbearing spirit in a people thrives none 
the worse for a consciousness that its army or 
navy can hold its own with any other in Europe. 
Were it not the case that the essence of armed 
peace is that a high state of efficiency should be 

ruin. Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot as if his 
people wer in danger of being exterminated: and they give th 
name of Peace to this general effort of all against all." 

Montesquieu is of course writing in the days of mercenary troopb; 
but the cost to the nation of our modern armies, both ia time f 
peace and of war, is incomparably greater. 

Perpetual Peace 

general, the danger to peace would be very great 
indeed. No doubt it is due to this fact that France 
has kept quietly to her side of the Rhine during 
the last thirty years. The annexation of Alsace- 
Lorraine was an immediate stimulus to the increase 
of armaments; but otherwise, just because of this 
greater efficiency and the slightly stronger military 
position of Germany, it has been an influence on 
the side of peace. 

The Czar's Rescript of 1898 gave a new stimulus 
to an interest in this question which the subsequent 
conference at the Hague was unable fully to satisfy. 
We are compelled to consider carefully how a 
process of simultaneous disarmament can actually 
be carried out, and what results might be antici- 
pated from this step, with a view not only to the 
present but the future, Can this be done in 
accordance with the principles of justice ? Organi- 
sations like a great navy or a highly disciplined 
army have been built up, in the course of centuries, 
at great cost and at much sacrifice to the nation. 
They are the fruit of years of wise government 
and a high record of national industry. Are such 
visible tokens of the culture and character and 
worth of a people to be swept away and Britain, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey to stand on 
the same level? And, even if no such ethical 
considerations should arise, on what method are 

Translator s Introduction 91 

we to proceed? The standard as well as the 
nature of armament depends in every state on 
its geographical conditions and its historical 
position. An ocean-bound empire like Britain 
is comparatively immune from the danger of 
invasion : her army can be safely despatched to 
the colonies, her fleet protects her at home, her 
position is one of natural defence. But Germany 
and Austria find themselves in exactly opposite 
circumstances, with the hard necessity imposed 
upon them of guarding their frontiers on every 
side. The safety of a nation like Germany is 
in the hands of its army: its military strength 
lies in an almost perfect mastery of the science 
of attack. 

The Peace Society has hitherto made no 
attempt to face the difficulties inseparable from 
any attempt to apply a uniform method of 
treatment to peculiarities and conditions so con- 
flicting and various as these. Those who have 
been more conscientious have not been very 
successful in solving them. Indeed, so con- 
stantly is military technique changing that it 
is difficult to prophesy wherein will lie, a few 
years hence, the essence of a state's defensive 
power or what part the modern navy will play 
in this defence. No careful thinker would sug- 
gest, in the face of dangers threatening from the 

Ptrprtual Ptace 

East, * a complete disarmament. The simplest of 
many suggestions made but this on the basis of 
universal conscription - seems to be that the number 
of years or months of compulsory military service 
should be reduced to some fixed period. But this 
does not touch the difficulty of colonial empires f 
like Britain which might to a certain extent disarm, 
like their neighbours, in Europe, but would be 
compelled to keep an army for the defence of their 
colonies elsewhere. It is, in the meantime, inevit- 
able that Europe should keep up a high standard 
of armament this is, (and even if we had European 
federation, would remain) an absolute necessity as 
a protection against the yellow races, and in Europe 
itself there are at present elements hostile to the 
cause of peace. - Alsace-Lorraine, Polish Prussia, 
Russian Poland and Finland are still, to a considerable 
degree, sources of discontent and dissatisfaction. But 
in Russia itself lies the great obstacle to a future 
European peace or European federation : we can 
scarcely picture Russia as a reliable member of 
such a union. That Russia should disarm is scarcely 

* Even St. Pierre was alive to this danger (Projet, Art. VIII: in 
the English translation of 1714, p. 160): "The European Union 
thall endeavour to obtain in Asia, a permanent society like that of 
Europe, that Peace may be maintaiu'd There also; and especially 
that it may have no cause to fear any Asiatic Sovereign, either 
as to its tranquillity, or its Commerce in Asia" 

f Beutham's suggestion, would b useful here ! See bore, p. 79, 

Translators Introduction 93 

feasible, in view of its own interest : it has always 
to face the danger of rebellion in Poland and 
anarchy at home. But that Europe should disarm, 
before Russia has attained a higher civilisation, a 
consciousness of its great future as a north eastern, 
inter-oceanic empire, and a government more favour- 
able to the diffusion of liberty, is still less practic- 
able. * We have here to fall back upon federation 
again. It is not impossible that, in the course of 
time, this problem may be solved and that the 
contribution to the federal troops of a European 
union may be regulated upon some equitable basis 
the form of which we cannot now well prophesy. 
European federation would likewise meet all 
difficulties where a risk might be likely to occur 
of one nation intervening to protect another. As 
we have said (above, p. 64, note] nations are 
now-a-days slow to intervene in the interests of 
humanity: they are in general constrained to do 
so only by strong motives of self-interest, and when 
these are not at hand they are said to refrain from 
respect for another's right of independent action. 
Actually a state which is actuated by less selfish 
impulses is apt to lose considerably more than it 

* The best thing for Europe might be that Russia (prhaps 
including China) should be regarded as a serious danger by all 
the civilised power* of the West. That would bring us nearer to 
tht United States of Europe and America (for th United State, 
America, is Russia's neighbour on the East) than anythiag else. 

94 Perpetual Peace 

gains, and the feeling of the people expresses 
itself strongly against any quixotic or sentimental 
policy. It is not impossible that the Powers may 
have yet to intervene to protect Turkey against 
Russia. Such a step might well be dictated purely 
by a proper care for the security of Europe; but 
wars of this kind seem not likely to play an im- 
portant part in the near future. 

We have said that the causes of difference which 
may be expected to disturb the peace of Europe 
are now fewer. A modern sovereign no longer spends 
his leisure time in the excitement of slaying or 
seeing slain. He could not, if he would. His honour 
and his vanity are protected by other means : they 
play no longer an important part in the affairs of 
nations. The causes of war can no more be either 
trifling or personal. Some crises there are, which 
are ever likely to be fatal to peace. There present 
themselves, in the lives of nations, ideal ends for 
which everything must be sacrificed : there are rights 
which must at all cost be defended. The question 
of civil war we may neglect: liberty and wise 
government are the only - medicine for social dis- 
content, and much may be hoped from that in the 
future. But now, looking beyond the state to the 
great family of civilised nations, we may say that 
the one certain cause of war between them or of 
rebellion within a future federated union will be a 

Translator s Introduction 95 

menace to the sovereign rights, the independence 
and existence of any member of that federation. 
Other causes of quarrel offer a more hopeful pro- 
spect. Some questions have been seen to be speci- 
ally fitted for the legal procedure of a tribunal of 
arbitration, others to be such as a federal court 
would quickly settle. The preservation of the 
balance of power which Frederick the Great 
regarded as the talisman of peace in Europe a 
judgment surely not borne out by experience is 
happily one of the causes of war which are of the 
past. Wars of colonisation, such as would be an 
attempt on the part of Russia to conquer India, 
seem scarcely likely to recur except between higher 
and lower races. The cost is now-a-days too great. 
Political wars, wars for national union and unity, 
of which there were so many during the past 
century, seem at present not to be near at hand; 
and the integration of European nations what may 
be called the great mission of war is, for the 
moment, practically complete; for it is highly 
improbable that either Alsace-Lorraine or Poland 
still less Finland will be the cause of a war of 
this kind. 

Our hope lies in a federated Europe. Its troops 
would serve to preserve law and order in the 
country from which they were drawn and to protect 
its eoloniei abroad ; but their higher function would 

96 Perpetual Peace 

be to keep peace in Europe, to protect the weaker 
members of the Federation and to enforce the decision 
of the majority, either, if necessary, by actual war, 
or by the mere threatening demonstrations of fleets, 
such as have before proved effectual. 

We have carefully considered what has been 
attempted by peace workers, and we have now to 
take note that all the results of the last fifty years 
are not to be attributed to their conscientious but 
often ill-directed labour. The diminution of the 
causes of war is to be traced less to the efforts of 
the Peace Society, (except indirectly, in so far as 
they have influenced the minds of the masses) than 
to the increasing power of the people themselves. 
The various classes of society are opposed to vio- 
lent methods of settlement, not in the main from 
a conviction as to the wrongfulness of war or from 
any fanatical enthusiasm for a brotherhood of 
nations, but from self-interest. War is death to 
the industrial interests of a nation. It is vain to 
talk, in the language of past centuries, of trade 
between civilised countries being advanced and 
markets opened up or enlarged by this mean*. * 

* Trad in barbarous or savage countries is still increased by 
war, especially on the French and German plan which leaves no 
open door to other nations. Here the trade follows the flag. And war, 
of course, among civilised races causes small nationi to disappear 
and thtir tariffs with them. This is beneficial to tradt, but to a 
degree so trifling that it may bere bt neglected. 

Translator's Introduction 97 

Kings give up the dream of military glory and 
accept instead the certainty of peaceful labour 
and industrial progress, and all this (for we may 
believe that to some monarchs it is much) from 
no enthusiastic appreciation of the efforts of Peace 
Societies, from no careful examination of the 
New Testament nor inspired interpretation of its 
teaching. It is self-interest, the prosperity of the 
country patriotism, if you will that seems better 
than war. 

What may be expected from Federation. 

Federation and federation alone can help out 
the programme of the Peace Society. It cannot 
be pretended that it will do everything. To state 
the worst at once, it will not prevent war. Even 
the federations of the states of Germany and 
America, bound together by ties of blood and 
language and, in the latter case, of sentiment, 
were not strong enough within to keep out dissen- 
sion and disunion. * Wars would not cease, but 
they would become much less frequent. "Why is 
there no longer war between England and Scot- 
land? Why did Prussian and Hanoverian fight 
side by side in 1870, though they had fought 

* Cf. also the civil war of 1847 in Switzerland. 

98 Perpetual Peace 

against each other only four years before ? . . . If 
we wish to know how war is to cease, we should 
ask ourselves how it has ceased " (Professor D. G. 
Ritchie, op. cit. t p. 169). Wars between different 
grades of civilisation are bound to exist as long 
as civilisation itself exists. The history of culture 
and of progress has been more or less a history 
of war. A calm acceptance of this position may 
mean to certain short-sighted, enthusiastic theorists 
an impossible sacrifice of the ideal ; but, the sacri- 
fice once made, we stand on a better footing with 
regard to at least one class of arguments against 
a federation of the world. Such a union will lead, 
it is said, to an equality in culture, a sameness 
of interests fatal to progress ; all struggle and con- 
flict will be cast out of the state itself; national 
characteristics and individuality will be obliterated ; 
the lamb and the wolf will lie down together: 
stagnation will result, intellectual progress will be 
at an end, politics will be no more, history will 
stand still. This is a sweeping assertion, an alarm- 
ing prophecy. But a little thought will assure 
us that there is small cause for apprehension. 
There can be no such standstill, no millennium in 
human affairs. A gradual smoothing down of 
sharply accentuated national characteristics there 
might be: this is a result which a freer, more 
friendly intercourse between nations would be very 

Translator's Introduction 99 

likely to produce. But conflicting interests, keen 
rivalry in their pursuit, difference of culture and 
natural aptitude, and all or much of the individu- 
ality which language and literature, historical and 
religious traditions, even climatic and physical con- 
ditions produce are bound to survive until the 
coming of some more overwhelming and far-spread- 
ing revolution than this. It would not be well if 
it were otherwise, if those " unconscious and invi- 
sible peculiarities" in which Fichte sees the hand 
of God and the guarantee of a nation's future 
dignity, virtue and merit should be swept away. 
(Reden an die deutsche Nation, * 1 807.) Nor is 
stagnation to be feared. " Strife," said the old 
philosopher, "is the father of all things." There 
can be no lasting peace in the processes of nature 
and existence. It has been in the constant rivalry 
between classes within themselves, and in the 
struggle for existence with other races that great 
nations have reached the highwater mark of their 
development. A perpetual peace in international 
relations we may nay, surely will one day have, 
but eternity will not see the end to the feverish 
unrest within the state and the jealous competition 
and distrust between individuals, groups and classes 
of society. Here there must ever be perpetual war. 
It was only of this political peace between civil- 

* See IVerke, VTL, p. 467. 

ioo Perpetual Peace 

ised nations that Kant thought. * In this form it 
is bound to come. The federation of Europe will 
follow the federation of Germany and of Italy, not 
only because it offers a solution of many problems 
which have long taxed Europe, but because great 
men and careful thinkers believe in it. f It may 
not come quickly, but such men can afford to 
wait. " If I were legislator," cried Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, "I should not say what ought to be 
done, but I would do it." This is the attitude of 
the unthinking, unpractical enthusiast. The wish 
is not enough : the will is not enough. The mills 
of God must take their own time : no hope or 
faith of ours, no struggle or labour even can 
hurry them. 

It is a misfortune that the Peace Society has 
identified itself with so narrow and uncritical an 
attitude towards war, and that the copious clo- 

* The other he knew was impossible. Peace within the state 
meant decay and death. In the antagonism of nations, he saw 
nature's means of educating the race: it was a law of existence, 
a law of progress, and, as such, eternal. 

t For a vivid picture of the material advantages offered by 
such a union and of the dismal future that may lie before an 
unfederated Europe, we cannot do better than read Mr. Andrew 
Carnegie's recent Rectorial Address to the students of St. Andrews 
University (Oct 1902). Unfortunately, Mr. Carnegie's enthusiasm 
stops here: he does not tell us by what means the difficulties at 
present in the way of * federation, industrial or political, are to 
be overcome. 

Translator's Introduction IO1 

quence of its members is not based upon a con- 
sideration of the practical difficulties of the case. 
This well-meaning, hard working and enthusiastic 
body would like to do what is impossible by an 
impossible method. The end which it sets for itself 
is an unattainable one. But this need not be so. 
To make unjustifiable aggression difficult, to banish 
unworthy pretexts for making war might be a 
high enough ideal for any enthusiasm and offer 
scope wide enough for the labours of any society. 
But the Peace Society has not contented itself 
with this great work. Through its over-estimation 
of the value of peace, *-.its cause has been injured 
and much of its influence has been weakened or 
lost. Our age is one which sets a high value upon 
human life; and to this change of thinking may 
be traced our modern reform in the methods of 
war and all that has been done for the alleviation 
of suffering by the great Conventions of recent 
years. For the eyes of most people war is merely 
a hideous spectacle of bloodshed and deliberate 
destruction of life : this is its obvious side. But it 
is possible to exaggerate this confessedly great 
evil. Peace has its sacrifices as well as war : the 

* Professor D. (. Ritchie remarks that it is less an over- 
estimation of the value of peace than a too easy-going acceptance 
of abstract and unanalysed phrases about the rights of nation* 
that injurei the work of the Peace Society. Cf. his note on the 
principles of the Peace Congresses (op. cif,, p. 172). 

102 Perpetual Peace 

progress of humanity requires that the individual 
should often be put aside for the sake of lasting 
advantage to the whole. An opposite view can 
only be reckoned individualistic, perhaps material- 
istic. "The reverence for human life," says Mar- 
tineau, (Studies of Christianity, pp. 352, 354) "is 
carried to an immoral idolatry, when it is held more 
sacred than justice and right, and when the spec- 
tacle of blood becomes more horrible than the 
sight of desolating tyrannies and triumphant hypo- 
crisies. . . . We have, therefore, no more doubt 
that a war may be right, than that a policeman 
may be a security for justice, and we object to a 
fortress as little as to a handcuff." 

The Peace Society are not of this opinion : they 
greatly doubt that a war may be right, and they 
rarely fail to take their doubts to the tribunal of 
Scripture. Their efforts are well meant, this piety 
may be genuine enough ; but a text is rarely a 
proof of anything, and in any case serves one man 
in as good stead as another. We remember that 
"the devil can cite Scripture for his purpose." 
This unscientific method of proof or persuasion has 
ever been widely popular. It is a serious examin- 
ation of the question that we want, a more careful 
study of its actual history and of the possibilities 
of human nature ; less vague, exaggerated language 
about what ought to be done, and a realisation of 

Translator's Introduction 103 

what has been actually achieved ; above all, a clear 
perception of what may fairly be asked from the future. 
It used to be said is perhaps asserted still by 
the war-lovers that there was no path to civilisation 
which had not been beaten by the force of arms, 
no height to which the sword had not led the way. 
The inspiration of war was upon the great arts of 
civilisation: its hand was upon the greatest of the 
sciences. These obligations extended even to com- 
merce. War not only created new branches of 
industry, it opened new markets and enlarged the 
old. These are great claims, according to which 
war might be called the moving principle of history. 
If we keep our eyes fixed upon the history of the 
past, they seem not only plausible: they are in a 
great sense true. Progress did tread at the heels 
of the great Alexander's army : the advance of 
European culture stands in the closest connection 
with the Crusades. But was this happy compensation 
for a miserable state of affairs not due to the 
peculiarly unsocial conditions of early times and 
the absence of every facility for the interchange of 
ideas or material advantages? It is inconceivable 
that now-a-days * any aid to the development of 
thought in Europe should come from war. The 

* The day is past, when a nation could enjoy the exclusive 
advantages of its own inventions. Vattel naively recommends that 
we should keep the knowledge of certain kinds of trade, the 

IO4 Perpetual Peace 

old adage, in more than a literal sense, has but 
too often been proved true: "Inter arma, Musae 
silent." Peace is for us the real promoter of 

We have to endeavour to take an intermediate 
course between uncritical praise and wholesale 
condemnation, between extravagant expectation 
and unjustifiable pessimism. War used to be the 
rule: it is now an overwhelming and terrible ex- 
ception an interruption to the peaceful prosperous 
course of things, inflicting unlimited suffering and 
temporary or lasting loss. Its evils are on the 
surface, apparent to the most unthinking observer. 
The day may yet dawn, when Europeans will have 
learned to regard the force of arms as an instrument 
for the civilisation of savage or half-savage races, 
and war within their, continent as civil war, neces- 
sary and justifiable sometimes perhaps, but still a 
blot upon their civilisation and brotherhood as men. 
Such a suggestion rings strangely. But the great 
changes, which the roll of centuries has marked, 
once came upon the world not less unexpectedly. 
How far off must the idea of a civil peace have 
seemed to small towns and states of Europe in the 
fifteenth century! How strange, only a century 

building of war-ships and the like, to ourselves. Prudence, he 
says, prevents us from making an enemy stronger and the care of 
our own safety forbids it. (Law of Nations, n. Ch. I. 16.) 

Translator s Introduction 105 

ago, would the idea of applying steam power or 
electrical force have seemed to ourselves I Let us 
not despair. War has played a great part in the 
history of the world: it has been ever the great 
architect of nations, the true mother of cities. It 
has justified itself to-day in the union of kindred 
peoples, the making of great empires. It may be 
that one decisive war may yet be required to unite 
Europe. May Europe survive that struggle and 
go forward fearlessly to her great future ! A peaceful 
future that may not be. It must never be forgotten 
that war is sometimes a moral duty, that it is ever 
the natural sequence of human passion and human 
prejudice. An unbroken peace we cannot and do 
not expect ; but it is this that we must work for. As 
Kant says, we must keep it before us as an ideal, 



WE need not try to decide whether this satirical in- 
scription, (once found on a Dutch innkeeper's sign- 
board above the picture of a churchyard) is aimed 
at mankind in general, or at the rulers of states in 
particular, unwearying in their love of war, or per- 
haps only at the philosophers who cherish the 
sweet dream of perpetual peace. The author of the 
present sketch would make one stipulation, however. 
The practical politician stands upon a definite foot- 
ing with the theorist: with great self-complacency 
he looks down upon him as a mere pedant whose 
empty ideas can threaten no danger to the state 
(starting as it does from principles derived from 
experience), and who may always be permitted to 

* The text used in this translation is that edited by Kehr- 
bach. [Tr.] 

f I have seen something of M. de St. Pierre's plan for maintain- 
ing perpetual peace in Europe. It reminds me of an inscription 
outside of a churchyard, which ran ''Pax Ferfetua. For the dead, 
it is true, fight no more. But the living are of another mind, and 
the mightiest among them have little respect for tribunals." (Leib- 
nitz: Letter to Grirnaresf, quoted above, p. 37, note .) [Tr.] 

translation lo? 

knock down his eleven skittles at once without a 
worldly-wise statesman needing to disturb himself. 
Hence, in the event of a quarrel arising between 
the two, the practical statesman must always act 
consistently, and not scent danger to the state 
behind opinions ventured by the theoretical politi- 
cian at random and publicly expressed. With which 
saving clause (clausula salvatoria] the author will 
herewith consider himself duly and expressly pro- 
tected against all malicious misinterpretation. 



I. "No treaty of peace shall be regarded as 
valid, if made with the secret reservation of mate- 
rial for a future war." 

For then it would be a mere truce, a mere 
suspension of hostilities, not peace. A peace signi- 
fies the end of all hostilities and to attach to it 
the epithet " eternal " is not only a verbal pleonasm, 
but matter of suspicion. The causes of a future 
war existing, although perhaps not yet known to 
the high contracting parties themselves, are entirely 

io8 Perpetual Peace 

annihilated by the conclusion of peace, howev< 
acutely they may be ferreted out of documents 
the public archives. There may be a mental rese 
vation of old claims to be thought out at a futui 
time, which are, none of them, mentioned at th 
stage, because both parties are too much exhauste 
to continue the war, while the evil intention remain 
of using the first favourable opportunity for furthe 
hostilities. Diplomacy of this kind only Jesuitic? 
casuistry can justify: it is beneath the dignity of 
ruler, just as acquiescence in such processes c 
reasoning is beneath the dignity of his minister, i ! 
one judges the facts as they really are. * 

If, however, according to present enlightened idea. 1 
of political wisdom, the true glory of a state lie* 
in the uninterrupted development of its power by 
every possible means, this judgment must certainly 
strike one as scholastic and pedantic. 

2. "No state having an independent existence 
whether it be great or small- shall be acquired by 
another through inheritance, exchange, purchase or 
donation." f 

* On the honourable interpretation of treaties, see Vattel (op. fit., 
II. Ch. XVII, esp. 263296, 291). See also what he says of 
the validity of treaties and the necessity for holding them sacred 
(II. Ch. XII. 157, 158: II. Ch. XV). [Tr.j 

f "Even the smoothest way," says Hume, (Of the Original 
Contract) "by which a nation may receive a foreign master, bj 


For a state is not a property (patrimonium\ as 
may be the ground on which its people are settled, j 
It is a society of human beings over whom no one | 
but itself has the right to rule and to dispose. | 
Like the trunk of a tree, it has its own roots, and 
to graft it on to another state is to do away with 
its existence as a moral person, and to make of it 
a thing. Hence it is in contradiction to the idea 
of the original contract without which no right 
over a people is thinkable. * Everyone knows to 
what danger the bias in favour of these modes of 
acquisition has brought Europe (in other parts of the 
world it has never been known). The custom of 
marriage between states, as if they were individuals, 
has survived even up to the most recent times,f and is 
regarded partly as a new kind of industry by which 
ascendency may be acquired through family alli- 
ances, without any expenditure of strength ; partly 

marriage or a will, is not extremely honourable for the people; 
but supposes them to be disposed of, like a dowry or a legacy, 
according to the pleasure or interest of their rulers." [Tr.] 

* An hereditary kingdom is not a state which can be inherited 
by another state, but one whose sovereign power can be inherited 
by another physical person. The state then acquires a ruler, not the 
ruler as *uch (that is, as one already possessing another realm) the state. 

t This has been one of the causes of the extraordinary admixture 
of races in the modern Austrian empire. Cf. the lines of Matthias 
Corvinus of Hungary (quoted in Sir W. Stirling Maxwell's Cloister 
Life sf Ckarlts the Fifth, Ch. I , notcy 

"Bella gerant alii, ru, felix Austria, nube! 
Nam quae Mars aliis, dat tibi regna Venus." [Tr.] 

no Perpetual Peace 

as a device for territorial expansion. Moreover, the 
hiring out of the troops of one state to another 
to fight against an enemy not at war with their 
native country is to be reckoned in this connection ; 
for the subjects are in this way used and abused 
at will as personal property. 

3. -"Standing armies (miles perpetuus] shall be 
abolished in course of time." 

For they are always threatening other states 
with war by appearing to be in constant readiness 
to fight. They incite the various states to outrival 
one another in the number of their soldiers, and 
to this number no limit can be set. Now, since 
owing to the sums devoted to this purpose, peace 
at last becomes even more oppressive than a short 
war, these standing armies are themselves the cause 
of wars of aggression, undertaken in order to get 
rid of this burden. To which we must add that 
the practice of hiring men to kill or to be killed 
seems to imply a use of them as mere machines 
and instruments in the hand of another (namely, 
the state) which cannot easily be reconciled with 
the right of humanity in our own person. * The 

* A Bulgarian Prince thus answered the Greek Emperor who 
magnanimously offered to settle a quarrel with him, not by shed- 
ding the blood of his subjects, but by a duel: "A smith who has 

Translation 1 1 1 

matter stands quite differently in the case of volun- 
tary periodical military exercise on the part of 
citizens of the state, who thereby seek to secure them- 
selves and their country against attack from without. 
The accumulation of treasure in a state would 
in the same way be regarded by other states as a 
menace of war, and might compel them to anticipate 
this by striking the first blow. For of the three 
forces, the power of arms, the power of alliance 
and the power of money, the last might well 
become the most reliable instrument of war, did 
not the difficulty of ascertaining the amount stand 
in the way. 

4. " No national debts shall oe contracted in 
connection with the external affairs of the state." 

This source of help is above suspicion, where 
assistance is sought outside or within the state, on 
behalf of the economic administration of the country 
(for instance, the improvement of the roads, the 
settlement and support of new colonies, the establish- 
ment of granaries to provide against seasons of 
scarcity, and so on). But, as a common weapon 
used by the Powers against one another, a credit 
system under which debts go on indefinitely in- 

tongs will not take the red-hot iron from the fire with his hands " 
(This note is a-wanting in the second Edition of 1796. It is 
repeated in Art. II., see p. 130.) [Tr.j 

1 1 2 Perpetual Peace 

creasing and are yet always assured against im- 
mediate claims (because all the creditors do not 
put in their claim at once) is a dangerous money 
power. This ingenious invention of a commercial 
people in the present century is, in other words, 
a treasure for the carrying on of war which 
may exceed the treasures of all the other states 
taken together, and can only be exhausted by 
a threatening deficiency in the taxes an event, 
however, which will long be kept off by the 
very briskness of commerce resulting from the 
reaction of this system on industry and trade. The 
ease, then, with which war may be waged, coupled 
with the inclination of rulers towards it an 
inclination which seems to be implanted in human 
nature is a great obstacle in the way of perpetual 
peace. The prohibition of this system must be 
laid down as a preliminary article of perpetual 
peace, all the more necessarily because the final 
inevitable bankruptcy of the state in question must 
involve in the loss many who are innocent; and 
this would be a public injury to these states. 
Therefore other nations are at least justified in 
uniting themselves against such an one and its 

5. "No state shall violently interfere with the 
constitution and administration of another." 

Translation 113 

For what can justify it in so doing? The scandal 
which is here presented to the subjects of another 
state? The erring state can much more serve as 
a warning by exemplifying the great evils which a 
nation draws down on itself through its own law- 
lessness. Moreover, the bad example which one free 
person gives another, (as scandalum acceptum] does 
no injury to the latter. In this connection, it is 
true, we cannot count the case of a state which 
has become split up through internal corruption 
into two parts, each of them representing by itself 
an individual state which lays claim to the whole. 
Here the yielding of assistance to one faction could 
not be reckoned as interference on the part of a 
foreign state with the constitution of another, for 
here anarchy prevails. So long, however, as the 
inner strife has not yet reached this stage the 
interference of other powers would be a violation 
of the rights of an independent nation which is 
only struggling with internal disease. * It would 

* See Vattel: Law of Nations, II. Ch. IV. 55. No foreign 
power, he says, has a right to judge the conduct and administration 
of any sovereign or oblige him to alter it. " If he loads his subjects 
with taxes, or if he treats them with severity, the nation alone is 
concerned; and no other is called upon to offer redress for his 
behaviour, or oblige him to follow more wise and eqnitable 

maxims But (loc. cii. 56) when the bands of the 

political society are broken, or at least suspended, between the 
sovereign and his people, the contending parties may then be 
considered M two distinct powers; and, since they are both equally 


114 Perpetual Peace 

therefore itself cause a scandal, and make the 
autonomy of all states insecure. 

6. "No state at war with another shall coun- 
tenance such modes of hostility as would make 
mutual confidence impossible in a subsequent state 
of peace: such are the employment of assassins 
(percussores) or of poisoners (venefici], breaches of 
capitulation, the instigating and making use of 
treachery (perduellio] in the hostile state." 

These are dishonourable stratagems. For some 
kind of confidence in the disposition of the enemy 
must exist even in the midst of war, as otherwise 
peace could not be concluded, and the hostilities 
would pass into a war of extermination (bellum 
internecinum). War, however, is only our wretched 
expedient of asserting a right by force, an expe- 
dient adopted in the state of nature, where no 
court of justice exists which could settle the matter 
in dispute. In circumstances like these, neither of 
the two parties can be called an unjust enemy, 
because this form of speech presupposes a legal 
decision : the issue of the conflict just as in the 

independent of all foreign authority, nobody has a right to judge 
them. Either may be in the right; and each of those who grant 
their assistance may imagine that he is giving his support to the 
better cause." [Tr.] 

Translation 1 1 5 

case of the so-called judgments of God decides 
on which side right is. Between states, however, 
no punitive war (bellum punitivum] is thinkable, 
because between them a relation of superior and 
inferior does not exist. Whence it follows that a 
war of extermination, where the process of annihil- 
ation would strike both parties at once and all 
right as well, would bring about perpetual peace 
only in the great graveyard of the human race. 
Such a war then, and therefore also the use of all 
means which lead to it, must be absolutely for- 
bidden. That the methods just mentioned do in- 
evitably lead to this result is obvious from the fact 
that these infernal arts, already vile in themselves, 
on coming into use, are not long confined to the 
sphere of war. Take, for example, the use of 
spies (uti exploratoribus}. Here only the dishonesty 
of others is made use of; but vices such as these, 
when once encouraged, cannot in the nature of 
things be stamped out and would be carried over 
into the state of peace, where their presence would 
be utterly destructive to the purpose of that state. 
Although the laws stated are, objectively regarded, 
(i.e. in so far as they affect the action of rulers) 
purely prohibitive laws (leges prohibitivce], some of 
them (leges strictce] are strictly valid without regard 
to circumstances and urgently require to be enforced. 
Such are Nos. I, 5, 6. Others, again, (like Nos. 2, 

Ii6 Perpetual Peace 

3, 4) although not indeed exceptions to the maxims 
.of law, yet in respect of the practical application 
of these maxims allow subjectively of a certain 
latitude to suit particular circumstances. The en- 
forcement of these leges latce may be legitimately 
put off, so long as we do not lose sight of the 
ends at which they aim. This purpose of reform 
does not permit of the deferment of an act of 
restitution (as, for example, the restoration to 
certain states of freedom of which they have been 
deprived in the manner described in article 2) to 
an infinitely distant date as Augustus used to say, 
to the "Greek Kalends", a day that will never 
come. This would be to sanction non-restitution. 
Delay is permitted only with the intention that 
restitution should not be made too precipitately 
and so defeat the purpose we have in view. For 
the prohibition refers here only to the mode of 
acquisition which is to be no longer valid, and 
not to the fact of possession which, although 
indeed it has not the necessary title of right, yet 
at the time of so-called acquisition was held legal 
by all states, in accordance with the public opinion 
of the time. * 

* It has been hitherto doubted, not without reason, whether there 
can be laws rf permission (leges permit sivai) of pure reason as 
well as commands (leges praceptivci) and prohibitions (leges pro- 
hibittva). For law in general hai a basis of objective practical 
necessity: permission, on the other hand, is bated upon the eou- 

Translation 1 1 7 



A state of peace among men who live side by 
side is not the natural state (status naturalis\ which 

tingency of certain actions in practice. It follows that a law of 
permission would enforce what cannot be enforced ; and this would 
involve a contradiction, if the object of the law should be the same 
in both cases. Here, however, in the present case of a law of 
permission, the presupposed prohibition is aimed merely at the 
future manner of acquisition of a right for example, acquisition 
through inheritance: the exemption from this prohibition (/'.*. the 
permission) refers to the present state of possession. In the tran- 
sition from a state of nature to the civil state, this holding of 
property can continue as a bona fide, if usurpatory, ownership, 
under the new social conditions, in accordance with a permission 
of the Law of Nature. Ownership of this kind, as soon as its 
true nature becomes known, is seen to be mere nominal possession 
(fossessio putativd) sanctioned by opinion and customs in a natural 
state of society. After the transition stage is passed, such modes 
of acquisition are likewise forbidden in the subsequently evolved 
civil state : and this power to remain in possession would not be 
admitted if the supposed acquisition had taken place in the civilized 
community. It would be bound to come to an end as an injury 
to the right of others, the moment its illegality became patent. 

I have wished here only by the way to draw the attention of 
teachers of the Law of Nature to the idea of a lex permissiva 
which presents itself spontaneously in any system of rational classi- 
fication. I do so chiefly because use is often made of this con- 
cept in civil law with reference to statutes ; with this difference, 
that the law of prohibition stands alone by itself, while permis- 
sion is not, as it ought to be, introduced into that law as a limiting 
clause, but is thrown among the exceptions. Thus " this or that is 
forbidden", say, Nos. I, 2, 3, and so on in an infinite progression, 
while permissions are only added to the law incidentally : they 
are not reached by the application of some principle, but only by 

ii8 Perpetual Peace 

is rather to be described as a state of war : * that 
is to say, although there is not perhaps always 
actual open hostility, yet there is a constant threat- 
ening that an outbreak may occur. Thus the 
state of peace must be established, f For the mere 

groping about among cases which have actually occurred. Were 
this not so, qualifications would have had to be brought into the 
formula of laws of prohibition which would have immediately 
transformed them into laws of permission. Count von Windisch- 
gratz. a man whose wisdom was equal to his discrimination, urged 
this very point in the form of a question propounded by him for 
a prize essay. One must therefore regret that this ingenious 
problem has been so soon neglected and left unsolved. For the 
possibility of a formula similar to those of mathematics is the sole 
real test of a legislation that would be consistent. Without this, 
the so-called jus cerium will remain forever a mere pious wish: 
we can have only general laws valid on the whole; no general laws 
possessing the universal validity which the concept law seems to 

* "Fron? this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any 
man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, 
by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so 
long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: 
and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is 
generally allowed." (Hobbes: Lev. I. Ch. XIII.) [Tr.] 

f Hobbes thus describes the establishment of the state, "^com- 
monwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree, 
and covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever man, 
or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part, the fight to 
present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their represen- 
tative ; everyone, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted 
against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments, of that 
man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were 
his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be 
protected against other men." (Lev. II. Ch. XVIII.) 

There is a covenant between them, "as if every man should 
ay to every man, / authorize and give up my right of governing 

Translation \ 1 9 

cessation of hostilities is no guarantee of continued 
peaceful relations, and unless this guarantee is given ' 
by every individual to his neighbour which can j 
only be done in a state of society regulated by I 
law one man is at liberty to challenge anothei 
and treat him as an enemy. * 

myself t to this man, or to this assembly of nteri> on this condition^ 
that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize nil his actions 
in like wanner." (Lev. II. Ch. XVII.) [Tr.] 

* It is usually accepted that a man may not take hostile steps 
against any one, unless the latter has already injured him by act. 
This is quite accurate, if both are citizens of a law-governed state. 
For, in becoming a member of this community, each gives the 
other the security he demands against injury, by means of the 
supreme authority exercising control over them both. The indivi- 
dual, however, (or nation) who remains in a mere state of nature 
deprives me of this security and does me injury, by mere proximity. 
There is perhaps no active (facto) molestation, but there is a state 
of lawlessness, (status injustus) which, by its very existence, offers a 
continual menace to me.v^I can therefore compel him, either to 
enter into relations with me under which we are both subject to 
law, or to withdraw from my neighbourhood. So that the postulate 
upon which the following articles are based is: "All men who 
have the power to exert a mutual influence upon one another must 
be under a civil government of some kind." 

A legal constitution is, according to the nature of the indivi- 
duals who compose the state : 

(1) A constitution formed in accordance with the right of citizen- 
ship of the individuals who constitute a nation (jus civitatis}. 

(2) A constitution whose principle is international law which 
determines the relations of states (jus gentium). 

(3) A constitution formed in accordance with cosmopolitan 
law, in as far as individuals and states, standing in an external 
relation of mutual reaction, may be regarded as citizens of one 
world-state (jus cosmopoliticum). 

This classification is not an arbitrary one, but is necessary 
>\ ith reference to the idea of perpetual peace, For, if even one of 

12O Ptrpttual Peace 


I. "The civil constitution of each state shall be 

The only constitution which has its origin in the 
idea of the original contract, upon which the lawful 
legislation of every nation must be based, is the 
republican. * It is a constitution, in the first place, 

these units of society were in a position physically to influence 
another, while yet remaining a member of a primitive order of 
society, then a state of war would be joined with these primitive 
conditions; and from this it is our present purpose to free ourselves. 

* Lawful, that is to say, external freedom cannot be defined, as 
it so ofteu is, as the right \J3ef ugniss] "to do whatever one likes, 
so long as this does not wrong anyone else." l For what is this 
right? It is the possibility of actions which do not lead to the 
injury of others. So the explanation of a "right" would be 
something like this: "Freedom is the possibility of actions which 
do not injure anyone. A man does not wrong another whatever 
his action if he docs not wrong another": which is empty 
tautology. My external (lawful) freedom is rather to be explained in 
this way: it is the right through which I require not to obey any 
external laws except those to which I could have given my consent. 
In exactly the same way, external (legal) equality in a state is that 
relation of the subjects in consequence of which no individual 
can legally bind or oblige another to anything, without at the 
same time submitting himself to the law which ensures that he 
can, in his turn, be bound and obliged in like manner by this 

The principle of lawful independence requires no explanation, 

1 Hobbes' definition of freedom is interesting. See Lev. II. Ch. 
XXI.: "A FREEMAN, is he t that in those things, -which by hit 
strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to dt what he 
has a will to?' [Tr.j 

Translation 121 

founded in accordance with the principle of the 
freedom of the members of society as human 
beings: secondly, in accordance with the principle 
of the dependence of all, as subjects, on a common 
legislation: and, thirdly, in accordance with the 
law of the equality of the members as citizens. 
It is then, looking at the question of right, the 
only constitution whose fundamental principles lie 
at the basis of every form of civil constitution. 
And the only question for us now is, whether it is 
also the one constitution which can lead to per- 
petual peace. 

Now the republican constitution apart from the 
soundness of its origin, since it arose from the 

as it is involved in the general concept of a constitution. The 
validity of this hereditary and inalienable right, which belongs of 
necessity to mankind, is affirmed and ennobled by the principle 
of a lawful relation between man himself and higher beings, 
if indeed he believes in such beings. This is so, because he 
thinks of himself, in accordance with these very principles, as 
a citizen of a transcendental world as well as of the world of 
stnae. For, as far as my freedom goes, I am bound by no 
obligation even with regard to Divine Laws which are appre- 
hended by me only through my reason except in so far as I 
could have given my assent to them; for it is through the law 
of freedom of my own reason that I first form for myself a , 
concept of a Divine Will... As for the principle of equality, in ; 
so far as it applies to the most sublime being in the universe ;' 
next to God a being I might perhaps figure to myself as a 
mighty emanation of the Divine spirit, there is no reason why, 
if I perform my duty in the sphere in which I am placed, as that 
aeon doet in his, the duty of obedience alone should fall to my 
share, the right to command to him. That this principle of 

122 Perpetual Peace 

pure source of the concept of right, has also the 
prospect of attaining the desired result, namely, 
perpetual peace. And the reason is this. If, as 
must be so under this constitution, the consent of 
the subjects is required to determine whether there 
shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than 
that they should weigh the matter well, before 
undertaking such a bad business. For in decreeing 
war, they would of necessity be resolving to bring 
down the miseries of war upon their country. This 
implies: they must fight themselves; they must 
hand over the costs of the war out of their own 

equality, (unlike the principle of freedom), does not apply to 
our relation to God is due to the fact that, to this Being alone, 
the idea of duty does not belong. 

As for the right to equality which belongs to all citizens as 
subjects, the solution of the problem of the admissibility of an 
hereditary nobility hinges on the following question: "Does 
social rank acknowledged by the state to be higher in the case 
of one subject than another stand above desert, or does merit 
take precedence of social standing?" Now it is obvious that, if 
high position is combined with good family, it is quite uncertain 
whether merit, that is to say, skill and fidelity in office, will follow 
as well. This amounts to granting the favoured individual a com- 
manding position without any question of desert; r.nd to that, 
the universal will of the people expressed in an original contract 
which is the fundamental principle of all right would never 
consent.JFor it does not follow that a nobleman is a man of 
noble character. In the case of the official nobility, as one might 
term the rank of higher magistracy which one must acquire by 
merit the social position is not attached like property to the 
person but to his office, and equality is not thereby disturbed; 
for, if a man gives up office, he lays down with it his official 
rank and falls back into the rank of his fellows. 

Translation 123 

property; they must do their poor best to make 
good the devastation which it leaves behind; and 
finally, as a crowning ill, they have to accept a 
burden of debt which will embitter even peace 
itself, and which they can never pay off on account 
of the new wars which are always impending. 
On the other hand, in a government where the 
subject is not a citizen holding a vote, (*. e. in a 
constitution which is not republican), the plunging 
into war is the least serious thing in the world. 
For the ruler is not a citizen, but the owner of 
the state, and does not lose a whit by the war, 
while he goes on enjoying the delights of his table 
or sport, or of his pleasure palaces and gala days. 
He can therefore decide on war for the most 
trifling reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure 
party. * Any justification of it that is necessary for 
the sake of decency he can leave without concern 
to the diplomatic corps who are always only too 
ready with their services. 

* Cf. Cowper: Tht Winter Morning Walk: 
"But is it fit, or can it bear the shock 
Of rational discussion, that a man, 
Compounded and made up like other men 
Of elements tumultuous, , 

Should when he pleases, and on whom he 
"Wage war, with any or with no pretence 
Of provocation giv'n or wrong sustaiu'd^ 

114 Ptrpttual Peace 

The following remarks must be made in order 
that we may not fall into the common error of 
confusing the republican with the democratic con- 
stitution. The forms of the state (civitas] * may 
be classified according to either of two principles 
of division : the difference of the persons who hold 
the supreme authority in the state, and the manner 
in which the people are governed by their ruler 
whoever he may be. The first is properly called 
the form of sovereignty (forma imperii], and there 
can be only three constitutions differing in this 
respect: where, namely, the supreme authority 
belongs to only one, to several individuals work- 
ing together, or to the whole people constituting 
the civil society. Thus we have autocracy or the 
sovereignty of a monarch, aristocracy or the 
sovereignty of the nobility, and democracy or the 

And force the beggarly last doit, by means 
That his own humour dictates, from tha clutch 
Of poverty, that thus he may procure 
His thousands, weary of penurious life, 
A splendid opportunity to die?" 

''He deems a thousand or ten thousand lives 
Spent in the purchase of renown for him, 
An easy reckoning." [Tr.] 

* Cf. Hobbes: On Dominion, Ch. VII. I. "As for the 
difference of cities, it is taken from the difference of the persons to 
whom the supreme power is committed. This power is committed 
either to one man, or council, or some one court consisting of 
many men." [Tr.] 

Translation 125 

sovereignty of the people. The second principle of 
division is the form of government (forma regi- 
mims), and refers to the way in which the state 
makes use of its supreme power : for the manner 
of government is based on the constitution, itself 
the act of that universal will which transforms a 

multitude into a nation. In this respect the form 


of government is either republican or despotic. 
Republicanism is the political principle of severing 
the executive power of the government from the 
legislature. Despotism is that principle in pur- 
suance of which the state arbitrarily puts into 
effect laws which it has itself made : consequently 
it is the administration of the public will, but 
this is identical with the private will of the ruler. 
Of these three forms of a state, democracy, in 
the proper sense of the word, is of necessity des- 
potism, because it establishes an executive power, 
since all decree regarding and, if need be, 
against any individual who dissents from them. 
Therefore the ''whole people", so-called, who carry 
their measure are really not all, but only a majo- 
rity: so that here the universal will is in contra- 
diction with itself and with the principle of freedom. 
Every form of government in fact which is not 
representative is really no true constitution at all, 
because a law-giver may no more be, in one and 
the same perion, the administrator of his own 

126 Perpetual Peace 

will, than the universal major premise of a 
syllogism may be, at the same time, the sub- 
sumption under itself of the particulars contained in 
the minor premise. And, although the other two 
constitutions, autocracy and aristocracy, are always 
defective in so far as they leave the way open for 
such a form of government, yet there is at least 
always a possibility in these cases, that they may 
take the form of a government in accordance with 
the spirit of a representative system. Thus Frederick 
the Great used at least to say that he was " merely 
the highest servant of the state. * The democratic 
constitution, on the other hand, makes this impos- 
sible, because under such a government every one 
wishes to be master. We may therefore say that 
the smaller the staff of the executive that is to 
say, the number of rulers and the more real, on the 
other hand, their representation of the people, so 
much the more is the government of the state in 

* The lofty appellations which are often given to a ruler such 
as the Lord's Anointed, the Administrator of the Divine Will 
upon earth and Vicar of God have been many times censured as 
flattery gross enough to make one giddy. But it seems to me 
without cause. Far from making a prince arrogant, names like 
these must rather make him humble at heart, if he has any intel- 
ligence which we take for granted he has and reflects that he 
has undertaken an office which is too great for any human being. 
For, indeed, it is the holiest which God has on earth namely, the 
right of ruling mankind: and he must ever live in fear of injuring 
this treasure of God in some respect or other. 

Translation 1 27 

accordance with a possible republicanism ; and it 
may hope by gradual reforms to raise itself to 
that standard. For this reason, it is more difficult 
under an aristocracy than under a monarchy 
while under a democracy it is impossible except 
by a violent revolution to attain to this, the 
one perfectly lawful constitution. The kind of 
government, * however, is of infinitely more im- 
portance to the people than the kind of consti- 
tution, although the greater or less aptitude of a 
people for this ideal greatly depends upon such 
external form. The form of government, however, 
if it is to be in accordance with the idea of right, 
must embody the representative system in which 
alone a republican form of administration is pos- 

* Mallet du Pan boasts in his seemingly brilliant but shallow 
and superficial language that, after many years experience, he has 
come at last to be convinced of the truth of the well known 
saying of Pope [Essay on Man, III. 303] : 

"For Forms of Government let fools contest; 

Whate'er is best administered is best", "> 

If this means that the best administered government is best 
administered, then, in Swift's phrase, he has cracked a nut to find a 
worm in it. If it means, however, that the best conducted govern- 
ment is also the best kind of government, that is, the best form 
of political constitution, then it is utterly false : for examples of 
wise administration are no proof of the kiud of government. Who 
ever ruled better than Titus and Marcus Aurelius, and yet the one 
left Domitian, the other Commodus, as his successor? This could 
not have happened where the constitution was a good one, for 
their absolute unfitness for the position was early enough known, 
and the power of the emperer was sufficiently great to exclude them. 

128 Perpetual Peace 

sible and without which it is despotic and violent, 
be the constitution what it may. None of the 
ancient so-called republics were aware of this, and 
they necessarily slipped into absolute despotism 
which, of all despotisms, is most endurable under 
the sovereignty of one individual. 


II. "The law of nations shall be founded oa a 
federation of free states." 

Nations, as states, may be judged like individuals 
who, living in the natural state of society that is 
to say, uncontrolled by external law injure one 
another through their very proximity. *.~ Every state, 
for the sake of its own security, may and ought 
to demand that its neighbour should submit itself 
to conditions, similar to those of the civil society 
where the right of every individual is guaranteed. 

* "For as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war, of 
every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to 
the son, nor to expect from the father; no propriety of goods, or 
lands; no security; but a full and absolute liberty in every parti- 
cular man : so in states, and commonwealths not dependent on one 
another, every commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute 
liberty, to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what that man, 
or assembly that represented it, shall judge most conducing to 
their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a perpetual 
war, and upon the confines of battle, witk their frontiers arm4, 
and cannons planted against their neighbours round about." 
(Hobbes: Leviathan, II. Ch. XXI.) [Tr.J 

Translation \ 29 

This would give rise to a federation of nations which, 
however, would not have to be a State of nations. * 
That would involve a contradiction. For the term 
"state" implies the relation of one who rules to 
those who obey that is to say, of lawgiver to the 
subject people : and many nations in one state would 
constitute only one nation, which contradicts our 
hypothesis, since here we have to consider the right 
of one nation against another, in so far as they 
are so many separate states and are not to be 
fused into one. 

* But see p. 136, where Kant seems to speak of a State of nations 
as the ideal. Kant expresses himself, on this point, more clearly 
in the Rechtslehre, Part. II. 61 : " The natural state of nations," 
he says here, "like that of individual men, is a condition which 
must be abandoned, in order that they may enter a state regulated 
by law. Hence, before this can take place, every right possessed 
by these nations and every external "mine" and "thine" \id est, 
symbol of possession] which states acquire or preserve through war are 
merely provisional^ and can become ftremftorily valid and constitute 
a true state of peace only in a universal union of ttates, by a 
process analogous to that through which a people becomes a state. 
Since, however, the too great extension of such a State of nations 
over vast territories must, in the long run, make the government of 
that union and therefore the protection of each of its members 
impossible, a multitude of such corporations will lead again to a 
state of war. So that ferpetual peace, the final goal of international 
law as a whole, is really an impracticable idea \eine unaus/uhr~ 
bare Idee\ The political principles, however, which are directed 
towards this end, (that is to say, towards the establishment of such 
unions of states as may serve as a continual approximation to that 
ideal), are not impracticable; on the contrary, as this approximation 
is required by duty and is therefore founded also upon the rights 
of men and of states, these principles are, without doubt, capable 
of practical realisation." [Tr.] 


Perpetual Peace 

The attachment of savages to their lawless liberty, 
the fact that they would rather be at hopeless 
variance with one another than submit themselves 
to a legal authority constituted by themselves, that 
they therefore prefer their senseless freedom to a 
reason-governed liberty, is regarded by us with 
profound contempt as barbarism and uncivilisation 
and the brutal degradation of humanity. So one 
would think that civilised races, each formed into 
a state by itself, must come out of such an aban- 
doned condition as soon as they possibly can. 
On the contrary, however, every state thinks rather 
that its majesty (the "majesty" of a people is an 
absurd expression) lies just in the very fact that 
it is subject to no external legal authority ; and the 
glory of the ruler consists in this, that, without his 
requiring to expose himself to danger, thousands 
stand at his command ready to let themselves be 
sacrificed for a matter of no concern to them. * 
The difference between the savages of Europe 
and those of America lies chiefly in this, that, 
while many tribes of the latter have been entirely 
devoured by their enemies, Europeans know a 
better way of using the vanquished than by eating 

* A Greek Emperor who magnanimously volunteered to settle 
by a duel his quarrel with a Bulgarian Prince, got the following 
answer: "A smith who has toQgs will not pluck the glowing 
iron from the fire with his hands." 

Translation 131 

them; and they prefer to increase through them 
the number of their subjects, and so the number 
of instruments at their command for still more 
widely spread war. 

The depravity of human nature * shows itself 
without disguise in the unrestrained relations of 
nations to each other, while in the law-governed 
civil state much of this is hidden by the check 
of government. This being so, it is astonishing 
that the word "right" has not yet been entirely 
banished from the politics of war as pedantic, 
and that no state has yet ventured to publicly 
advocate this point of view/ For Hugo Grotius, 
Puffendorf, Vattel and others Job's comforters, all 
of them are always quoted in good faith to justify 
an attack, although their codes, whether couched 
in philosophical or diplomatic terms, have not nor 
can have the slightest legal force, because states, 
as such, are under no common external authority; 
and there is no instance of a state having ever 

* "Both sayings are very true: that man to man is a kind of 
God; and that man to man u an arrant wolf. The first is true, 
if we compare citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we 
compare cities. In the one, there is some analogy of similitude with 
the Deity; to wit, justice and charity, the twin sisters of peace. But 
in the other, good men must defend themselves by taking to them 
for a sanctuary the two daughters of war, deceit and violence: 
that is, in plain terms, a mere brutal rapacity." (Hobbes: Epistle 
Dedicatory*" to the Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government 
and Society?) ^Tr.] 

132 Perpetual Peace 

been moved by argument to desist from its 
purpose, even when this was backed up by the 
testimony of such great men. This homage which 
every state renders in words at least to the 
idea of right, proves that, although it may be 
slumbering, there is, notwithstanding, to be found 
in man a still higher natural moral capacity by 
the aid of which he will in time gain the mastery 
over the evil principle in his nature, the existence 
of which he is unable to deny. And he hopes 
the same of others; for otherwise the word 
"right" would never be uttered by states who 
wish to wage war, unless to deride it like the 
Gallic Prince who declared: " The privilege which 
nature gives the strong is that the weak must 
obey them." * 

The method by which states prosecute their 
rights can never be by process of law as it is 
where there is an external tribunal but only by war. ' 
Through this means, however, and its favourable 
issue, victory, the question of right is never decided. 
A treaty of peace makes, it may be, an end to 
the war of the moment, but not to the conditions 

* "The strongest are still never sufficiently strong to ensure 
them the continual mastership, unless they find means of trans- 
forming force into right, and obedience into duty. 

From the right of the strongest, right takes an ironical appear- 
ance, and is rarely established as a principle." (Contrat Soda/, I, 
Ch. III.) [Tr.j 

i j $ 

of war which at any time may afford a new pretext 
for opening hostilities; and this we cannot exactly 
condemn as unjust, because under these conditions 
everyone is his own judge. Notwithstanding, not 
quite the same rule applies to states according to 
the law of nations as holds good of individuals in 
a lawless condition according to the law of nature, 
namely, "that they ought to advance out of this 
condition." This is so, because, as states, they have 
already within themselves a legal constitution, and 
have therefore advanced beyond the stage at which 
others, in accordance with their ideas of right, can 
force them to come under a wider legal constitution. 
Meanwhile, however, reason, from her throne of 
the supreme law-giving moral power, absolutely 
condemns war * as a morally lawful proceeding, 

* "The natural state," says Hobbes, (On Dominion, Ch. VH 18) 
"hath the same proportion to the ciril, (I mean, liberty to subjection), 
which passion hath to reason, or a beast to a man." 

Locke speaks thus of man, when he puts himself into the state 
of war with another: "haying quitted reason, which God hath 
given to be the rule betwixt man aod man, and the common bond 
whereby human kind is united ioto one fellowship and society; 
and having renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and 
made use of the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon 
another, where he has no right: and so revolting from his own 
kind to that of beasts, by making force, which is theirs, to be hig 
rule of right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the 
injured person, and the rest of mankind that will join with him 
in the execution of justice, as any other wild beat, or noxious 
brute, with whom mankind can have neither society nor stcurity." 
(Civil Grvtrnrnmt, Ch. XV. 172.) [Tr.] 

134 Perpttual Peace 

and makes a state of peace, on the other hand, 
an immediate duty. Without a compact between 
the nations, however, this state of peace cannot 
be established or assured. Hence there must be 
an alliance of a particular kind which we may 
call a covenant of peace (foedus pacificum\ which 
would differ from a treaty of peace (pactum pads] 
in this respect, that the latter merely puts an 
end to one war, while the former would seek 
to put an end to war for ever. This alliance does 
not aim at the gain of any power whatsoever 
of the state, but merely at the preservation and 
security of the freedom of the state for itself and 
of other allied states at the same time. * The latter 
do not, however, require, for this reason, to submit 
themselves like individuals in the state of nature 
to public laws and coercion. The practicability or 
objective reality of this idea of federation which 
is to extend gradually over all states and so lead 
to perpetual peace can be shewn. For, if Fortune 
ordains that a powerful and enlightened people 
should form a republic, which by its very nature 
is inclined to perpetual peace this would serve as 
a centre of federal union for other states wishing 
to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom 

* Cf. Rousseau: Gouverntment de Polognt, Ch. V. Federate 
government is "the only one which unites in itself all the advantage* 
of great and small states/' [Tr.] 

Translation 13 J 

among the states in accordance with the idea of 
the law of nations. Gradually, through different 
unions of this kind, the federation would extend 
further and further. 

It is quite comprehensible that a people should 
say : " There shall be no war among us, for we shall 
form ourselves into a state, that is to say, constitute 
for ourselves a supreme legislative, administrative 
and judicial power which will settle our disputes 
peaceably." But if this state says: "There shall 
be no war between me and other states, although 
I recognise no supreme law-giving power which 
will secure me. my rights and whose rights I will 
guarantee;" then it is not at all clear upon what 
grounds I could base my confidence in my right, 
unless it were the substitute for that compact on 
which civil society is based namely, free federation 
which reason must necessarily connect with the 
idea of the law of nations, if indeed any meaning 
is to be left in that concept at all. 

There is no intelligible meaning in the idea of the 
law of nations as giving a right to make war; for 
that must be a right to decide what is just, not in 
accordance with universal, external laws limiting 
the freedom of each individual, but by means of 
one-sided maxims applied by force. We must 
then understand by this that men of such ways 
of thinking are quite justly served, when they 

136 Perpetual Peace 

destroy one another, and thui find perpetual peace 
in the wide grave which covers all the abomina- 
tions of acts of violence as well as the authors of 
such deeds. For states, in their relation to one 
another, there can be, according to reason, no other 
way of advancing from that lawless condition which 
unceasing war implies, than by giving up their 
savage lawless freedom, just as individual men have 
done, and yielding to the coercion of public laws. 
Thus they can form a State of nations (civitas 
gentium], one, too ; which will be ever increasing 
and would finally embrace all the peoples of the 
earth. States, however, in accordance with their 
understanding of the law of nations, by no means 
desire this, and therefore reject in hypothesi what 
ii correct in thesi. Hence, instead of the positive 
idea of a world-republic, if all is not to be lost, 
only the negative substitute for it, a federation 
averting war, maintaining its ground and ever 
extending over the world may stop the current of 
this tendency to war and shrinking from the con- 
trol of law. But even then there will be a con- 
stant danger that this propensity may break out. * 

* On the conclusion of peace at the end of a war, it might not 
be unseemly for a nation to appoint a day of humiliation, after 
the festival of thanksgiving, on which to invoke the mercy of 
Heaven for the terrible sin which the human race are guilty of, 
in their continued unwillingness to submit (in their relation* with 
other states) to a law-governed constitution, preferring rather 

Translation 1 3 7 

"Furor impiui intui fremit horddui oro crucnto." 
(Virgil.) * 


III. "The rights of men, as citizens of the world, 
shall be limited to the conditions of universal 

We are speaking here, as in the previous articles, 
not of philanthropy, but of right ; and in this sphere 
hospitality signifies the claim of a stranger entering 
foreign territory to be treated by its owner without 
hostility. The latter may send him away again, if 
this can be done without causing his death; but, 
so long as he conducts himself peaceably, he must 
not be treated as an enemy. It is not a right to 
be treated as a guest to which the stranger can lay 

in the pride of their independence to use the barbarous method 
of war, which after all does not really settle what is wanted, 
namely, the right of each state in a quarrel. The feasts of 
thanksgiving during a war for a victorious battle, the hymns 
which are sung to use the Jewish expression " to the Lord of 
Hosts" are not in less strong contrast to the ethical idea of a 
father of mankind; for, apart from the indifference these customs 
show to the way in which nations seek to establish their rights 
sad enough as it is these rejoicings bring in an element of 
txultation that a great number of Urea, or at least the happiness 
of many, has been destroyed. 
* Cf. Aeneidos, I. 294 $tq. 

"Furor impius iatu*, 

Saeva sedens super arma, et centum vinetua ai'nis 
Post tergum nodis, fremet horridus ore cnieuto." [Tr.] 

138 Perpetual Ptaee 

claim a special friendly compact on his behalf 
would be required to make him for a given time 
an actual inmate but he has a right of visitation. 
This right * to present themselves to society belongs 
to all mankind in virtue of our common right of 
possession on the surface of the earth on which, as 
it is a globe, we cannot be infinitely scattered, and 
must in the end reconcile ourselves to existence 
side by side: at the same time, originally no one 
individual had more right than another to live in 
any one particular spot. Uninhabitable portions of 
the surface, ocean and desert, split up the human 
community, but in such a way that ships and camels 
"the ship of the desert" make it possible for 
men to come into touch with one another across 
these unappropriated regions and to take advantage 
of our common claim to the face of the earth with 
a view to a possible intercommunication. The in- 
hospitality of the inhabitants of certain sea coasts 
as, for example, the coast of Barbary in plunder- 
ing ships in neighbouring seas or making slaves of 
shipwrecked mariners ; or the behaviour of the 
Arab Bedouins in the deserts, who think that 

* Cf. Vattel (pp. cit., II. ch. IX. 123): "The right of passage 
is also a remnant of the primitive state of communion, in which 
the entire earth was common to all mankind, and the passage was 
everywhere free to each individual according to his necessities. 
Nobody can be entirely deprived of this right." See also aboTe, 
P, 65, note. [Tr.] 

Translation 139 

proximity to nomadic tribes constitutes a right to 
rob, is thus contrary to the law of nature. This 
right to hospitality, however that is to say, the 
privilege of strangers arriving on foreign soil does 
not amount to more than what is implied in a 
permission to make an attempt at intercourse with 
the original inhabitants. In this way far distant 
territories may enter into peaceful relations with 
one another. These relations may at last come 
under the public control of law, and thus the hu- 
man race may be brought nearer the realisation 
of a cosmopolitan constitution. 

Let us look now, for the sake of comparison, at 
the inhospitable behaviour of the civilised nations, 
especially the commercial states of our continent. 
The injustice which they exhibit on visiting foreign 
lands and races this being equivalent in their 
eyes to conquest is such as to fill us with 
horror. America, the negro countries, the Spice 
Islands, the Cape etc. were, on being discovered, 
looked upon as countries which belonged to no- 
body; for the native inhabitants were reckoned as 
nothing. In Hindustan, under the pretext of in- 
tending to establish merely commercial depots, the 
Europeans introduced foreign troops ; and, as a 
result, the different states of Hindustan were stirred 
up to far-spreading wars. Oppression of the natives 
followed, famine, insurrection, perfidy and all 

140 Pfrpetual Piace 

the rest of the litany of evilt which can afflict 

China * and Japan (Nipon) which had made an 
attempt at receiving guests of this kind, have now 

* ID order to call this great empire by the uame which it girts 
itself namely, China, not Sina or a word of similar sound we have 
only to look at Gcorgii: Alphab. Tibet., pp. 651 654, particularly 
nott b., below. According to the observation of Professor Fischer 
of St. Petersburg, there is really no particular name which it always 
goes by: tfce most usual is the word Kin, is. gold, which the inha- 
bitants of Tibet call Scr. Hence the emperor is called the king 
of gold, /./. the king of the most splendid country in the world. 
This word Kin may probably be Ckin in the empire itself, but 
b pronounced Kin by the Italian missionaries on account of 
ihe gutturals. Thus we see that the country of the Seres, BO often 
mentioned by the Romans, was China: the silk, however, was 
despatched to Europe across Greater Tibet, probably through 
Smaller Tibet and Bucharia, through Persia and then on. Thi 
lead* to many reflections as to the antiquity of this wonderful 
state, M compared with Hindustan, at the time of it* union with 
Tibet and thence with Japan. On the other hand, the name 
Sina or Tschina which is said to be given to this land by neigh- 
bouring people* leads to nothing. 

Perhaps we can explain the ancient intercourse of Europe with 
Tibet fact at no time widely kcown by looking at what 
Hesychius has preserred on the matter. I refer to the shout, Kot/z- 
Of4*-a% (Konx Ompax), the cry of the Hierophants in the Eleusiniaa 
mysteries (cf. Travels of Anacharsit tke Younger, Part V., p. 447, 
setf.). For, according to Georgii Alfk. Tibet., the word Coneioa 
which bears a striking resemblance to Konx means God. Pak-ci 
(fb. p. 520) which might easily be pronounced by the Greeks like 
fax means promulgator legis, the divine principle permeating 
nature (called also, on p. 177, Cencresi). Om, however, which La 
Croie translates by benedictus, i.e. blessed, can when applied to 
th Deity mean nothing but beatified (p. 507). Now P. Franc. 
Hormtiua, when be asked th Lhamas of Tibet, as he often did, 
what tfecy mndaratood by God (Cencria) always got tfce aaswer : 

Translation 141 

taken a prudent step. Only to a single European 
people, the Dutch, has China given the right of 
access to her shores (but not of entrance into the 
country), while Japan has granted both these con- 
cessions; but at the same time they exclude the 
Dutch who enter, as if they were prisoners, from 
social intercourse with the inhabitants. The worst, 
or from the standpoint of ethical judgment the 
best, of all this is that no satisfaction is derived 
from all this violence, that all these trading com- 
panies stand on the verge of ruin, that the Sugar 
Islands, that seat of the most horrible and delib- 

"it is the assembly of all the saints," i.e. the assembly of those 
blessed ones who have been born again according to the faith of 
the Lama and, after many wanderings in changing forms, have at 
last returned to God, to Burchane : that is to say, they are beings 
to be worshipped, souls which have undergone transmigration 
(p. 223). So the mysterious expression JKonx Ompax ought 
probably to mean the holy (Konx\ blessed, (Om) and wise (Pax) 
supreme Being pervading the universe, the personification of nature. 
Its use in the Greek mysteries probably signified monotheism for 
the Epoptes, in distinction from the polytheism of the people, 
although elsewhere P. Horalius scented atheism here. How that 
mysterious word came by way of Tibet to the Greeks may 
be explained as above; and, on the other hand, in this way is 
made probable an early intercourse of Europe with China across 
Tibet, earlier perhaps than the communication with Hindustan. 
(There is some difference of opinion as to the meaning of the words 
x^y '<fytwa according to Liddell and Scott, a corruption of jwy| 
iliofus T$fd Kant's inferences here seem to be more than far- 
fetched. Lobeck, in his Aglaophamus (p. 775), gives a quite different 
interpretation which has, he says, been approved by scholars. And 
Whately {Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Bonaparte, 3rd. ed., 
Postcript) uses Konx Ompax as a pseudonym. [Tr.]) 

142 Perpetual Peace 

erate slavery, yield no real profit, but only have 
their use indirectly and for no very praiseworthy 
object namely, that of furnishing men to be 
trained as sailors for the men-of-war and thereby 
contributing to the carrying on of war in Europe. 
And this has been done by nations who make a 
great ado about their piety, and who, while they 
are quite ready to commit injustice, would like, in 
their orthodoxy, to be considered among the elect. 
The intercourse, more or less close, which has 
been everywhere steadily increasing between the 
nations of the earth, has now extended so enor- 
mously that a violation of right in one part of the 
world is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a cos- 
mopolitan right is no fantastical, high-flown notion 
of right, but a complement of the unwritten code 
of law constitutional as well as international 
law necessary for the public rights of mankind 
in general and thus for the realisation of perpetual 
peace. For only by endeavouring to fulfil the 
conditions laid down by this cosmopolitan law can 
we flatter ourselves that we are gradually approach- 
ing that ideal. 



THIS guarantee is given by no less a power 
than the great artist nature (natura dcsdala rerum) 
in whose mechanical course is clearly exhibited a 
predetermined design to make harmony spring 
from human discord, even against the will of man. 
Now this design, although called Fate when looked 
upon as the compelling force of a cause, the 
laws of whose operation are unknown to us, is, 
when considered as the purpose manifested in the 
course of nature, called Providence, * as the deep- 

* In the mechanical system of nature to which man belongs as 
a sentient being, there appears, as the underlying ground of its 
existence, a certain form which we cannot make intelligible to 
ourselves except by thinking into the physical world the idea of 
an end preconceived by the Author of the universe: this predeter- 
mination of nature on the part of God we generally call Divine 
Providence. In so far as this providence appears in the origin of 
the universe, we speak of Providence as founder of the world 
(prcvidentia conditrix ; semel jussit, semper parent. Augustine). As 
it maintains the course of nature, however, according to universal 
laws of adaptation to preconceived ends, [/.*. teleological laws] 
we call it a ruling providence (providentia gubernatrix). Further, 
we name it the guiding providence (providentia directrix), as it 
appears in the world for special ends, which we coXild not foresee, 
but suspect only from the result. Finally, regarding particular events 

144 Perpetual Peace 

lying wisdom of a Higher Cause, directing itself 
towards the ultimate practical end of the human 
race and predetermining the course of things with 
a view to its realisation. This Providence we do 

as (Hvine purposes, we speak no longer of providence, but of dispensa- 
tion (directio txtraordinaria). As this term, however, really suggests 
the idea of miracles, although the events are not spoken of by this 
name, the desire to fathom dispensation, as such, is a foolish 
presumption in men. Tor, from one single occurrence, to jump at 
the conclusion that there u a particular principle of efficient causes 
and that this event is an end and not merely the natural \natur- 
meehanische\ sequence of a design quite unknown to us is absurd 
and presumptuous, in however pious and humble a spirit we may 
speak of it. In the same way to distinguish between a universal 
and a particular providence when regarding it materialiier, in its 
relation to actual objects in the world (to say, for instance, that 
there may be, indeed, a providence for the preservation of the 
different species of creation, but that individuals are left to chance) 
is false and contradictory. For providence is called universal for the 
very reason that no single thing may be thought of as shut out from 
its care. Probably the distinction of two kinds of providence, 
formaliter or subjectively considered, had reference to the manner 
in which it* purposes are fulfilled. So that we have ordinary 
providence (eg. the yearly decay and awakening to new life in 
nature with change of season) and what we may call unusual or 
special providence (e.g. the bringing of timber by ocean currents 
to Arctic shores where it does not grow, and where without this 
aid the inhabitants could not live). Here, although we can quite 
well explain the physico-mcchanical cause of these phenomena 
in this case, for example, the banks of the rivers in temperate 
countries are over-grown with trees, some of which fall into 
the water and are carried along, probably by the Gulf Stream 
we must not overlook the teleological cause which points to the pro- 
vidential care of a ruling wisdom above nature. But the concept, 
commonly used in the schools of philosophy, of a co-operation on 
the part of the Deity or a concurrence (concursus) in the operations 
going on in the world of sense, must be dropped. For it is, firstly, 


not, it i true, perceive in the cunning contrivances 
[Kunstanstaltfn] of nature ; nor can we even 
conclude from the fact of their existence that 
it is there; but, as in every relation between 
the form of things and their final cause, we 
can, and must, supply the thought of a Higher 
Wisdom, in order that we may be able to form 
an idea of the possible existence of these products 
after the analogy of human works of art [Kunsthand- 

wlf-contradictory to couple the like and the unlike together (fty- 
phes jungtre equh} and to let HIM who is Himself the entire cause 
of tht changes im the universt make good any shortcomings in 
His own predetermining providence (which to require this must 
be defective) during the course of the world; for example, to say 
ttat the physician has restored the sick with the help of God that 
is to say that Ht has been present as a support. For tausa soli- 
taria nen j*t*>*t. God created the physician as well as his means 
ef healing; and we must ascribe the result wholly to Him, if we 
will go back to the supreme First Cause which, theoretically, is 
beyond our comprehension. Or we can ascribe the result entirely 
to the physician, in so far as we follow up this event, as 
explicable in the chain of physical causes, according to the 
order of nature. Secondly, moreover, such a way of looking at 
this question destroys all the fixed principles by which we judge 
an effect. But, from the ethico-practical point of view which looks 
entirely to the transcendental side of things, the idea of a divine 
concurrence is quite proper and even necessary : for example, in 
the faith that God will make good the imperfection of our human 
justice, if only our feelings and intentions are sincere; and that He 
will do this by means beyond our comprehension, and therefore 
we should not slacken our efforts after what is good. Whence it 
follows, as a matter of course, that no one must attempt to explain 
a goo 1 action as a mere event in time by this (oncurmt ; for that 
would be to pretend a theoretical knowledge of the supersensible 
aad hence be absurd, 



* The representation to ourselves of the 
relation and agreement of these formations of nature 
to the moral purpose for which they were made anc 
which reason directly prescribes to us, is an Idea 
it is true, which is in theory superfluous; but in 
practice it is dogmatic, and its objective reality K 
well established, f Thus we see, for example, with 
regard to the ideal \Pfiichtb egriff\ of perpetual 
peace, that it is our duty to make use of the 
mechanism of nature for the realisation of that end. 
Moreover, in a case like this where we are interested 
merely in the theory and not in the religious question, 
the use of the word " nature " is more appropriate 
than that of "providence", in view of the limitation* 
of human reason, which, in considering the relation 
of effects to their causes, must keep within the 
limits of possible experience. And the term 
"nature" is also less presumptuous than the other. 
To speak of a Providence knowable by us would be 
boldly to put on the wings of Icarus in order to 
draw near to the mystery of its unfathomable 

Before we determine the surety given by nature 
more exactly, we must first look at what ultimately 
makes this guarantee of peace necessary the 

* 14 AT/, which we cannot diuerar troai the id** of a 
skill capable of producing tho. (Tr.j 
t Sec preface, p. ix. above. 

First Supplement 

circumstances in which nature has carefully placed 
the actors in her great theatre. In the next place, 
we shall proceed to consider the manner in which 
she gives this surety. 

The provisions she has made are as follow : (i) 
she has taken care that men can live in all parts 
of the world ; (2) she has scattered them by means 
of war in all directions, even into the most inhos- 
pitable regions, so that these too might be popu- 
lated ; (3) by this very means she has forced them 
to enter into relations more or less controlled by 
law. It is surely wonderful that, on the cold wastes 
round the Arctic Ocean, there is always to be 
found moss for the reindeer to scrape out from 
under the snow, the reindeer itself either serving 
as food or to draw the sledge of the Ostiak or 
Samoyedes. And salt deserts which would other- 
wise be left unutilised have the camel, which seems 
as if created for travelling in such lands. This 
evidence of design in things, however, is still more 
clear when we come to know that, besides the 
fur-clad animals of the shores of the Arctic Ocean, 
there are seals, walruses and whales whose flesh 
furnishes food and whose oil fire for the dwellers 
in these regions. - But the providential care of 
nature excites our wonder above all, when we hear 
of the driftwood which is carried whence no one 
knows to these treeless shores: for without the 

148 Pfrpttual Ptatt 

aid of this material the natives could neither con- 
struct their craft, nor weapons, nor huts for shelter. 
Here too they have so much to do, making war 
against wild animals, that they live at peace with 
one another. But what drove them originally into 
these regions was probably nothing but war. 

Of animals, used by us as instruments of war, 
the horse was the first which man learned to tame 
ind domesticate during the period of the peopling 
of the earth; the elephant belongs to the later 
period of the luxury of states already established. 
In the same way, the art of cultivating certain 
grasses called cereals no longer known to us in 
their original form and also the multiplication and 
improvement, by transplanting and grafting, of the 
original kinds of fruit in Europe, probably only 
two species, the crab-apple and wild pear could 
only originate under the conditions accompanying 
established states where the rights of property are 
assured. That is to say it would be after man, 
hitherto existing in lawless liberty, had advanced 
beyond the occupations of a hunter, * a fisherman 

* Of all modes of livelihood the life of the hunter is undoubtedly 
most incompatible with a civilised condition of society. Because, 
to live by hunting, families must isolate themselves from their 
neighbours, soon becoming estranged and spread over widely 
scattered forests, to be before long on terms of hostility, since 
each requires a great deal of space to obtain food and raiment. 

God's command to Noah not to shed blood (I. Genesis^ IX. 46) 

First Supplement 149 

or a shepherd to the life of a tiller of the soil, 
when salt and iron were discovered, to become, 
perhaps, the first articles of commerce between 
different peoples, and were sought far and near. 
In this way the peoples would be at first brought 
into peaceful relation with one another, and so come 
to an understanding and the enjoyment of friendly 
intercourse, even with their most distant neighbours. 
Now while nature provided that men could live 
on all parts of the earth, she also at the same time 
despotically willed that they should live everywhere 
on it, although against their own inclination and 
even although this imperative did not presuppose 
an idea of duty which would compel obedience to 
nature with the force of a moral law. But, to 
attain this end, she has chosen war. So we see 
certain peoples, widely separated, whose common 

[4. "But flesh with the life thereof, which U the blood 
thereof, shall ye not eat. 

5. And surely your blood of your lives will I require; 
at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand 
of man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require 
the life of man. 

6. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood 
be shed : for in the image of God made he man."] 

is frequently quoted, and was afterwards in another connection it 
is true made by the baptised Jews a condition to which Chris- 
tians, newly converted from heathendom, had to conform. Cf. 
Acts XV. 20 ; XXI. 25. This command seems originally to have 
been nothing else than a prohibition of the life of the hunter; 
for here the possibility of eating raw flesh must often occur, and, 
in forbidding the one custom, we condemn th other. 

150 Perpetual Peace 

descent is made evident by affinity in their langu- 
ages. Thus, for instance, we find the Samoyedes 
on the Arctic Ocean, and again a people speaking 
a similar language on the Altai Mts., 200 miles 
[Mfileri\ * off, between whom has pressed in a mount- 
ed tribe, war-like in character and of Mongolian 
origin, which has driven one branch of the race 
far from the other, into the most inhospitable 
regions where their own inclination would certainly 
not have carried them, f In the same way, through 
the intrusion of the Gothic and Sarmatian tribes, 
the Finns in the most northerly regions of Europe, 
whom we call Laplanders, have been separated by 
as great a distance from the Hungarians, with whose 
language their own is allied. And what but war 
can have brought the Esquimos to the north of 
America, a race quite distinct from those of that 
country and probably European adventurers of 

* About 1000 English miles. 

f The question might be put:" If it is nature's will that thes 
Arctic shores should not remain unpopulated, what will become 
of their inhabitants, if, as is to be expected, at some time or 
other no more driftwood should be brought to them? For we 
may believe that, with the advance of civilisation, the inhabitants 
of temperate zones will utilise berter the wood which grows on 
the banks of their rivers, aiid not let it fall into the stream and 
so be swept away." I answer: the inhabitants of the shores of 
the River Obi, the Yenisei, the Lena will supply them with it 
through trade, and take in exchange the animal produce in which 
the seat of Arctic shore* are so rich that is, if nature KM first 
of all brought about peace among them. 

First Supplement 151 

prehistoric times? And war too, nature's method 
of populating the earth, must have driven the 
Pescherais * in South America as far as Patagonia. 
War itself, however, is in need of no special ) 
stimulating cause, but seems engrafted in human 7 
nature, and is even regarded as something noble \ 
in itself to which man is inspired by the love of 
glory apart from motives of self-interest. Hence, 
among the savages of America as well as those of 
Europe in the age of chivalry, martial courage is 
looked upon as of great value in itself, not merely 
when a war is going on, as is reasonable enough, 
but in order that there should be war: and thus 
war is often entered upon merely to exhibit this 
quality. So that an intrinsic dignity is held to 
attach to war in itself, and even philosophers 
eulogise it as an ennobling, refining influence on 
humanity, unmindful of the Greek proverb, " War 
is evil, in so far as it makes more bad people 
than it takes away." 

So much, then, of what nature does for her own 
ends with regard to the human race as members 
of the animal world. - Now comes the question 
which touches the essential points in this design of 
a perpetual peace: "What does nature do in this 
respect with reference to the end which man's own 

* Cf. EMC. Brit, (gth !.), art. ' ; Indians", in which there is an 
t " Futgiww, At Ptsckti-mis" tf some \rrihws. [Tr.] 

151 Perpetual Peace 

reason sets before him as a duty ? and consequently 
what does she do to further the realisation of hit 
moral purpose ? How does she guarantee that what 
man, by the laws of freedom, ought to do and yet 
fails to do, he will do, without any infringement 
of his freedom by the compulsion of nature and 
that, moreover, this shall be done in accordance 
with the three forms of public right constitutional 
or political law, international law and cosmopolitan 
law?" When I say of nature that she wills that 
this or that should take place, I do not mean that 
she imposes upon us the duty to do it for only the 
free, unrestrained, practical reason can do that but 
that she does it herself, whether we will or not. 
"Fata voltntem ducunt," nolentem trahunt" 

i . Even if a people were not compelled through 
internal discord to submit to the restraint of public 
laws, war would bring this about, working from 
without. For, according to the contrivance of na- 
ture which we have mentioned, every people finds 
another tribe in its neighbourhood, pressing upon 
it in such a manner that it is compelled to form 
itself internally into a state to be able to defend 
itself as a power should. Now the republican 
constitution is the only one which is perfectly 
adapted to the rights of man, but it is also the 
most difficult to establish and still more to main- 
tain. So generally is this retognised that people 

First Supplement 153 

often say the members of a republican state would 
require to be angels, * because men, with their self- 
seeking propensities, are not fit for a constitution 
of so sublime a form But now nature comes to 
the aid of the universal, reason-derived will which, 
much as we honour it, is in practice powerless. 
And this she does, by means of these very self- 
seeking propensities, so that it only depends - 
and so much lies within the power of man on a 
good organisation of the state for their forces to 
be so pitted against one another, that the one may 
check the destructive activity of the other or neu- 
tralise its effect. And hence, from the standpoint of 
reason, the result will be the same as if both forces 
did not exist, and each individual is compelled to 
be, if not a morally good man, yet at least a good 
citizen. The problem of the formation of the state, 
hard as it may sound, is not insoluble, even for a 

* Rousseau uses these terms in speaking of democracy. (Cont. 
Sea., III. Ch. 4.) " If there were a nation of Gods, they might be 
governed by a democracy: but so perfect a government will not 
agree with men." 

But he writes elsewhere of republican governments (op. ft/., 
II. Ch. 6.): "AH lawful governments are republican." And in a 
footnote to this passage: "I do not by the word 'republic' mean 
an aristocracy or democracy only, but in general all governments 
directed by the public will which is the law. If a government is 
to b lawful, it must not be coufused with the sovereign power, 
but be considered as the administrator of that power: and then 
Monarchy itself is a republic," This language ha* a eiosd affinity 
\vitfc &*t wed by Kam*. (Cf. above, p. i$.) [Tr.] 

154 Perpetual Peace 

race of devils, granted that they have intelligence. 
It may be put thus : " Given a multitude of rational 
beings who, in a body, require general laws for their 
own preservation, but each of whom, as an individual, 
is secretly inclined to exempt himself from this 
restraint : how are we to order their affairs and how 
establish for them a constitution such that, although 
their private dispositions may be really antagonistic, 
they may yet so act as a check upon one another, 
that, in their public relations, the effect is the same 
as if they had no such evil sentiments." Such a 
problem must be capable of solution. For it deals, 
not with the moral reformation of mankind, but 
only with the mechanism of nature ; and the problem 
is to learn how this mechanism of nature can be 
applied to men, in order so to regulate the antago- 
nism of conflicting interests in a people that they 
may even compel one another to submit to compul- 
sory laws and thus necessarily bring about the state 
of peace in which laws have force. We can see, 
in states actually existing, although very imperfectly 
organised, that, in externals, they already approx- 
imate very nearly to what the Idea of right prescribes, 
although the principle of morality is certainly not 
the cause. A good political constitution, however, 
is not to be expected as a result of progress in 
morality; but rather, conversely, the good moral 
condition of a nation is to be looked for, M one of 

First Supplement 155 

the first fruits of such a constitution. Hence the 
mechanism of nature, working through the self- 
seeking propensities of man (which of course coun- 
teract one another in their external effects), may be 
used by reason as a means of making way for the 
realisation of her own purpose, the empire of right, 
and, as far as is in the power of the state, to pro- 
mote and secure in this way internal as well as 
external peace. We may say, then, that it is the 
irresistible will of nature that right shall at last 
get the supremacy. What one here fails to do will 
be accomplished in the long run, although perhaps 
with much inconvenience to us. As Bouterwek says, 
11 If you bend the reed too much it breaks : he who 
would do too much does nothing." 

2. The idea of international law presupposes 
the separate existence of a number of neighbouring 
and independent states ; and, although such a con- 
dition of things is in itself already a state of war, 
(if a federative union of these nations does not 
prevent the outbreak of hostilities) yet, according 
to the Idea of reason, this is better than that all 
the states should be merged into one under a 
power which has gained the ascendency over its 
neighbours and gradually become a universal mo- 
narchy. * For the wider the sphere of their jurisdic- 

* $ above, p. 69, nte t p. reference to Thetry 0f Etkus. 

156 Perpetual Peace 

tion, the more laws lose in force; and soulless 
despotism, when it has choked the seeds of good, 
at last sinks into anarchy. Nevertheless it is the 
desire of every state, or of its ruler, to attain to 
a permanent condition of peace in this very way; 
that is to say, by subjecting the whole world as 
far as possible to its sway. But nature wills it 
otherwise. She employs two means to separate 
nations, and prevent them from intermixing : namely, 
the differences of language and of religion. * These 
differences bring with them a tendency to mutual 
hatred, and furnish pretexts for waging war. But, 
none the less, with the growth of culture and the 
gradual advance of men to greater unanimity of 
principle, they lead to concord in a state of peace 
which, unlike the despotism we have spoken of, (the 
churchyard of freedom) does not arise from the 
weakening of all forces, but is brought into being 
and secured through the equilibrium of these forces 
in their most active rivalry. 

* Difference of religion! A strange expression, M if one were 
to speak of different kinds of morality. There may indeed 
be different historical forms of belief, that is to say, the 
various means which have been used in the course of time 
to promote religion, but they are mere subjects of learned invest- 
igation, and do not really lie within the sphere of religion. In 
the same way there are many religious works the Zendavesta, 
Vida ) Koran etc. but there is only one religion, binding for 
all men and for all times. These books are each no more than 
the accidental mouthpiece of rtligion, and may be different according 
to diffrenc in tim and place. 

Suppltmmt 157 

3. As nature wisely separates nations which the 
will of each state, sanctioned even by the principles 
of international law, would gladly unite under its 
own sway by stratagem or force ; in the same way, 
on the other hand, she unites nations whom the 
principle of a cosmopolitan right would not have 
secured against violence and war. And this union 
she brings about through an appeal to their mutual 
interests. The commercial spirit cannot co-exist with 
war, and sooner or later it takes possession of every 
nation. For, of all the forces which lie at the com- 
mand of a state, the power of money is probably the 
most reliable. Hence states find themselves compelled 
not, it is true, exactly from motives of morality 
to further the noble end of peace and to avert war, 
by means of mediation, wherever it threatens to break 
out, just as if they had made a permanent league 
for this purpose. For great alliances with a view to 
war can, from the nature of things, only very 
rarely occur, and still more seldom succeed. 

In this way nature guarantees the coming of 
perpetual peace, through the natural course of 
human propensities: not indeed with sufficient cer- 
tainty to enable us to prophesy the future of this 
ideal theoretically, but yet clearly enough for prac- 
tical purposes. And thus this guarantee of nature 
makes it a duty that we should labour for this 
end, an end which is no mere chimera. 



A SECRET article in negotiations concerning public 
right is, when looked at objectively or with regard 
to the meaning of the term, a contradiction. When 
we view it, however, from the subjective standpoint, 
with regard to the character and condition of the 
person who dictates it, we see that it might quite 
well involve some private consideration, so that he 
would regard it as hazardous to his dignity to 
acknowledge such an article as originating from him. 

The only article of this kind is contained in the 
following proposition: "The ^opinions of philo- 
sophers, with regard to the conditions of the pos- 
sibility of a public peace, shall be taken into con- 
sideration by states armed for war." 

It seems, however, to be derogatory to the dignity 
of the legislative authority of a state to which we 
must of course attribute all wisdom to ask advice 
from subjects (among whom stand philosophers) 
about the rules of its behaviour to other states. 
At the same time, it is very advisable that this 
should be done. Hence the state will silently invite 
suggestion for this purpose, while at the same 
time keeping the fact secret. This amounts to 

1 19 

faying that the state will allow philotophen to 
discuss freely and publicly the universal principles 
governing the conduct of war and establishment 
of peace ; for they will do this of their own accord, 
if no prohibition is laid upon them. * The arrange- 
ment between states, on this point, does not require 
that a special agreement should be made, merely 
for this purpose; for it is already involved in 
the obligation imposed by the universal reason of 
man which gives the moral law. We would not 
be understood to say that the state must give 
a preference to the principles of the philosopher, 
rather than to the opinions of the jurist, the repre- 
sentative of state authority ; but only that he should 
be heard. The latter, who has chosen for a symbol 
the scales of right and the sword of justice, f generally 
uses that sword not merely to keep off all outside 
influences from the scales; for, when one pan of 
the balance will not go down, he throws his sword 
into it ; and then V<z victis I The jurist, not being 

' Montesquieu speaks thus in praise of the English state : " As 
the enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation, 
consists in every man's being allowed to speak his thoughts and 
to lay open his sentiments, a citizen in this state will say or write 
whatever the laws do not expressly forbid to be said or written." 
(Esprit des Loit, XIX. Ch. ay.) Hobbes is opposed to all free 
discussion of political questions and to freedom as a source of danger 
to the state. [Tr.] 

f Kant U thinking here not of the sword of justice, in die 
moral sense, but of a sword which i* symbolical of ifce executive 
powc of the actMl law. [Tr.] 

160 Ptrpttutl Ptact 


a moral philosopher, is under the greatest temptation 

to do this, because it is his business only to apply 
existing laws and not to investigate whether these 
are not themselves in need of improvement; and 
this actually lower function of his profession he 
looks upon as the nobler, because it is linked to 
power (as is the case also in both the other faculties, 
theology and medicine). Philosophy occupies a very 
low position compared with this combined power. So 
that it is said, for example, that she is the handmaid 
of theology; and the same has been said of her 
position with regard to law and medicine. It is not 
quite clear, however, " whether she bears the torch 
before these gracious ladies, or carries the train." 
That kings should philosophise, or philosophers 
become kings, is not to be expected. But neither 
is it to be desired; for the possession of power is 
inevitably fatal to the free exercise of reason. But it 
is absolutely indispensable, for their enlightenment 
as to the full significance of their vocations, that 
both kings and sovereign nations, which rule them- 
selves in accordance with laws of equality, should not 
allow the class of philosophers to disappear, nor forbid 
the expression of their opinions, but should allow them 
to speak openly. And since this class of men, by 
their very nature, are incapable of instigating rebellion 
or forming unions for purposes of political agitation, 
they should not be suspected of propagandism. 



IN an objective sense, morals is a practical 
science, as the sum of laws exacting unconditional 
obedience, in accordance with which we ought to 
act. Now, once we have admitted the authority 
of this idea of duty, it is evidently inconsistent 
that we should think of saying that we cannot act 
thus. For, in this case, the idea of duty falls to 
the ground of itself; " ultra posse nemo obligatur" 
Hence there can be no quarrel between politics, 
as the practical science of right, and morals, which 
is also a science of right, but theoretical. That 
is, theory cannot come into conflict with practice. 
For, in that case, we would need to understand 
under the term "ethics" or "morals" a universal 
doctrine of expediency, or, in other words, a theory 
of precepts which may guide us in choosing the 
best means for attaining ends calculated for our 
advantage. This is to deny that a science of 
morals exists. 


1 62 Perpetual Peace 

Politics says, "Be wise as serpents"; morals adds 
the limiting condition, " and guileless as doves." 
If these precepts cannot stand together in one 
command, then there is a real quarrel between 
politics and morals. * But if they can be com- 
pletely brought into accord, then the idea of any 
antagonism between them is absurd, and the question 
of how best to make a compromise between the 
two points of view ceases to be even raised. 
Although the saying, "Honesty is the best policy," 

* Cf. Aristotle: Politics, (Welldon'i trans.) IV. Ch. XIV. "The 
same principles of morality are best both for individuals and States." 

Among the ancients the connection between politics and morals 
was never questioned, although there were differences of opinion 
as to which science stood first in importance. Thus, while Plato 
put politics second to morals, Aristotle regarded politics as the 
chief science and ethics as a part of politics. This connection 
between the sciences was denied by Machiavelli, who lays down 
the dictum that, in the relations of sovereigns and states, the 
ordinary rules of morality do not apply. See Tht Ftince, Ch. XVIII. 
"A Prince," he says, "and most of all a new Prince, cannot observe 
all those rules of conduct in respect of which men are accounted 
good, being frequently obliged, in order to preserve his Princedom, 
to act in opposition to good faith, charity, humanity, and religion. 
He must therefore keep his mind ready to shift as the winds and 
tides of Fortune turn, and, as I have already said, he ought not 
to quit good courses if he can help it, but should know how to 
follow evil courses if he must." 

Hume thought that laxer principles might be allowed to govern 
states than private persons, because intercourse between them was 
not so "necessary and advantageous" as between individuals. 
"There i* a system of morals," he says, "calculated for princes, 
much more free than that which ought to govern private persons," 
(Treatise, HI., Part IL, Sect. IX.) JTr.J 

Appendix I 163 

expresses a theory which, alas, is often contradicted 
in practice, yet the likewise theoretical maxim, 
"Honesty is better than any policy," is exalted 
high above every possible objection, is indeed the 
necessary condition of all politics. 

The Terminus of morals does not yield to Jupiter, 
the Terminus of force ; for the latter remains beneath 
the sway of Fate. In other words, reason is not 
sufficiently enlightened to survey the series of pre- 
determining causes which would make it possible 
for us to predict with certainty the good or bad 
results of human action, as they follow from the 
mechanical laws of nature; although we may hope 
that things will turn out as we should desire. But 
what we have to do, in order to remain in the 
path of duty guided by the rules of wisdom, 
reason makes everywhere perfectly clear, and does 
this for the purpose of furthering her ultimate ends. 

The practical man, however, for whom morals is 
mere theory, even while admitting that what ought 
to be can be, bases his dreary verdict against our 
well-meant hopes really on this: he pretends that 
he can foresee from his observation of human 
nature, that men will never be willing to do what 
is required in order to bring about the wished-for 
results leading to perpetual peace. It is true that 
the will of all individual men to live under a legal 
constitution according to the principles of liberty 

164 Perpetual Peace 

that is to say, the distributive unity of the wills 
of all is not sufficient to attain this end. We 
must have the collective unity of their united 
will: all as a body must determine these new 
conditions. The solution of this difficult problem 
is required in order that civil society should be a 
whole. To all this diversity of individual wills there 
must come a uniting cause, in order to produce a 
common will which no distributive will is able to 
\ give. Hence, in the practical realisation of that 
] idea, no other beginning of a law-governed society 
\ can be counted upon than one that is brought 
about by force: upon this force, too, public law 
^afterwards rests. This state of things certainly 
prepares us to meet considerable deviation in actual 
experience from the theoretical idea of perpetual 
peace, since we cannot take into account the moral 
character and disposition of a law-giver in this 
connection, or expect that, after he has united a 
wild multitude into one people, he will leave it to 
them to bring about a legal constitution by their 
common will. 

It amounts to this. Any ruler who has once 
got the power in his hands will not let the people 
dictate laws for him. A state which enjoys an 
independence of the control of external law will 
not submit to the judgment of the tribunals of 
other states, when it has to consider how to obtain 

Appendix T 165 

its rights against them. And even a continent, 
when it feels its superiority to another, whether this 
be in its way or not, will not fail to take advantage 
of an opportunity offered of strengthening its power 
by the spoliation or even conquest of this territory. 
Hence all theoretical schemes, connected with con- 
stitutional, international or cosmopolitan law, crum- 
ble away into empty impracticable ideals. While, 
on the other hand, a practical science, based on 
the empirical principles of human nature, which 
does not disdain to model its maxims on an ob- 
servation of actual life, can alone hope to find a 
sure foundation on which to build up a system of 
national policy. 

Now certainly, if there is neither freedom nor a 
moral law founded upon it, and every actual or 
possible event happens in the mere mechanical 
course of nature, then politics, as the art of making 
use of this physical necessity in things for the 
government of men, is the whole of practical wisdom 
and the idea of right is an empty concept. If, on 
the other hand, we find that this idea of right 
is necessarily to be conjoined with politics and even 
to be raised to the position of a limiting condition of 
that science, then the possibility of reconciling them 
must be admitted. I can thus imagine a moral 
politician, that is to say, one who understands the 
principles of statesmanship to be such as do not 

1 66 Perpetual Ptace 

conflict with morali; but I cannot conceive of a 
political moralist who fashions for himself such a 
system of ethics as may serve the interest of 

The moral politician will always act upon the 
following principle : " If certain defects which could 
not have been avoided are found in the political 
constitution or foreign relations of a state, it is a 
duty for all, especially for the rulers of the state, 
to apply their whole energy to correcting them as 
soon as possible, and to bringing the constitution 
and political relations on these points into conformity 
with the Law of Nature, as it is held up as a model 
before us in the idea of reason; and this they 
should do even at a sacrifice of their own interest." 
Now it is contrary to all politics which is, in this 
particular, in agreement with morals to dissever 
any of the links binding citizens together in the 
state or nations in cosmopolitan union, before a 
better constitution is there to take the place of 
what has been thus destroyed. And hence it would 
be absurd indeed to demand that every imperfec- 
tion in political matters must be violently altered 
on the spot. But, at the same time, it may be re- 
quired of a ruler at least that he should earnestly 
keep the maxim in mind which points to the ne- 
cessity of such a change ; so that he may go on 
constantly approaching the end to be realised, 

Apptndix I i6f 

namely, the best possible constitution according to 
the laws of right. Even although it is still under 
despotic rule, in accordance with its constitution as 
then existing, a state may govern itself on republican 
lines, until the people gradually become capable of 
being influenced by the mere idea of the authority 
of law, just as if it had physical power. And they 
become accordingly capable of self-legislation, their 
faculty for which is founded on original right. But 
if, through the violence of revolution, the product 
of a bad government, a constitution more in accord 
with the spirit of law were attained even by un- 
lawful means, it should no longer be held justifiable 
to bring the people back to the old constitution, 
although, while the revolution was going on, every 
one who took part in it by use of force or stratagem, 
may have been justly punished as a rebel. As 
regards the external relations of nations, a state 
cannot be asked to give up its constitution, even 
although that be a despotism (which is, at the same 
time, the strongest constitution where foreign enemies 
are concerned), so long as it runs the risk of being 
immediately swallowed up by other states. Hence, 
when such a proposal is made, the state whose 
constitution is in question must at least be allowed to 
defer acting upon it until a more convenient time. * 

* These are per missive laws of reason which allow us to leave 
a system of public law, when it i tainted by injustice, to remain 

t68 FtretuAl Ptace 

It is always possible that moralists who rule 
despotically, and are at a loss in practical matters, 
will come into collision with the rules of political 
wisdom in many ways, by adopting measures with- 
out sufficient deliberation which show themselves 
afterwards to have been overestimated. When they 
thus offend against nature, experience must gradu- 
ally lead them into a better track. But, instead of 
this being the case, politicians who are fond of 
moralising do all they can to make moral improve- 
ment impossible and to perpetuate violations of law, 
by extenuating political principles which are an- 
tagonistic to the idea of right, on the pretext that 
human nature is not capable of good, in the sense 
of the ideal which reason prescribes. 

These politicians, instead of adopting an open, 
straightforward way of doing things (as they boast), 
mix themselves up in intrigue. They get at the 

just as it is, until everything is entirely revolutionised through an 
internal development, either spontaneous, or fostered and matured 
by peaceful influences. For any legal constitution whatsoever, 
even although it conforms only slightly with the spirit of law is 
better than none at all that is to say, anarchy, which is the fate 
of a precipitate reform. * Hence, as things now are, the wise 
politician will look upon it as his duty to make reforms on the 
lines marked out by the ideal of public law. He will not use 
revolutions, when these have been brought about by natural causes, 
to extenuate still greater oppression than caused them, but will 
regard them as the voice of nature, calling upon him to make 
such thorough reforms as will bring about the only lasting consti- 
tution, a lawful constitution based on the principles of freedom. 

Appendix / 169 

authorities in power and say what will please them ; 
their sole bent is to sacrifice the nation, or even, 
if they can, the whole world, with the one end in 
view that their own private interest may be for- 
warded. This is the manner of regular jurists (1 
mean the journeyman lawyer not the legislator), 
when they aspire to politics. For, as it is not their 
business to reason too nicely over legislation, but 
only to enforce the laws of the country, every legal 
constitution in its existing form and, when this is 
changed by the proper authorities, the one which 
takes its place, will always seem to them the best 
possible. And the consequence is that everything 
is purely mechanical. But this adroitness in suiting 
themselves to any circumstances may lead them to 
the delusion that they are also capable of giving 
an opinion about the principles of political con- 
stitutions in general, in so far as they conform to 
ideas of right, and are therefore not empirical, but 
a priori. And they may therefore brag about their 
knowledge of men, which indeed one expects to 
find, since they have to deal with so many with- 
out really knowing the nature of man and what 
can be made of it, to gain which knowledge a 
higher standpoint of anthropological observation 
than theirs is required. - Filled with ideas of this 
kind, if they trespass outside their own sphere on 
the boundaries of political and international law, 

170 Perpetual Peace 

looked upon as ideals which reason holds before 
us, they can do so only in the spirit of chicanery. 
For they will follow their usual method of making 
everything conform mechanically to compulsory 
laws despotically made and enforced, even here, 
where the ideas of reason recognise the val- 
idity of a legal compulsory force, only when it 
is in accordance with the principles of freedom 
through which a permanently valid constitution 
becomes first of all possible. The would-be prac- 
tical man, leaving out of account this idea of reason, 
thinks that he can solve this problem empirically 
by looking to the way in which those constitutions 
which have best survived the test of time were 
established, even although the spirit of these may 
have been generally contrary to the idea of right. 
The principles which he makes use of here, although 
indeed he does not make them public, amount 
pretty much to the following sophistical maxims, 
i. Fac et excusa. Seize the most favourable 
opportunity for arbitrary usurpation either of the 
authority of the state over its own people or over 
a neighbouring people; the justification of the act 
and extenuation of the use of force will come much 
more easily and gracefully, when the deed is done, 
than if one has to think out convincing reasons for 
taking this step and first hear through all the ob- 
jections which can be made against it. This is 

Apptndix I If I 

ipccially true ift the first case mentioned, whera 
the supreme power in the state also controls the 
legislature which we must obey without any reason- 
ing about it. Besides, this show of audacity in a 
statesman even lends him a certain semblance of 
inward conviction of the justice of his action ; and 
once he has got so far the god of success (bonus 
eventus) is his best advocate. 

2. Si fecisti, nega. As for any crime you have 
committed, such as has, for instance, brought your 
people to despair and thence to insurrection, deny 
that it has happened owing to any fault of yours. 
Say rather that it is all caused by the insubordi- 
nation of your subjects, or, in the case of your 
having usurped a neighbouring state, that human 
nature is to blame; for, if a man is not ready to 
use force and steal a march upon his neighbour, 
he may certainly count on the latter forestalling 
him and taking him prisoner. 

3. Divide et impera. That is to say, if there 
are certain privileged persons, holding authority 
among the people, who have merely chosen you 
for their sovereign as primus inter pares, bring 
about a quarrel among them, and make mischief 
between them and the people. Now back up the 
people with a dazzling promise of greater freedom ; 
everything will now depend unconditionally on 
your will. Or again, if there is a difficulty with 

Perpetual Ptace 

foreign states, then to stir up dissension among 
them is a pretty sure means of subjecting first one 
and then the other to your sway, under the pretext 
of aiding the weaker. 

It is true that nowadays no body is taken in by 
these political maxims, for they are all familiar to 
everyone. Moreover, there is no need of being 
ashamed of them, as if their injustice were too 
patent. For the great Powers never feel shame 
before the judgment of the common herd, but only 
before one another; so that as far as this matter 
goes, it is not the revelation of these guiding 
principles of policy that can make rulers ashamed, 
but only the unsuccessful use of. them. For as to 
the morality of these maxims, politicians are all 
agreed. Hence there is always left political prestige 
on which they can safely count; and this means 
the glory of increasing their power by any means 
that offer. * 

In all these twistings and turnings of an immo- 
ral doctrine of expediency which aims at substi- 
tuting a state of peace for the warlike conditions 
in which men are placed by nature, so much at 
least is clear; that men cannot get away from 

t * It is still sometimes denied that we find, in members of a 
civilised community, a certain depravity rooted in the nature of 

Appendix I 173 

the idea of right in their private any more than 
in their public relations; and that they do not 
dare (this is indeed most strikingly seen in the 
concept of an international law) to base politics 

man; l and it might, indeed, be alleged with some show of truth 
that not an innate corruptness in human nature, but the barbarism 
of men, the defect of a not yet sufficiently developed culture, is 
the cause of the evident antipathy to law which their attitude 
indicates.^ In the external relations of s states, however, human 
wickedness shows itself incontestably, 'without any attempt at 
concealment. Within the state, it is covered over by the compelling 
authority of civil laws. For, working against the tendency every 
citizen has to commit acts of violence against his neighbour, there 
is the much stronger force of the government which not only 
gives an appearance of morality to the whole state (causae non 
causae}, but, by checking the outbreak of lawless propensities, 
actually aids the moral qualities of men considerably, in their 
development of a direct respect for the law. For every individual 
thinks that he himself would hold the idea of right sacred and 
follow faithfully what it prescribes, if only he could expect that 
everyone else would do the same. This guarantee is in part 
given to him by the government; and a great advance is made 

1 This depravity of human nature is denied by Rousseau, who 
held that the inind of man was naturally inclined to virtue, and 
that good civil and social institutions are all that is required. 
(Discourse OH the Sciences and Arts, 1750.) Kant here takes sides 
with Hobbes against Rousseau. See Kant's Theory of Ethics, 
Abbott's trans. (4th ed., 1889), >. 339 seq. esp. p. 341 and note. 
Cf. also Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, I. 10: "Laws politic, 
ordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are never 
framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be 
inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience to 
the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man 
to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild 
beast, they do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to frame 
his outward actions, that they be uo hindrance unto the common 
good, for which societies are instituted." [Tr.J 

174 Perpetual Peace 

merely on the manipulations of expediency and there- 
fore to refuse all obedience to the idea of a public 
right. On the contrary, they pay all fitting honour 
to the idea of right in itself, even although they 
should, at the same time, devise a hundred 
subterfuges and excuses to avoid it in practice, 
and should regard force, backed up by cunning, 
as having the authority which comes from being the 
source and unifying principle of all right. It will be 
well to put an end to this sophistry, if not to the 
injustice it extenuates, and to bring the false advo- 
cates of the mighty of the earth to confess that it is 
not right but might in whose interest they speak, and 
that it is the worship of might from which they take 
their cue, as if in this matter they had a right to 
command. In order to do this, we must first ex- 
pose the delusion by which they deceive them- 

by this step which is not deliberately moral, towards the ideal of 
fidelity to the concept of duty for its own sake without thought 
of return. As, however, every man's good opinion of himself 
presupposes an evil disposition in everyone else, we have an 
expression of their mutual judgment of one another, namely, that 
when it comes to hard facts, none of them are worth much; but 
whence thi judgment comes remains unexplained, as we cannot 
lay the blame on the nature of man, since he is a being ia the 
possession of freedom. The respect for the idea of right, of 
which it is absolutely impossible for man to divest himself, sanc- 
tions in the most solemn manner the theory of our power to 
conform to its dictates. And hence every man sees himself obliged 
to act in accordance with what the idea of right prescribes, whether 
his neighbour! fulfil their obligation or not. 

Appendix I 175 

selves and others ; then discover the ultimate prin- 
ciple from which their plans for a perpetual peace 
proceed; and thence show that all the evil which 
stands in the way of the realisation of that ideal 
springs from the fact that the political moralist begins 
where the moral politician rightly ends and that, 
by subordinating principles to an end or putting 
the cart before the horse, he defeats his intention 
of bringing politics into harmony with morals. 

In order to make practical philosophy consistent 
with itself, we must first decide the following 
question: In dealing with the problems of practical 
reason must we begin from its material principle 
the end as the object of free choice or from its formal 
principle which is based merely on freedom in its 
external relation? from which comes the following 
law: "Act so that thou canst will that thy maxim 
should be a universal law, be the end of thy action 
what it will."* 

Without doubt, the latter determining principle 
of action must stand first; for, as a principle of 
right, it carries unconditional necessity with it, 
whereas the former is obligatory only if we assume 
the empirical conditions of the end set before us, 
that is to say, that it is an end capable of being 

* With regard to the meaning of the moral law and its signifi- 
cance in the Kantian system of ethics, see Abbott's translation of 
the Theory of Ethics (1889), pp. 38, 45, 54, 55, 119, 282. [Tr,] 

176 Perpetual Peace 

practically realised. And if this end as, for example, 
the end of perpetual peace should be also a duty, 
this same duty must necessarily have been deduced 
from the formal principle governing the maxims 
which guide external action. Now the first prin- 
ciple is the principle of the political moralist; the 
problems of constitutional, international and cos- 
mopolitan law are mere technical problems (problema 
technicum). The second or formal principle, on the 
other hand, as the principle of the moral politician 
who regards it as a moral problem (problema morale), 
differs widely from the other principle in its methods 
of bringing about perpetual peace, which we 
desire not only as a material good, but also as a 
state of things resulting from our recognition of 
the precepts of duty. * 

To solve the first problem that, namely, of 
political expediency much knowledge of nature is 
required, that her mechanical laws may be employed 
for the end in view. And yet the result of all 
knowledge of this kind is uncertain, as far as per- 
petual peace is concerned. This we find to be so, 
whichever of the three departments of public law 
we take. It is uncertain whether a people could 
be better kept in obedience and at the same time 
prosperity by severity or by baits held out to their 

* See Abbott's trans., pp. 33, 34. [Tr.j 

Apptndix I 

vanity; whether they would be better governed 
under the sovereignty of a single individual or by 
the authority of several acting together; whether 
the combined authority might be better secured 
merely, say, by an official nobility or by the power 
of the people within the state ; and, finally, whether 
such conditions could be long maintained. There 
are examples to the contrary in history in the case 
of all forms of government, with the exception of 
the only true republican constitution, the idea of 
which can occur only to a moral politician. Still 
more uncertain is a law of nations, ostensibly 
established upon statutes devised by ministers ; for 
this amounts in fact to mere empty words, and 
rests on treaties which, in the very act of ratification, 
contain "a secret reservation of the right to violate 
them. On the other hand, the solution of the 
second problem the problem of political wisdom 
forces itself, we may say, upon us; it is quite 
obvious to every one, and puts all crooked dealings 
to shame; it leads, too, straight to the desired 
end, while at the same time, discretion warns us 
not to drag in the conditions of perpetual peace 
by force, but to take time and approach this ideal 
gradually as favourable circumstances permit. 

This may be expressed in the following maxim : 
" Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason 
and its righteousness, and the object of your en- 


178 Ptrpttual Ptact 

deavour, the blessing of perpetual peace, will be 
added unto you." For the science of morals 
generally has this peculiarity, and it has it also with 
regard to the moral principles of public law, and 
therefore with regard to a science of politics know- 
able a priori, that the less it makes a man's conduct 
depend on the end he has set before him, his 
purposed material or moral gain, so much the 
more, nevertheless, does it conform in general to 
this end. The reason for this is that it is just the 
universal will, given a priori, which exists in a 
people or in the relation of different peoples to 
one another, that alone determines what is lawful 
among men. This union of individual wills, however, 
if we proceed consistently in practice, in observance 
the mechanical laws of nature, may be at the 
saiii<: time the cause of bringing about the result 
intended and practically realizing the idea of right. 
Hence it is, for example, a principle of moral 
politics that a people should unite into a state 
according to the only valid concepts of right, the 
ideas of freedom and equality; and this principle is 
not based on expediency, but upon duty. Political 
moralists, however, do not deserve a hearing, much 
and sophistically as they may reason about the 
existence, in a multitude of men forming a society, 
of certain natural tendencies which would weaken 
those principles and defeat their intention. They 

Appendix f 179 

may endeavour to prove their assertion by giving 
instances of badly organised constitutions, chosen 
both from ancient and modern times, (as, for 
example, democracies without a representative 
system); but such arguments are to be treated 
with contempt, all the more, because a pernicious 
theory of this kind may perhaps even bring about 
the evil which it prophesies. For, in accordance 
with such reasoning, man is thrown into a class 
with all other living machines which only require 
the consciousness that they are not free creatures 
to make them in their own judgment the most 
miserable of all beings. 

Fiat justitia, pereat mundus. This saying has 
become proverbial, and although it savours a little 
of boastfulness, is also true. We may translate it 
thus : " Let justice rule on earth, although all the 
rogues in the world should go to the bottom." It 
is a good, honest principle of right cutting off all 
the crooked ways made by knavery or violence. 
It must not, however, be misunderstood as allowing 
anyone to exercise his own rights with the utmost 
seventy, a course in contradiction to our moral duty ; 
but we must take it to signify an obligation, bind- 
ing upon rulers, to refrain from refusing to yield 
anyone his rights or from curtailing them, out of 
personal feeling or sympathy for other:.. For this 
end, in particular, we require, firstly, that a state 

i8o Perpetual Peact 

should have an internal political constitution, es- 
tablished according to the pure principles of right; 
secondly, that a union should be formed between 
this state and neighbouring or distant nations for 
a legal settlement of their differences, after the 
analogy of the universal state. This proposition 
means nothing more than this : Political maxims 
must not start from the idea of a prosperity and 
happiness which are to be expected from obser- 
vance of such precepts in every state; that is, not 
from the end which each nation makes the object 
of its will as the highest empirical principle of 
political wisdom; but they must set out from the 
pure concept of the duty of right, from the "ought" 
whose principle is given a priori through pure 
reason. This is the law, whatever the material 
consequences may be. The world will certainly not 
perish by any means, because the number of 
wicked people in it is becoming fewer. The mo- 
rally bad has one peculiarity, inseparable from its 
nature ; in its purposes, especially in relation to 
other evil influences, it is in contradiction with 
itself, and counteracts its own natural effect, and 
thus makes room for the moral principle of good, 
although advance in this direction may be slow. 
Hence objectively, in theory, there is no quarrel 
between morals and politics. But subjectively, in 
the self-seeking tendencies of men (which we cannot 

Appendix I 181 

actually call their morality, as we would a course 
of action based on maxims of reason,) this dis- 
agreement in principle exists and may always sur- 
vive; for it serves as a whetstone to virtue. Ac- 
cording to the principle, Tu ne cede malis, sed 
contra audentior ito, the true courage of virtue 
in the present case lies not so much in facing the 
evils and self-sacrifices which must be met here 
as in firmly confronting the evil principle in our 
own nature and conquering its wiles. For this is a 
principle far more dangerous, false, treacherous 
and sophistical which puts forward the weakness 
in human nature as a justification for every trans- 

In fact the political moralist may say that a 
ruler and people, or nation and nation do ont 
another no wrong, when thy enter on a war with 
violence or cunning, although they do wrong, 
generally speaking, in refusing to respect the idea 
of right which alone could establish peace for all 
time. For, as both are equally wrongly disposed 
to one another, each transgressing the duty he 
owes to his neighbour, they are both quite rightly 
served, when they are thus destroyed in war. This 
mutual destruction stops short at the point of exter- 
mination, so that there are always enough of the 
race left to keep this game going on through all 
the ages, and a far-off posterity may take warning 

1 82 Perpetual Peact 

by them. The Providence that orders the course 
of the world is hereby justified. For the moral 
principle in mankind never becomes extinguished, 
and human reason, fitted for the practical reali- 
sation of ideas of right according to that principle, 
grows continually in fitness for that purpose with 
the ever advancing march of culture; while at the 
same time, it must be said, the guilt of trans- 
gression increases as well. But it seems that, by 
no theodicy or vindication of the justice of God, 
can we justify Creation in putting such a race of 
corrupt creatures into the world at all, if, that is, 
we assume that the human race neither will nor 
can ever be in a happier condition than it is now. 
This standpoint, however, is too high a one for us 
to judge from, or to theorise, with the limited 
concepts we have at our command, about the 
wisdom of that supreme Power which is unknow- 
able by us. We are inevitably driven to such 
despairing conclusions as these, if we do not admit 
that the pure principles of right have objective 
reality that is to say, are capable of being prac- 
tically realised and consequently that action must 
be taken on the part of the people of a state and, 
further, by states in relation to one another, whatever 
arguments empirical politics may bring forward 
against this course. Politics in the real sense cannot 
take a step forward without first paying homage 

. Appendix I 183 

to the principles of morals. And, although politics, 
per se, is a difficult art, * in its union with moral* 
no art is required; for in the case of a conflict 
arising between the two sciences, the moralist can 
cut asunder the knot which politics is unable to 
untie. Right must be held sacred by man, however 
great the cost and sacrifice to the ruling power. 
Here is no half-and-half course. We cannot devise 
a happy medium between right and expediency, a 
right pragmatically conditioned. But all politics must 
bend the knee to the principle of right, and may, 
in that way, hope to reach, although slowly per- 
haps, a level whence it may shine upon men for 
all time. 

* Matthew Arnold defines politics somewhere as the art of 
"making reason and the will of God prtyil" an art, ont would 
say, difficult DOugh. [Tr.] 





IF I look at public right from the point of view 
of most professors of law, and abstract from its 
matter or its empirical elements, varying according 
to the circumstances given in our experience of 
individuals in a state or of states among themselves, 
then there remains the form of publicity. The 
possibility of this publicity, every legal title implies. 
For without it there could be no justice, which can 
only be thought as before the eyes of men; and, 
without justice, there would be no right, for, from 
justice only, right can come. 

This characteristic of publicity must belong to 
every legal title. Hence, as, in any particular case 
that occurs, there is no difficulty in deciding whether 
this essential attribute is present or not, (whether, 
that is, it is reconcilable with the principles of the 
agent or not), it furnishes an easily applied criterion 

Appendix II 185 

which is to be found a priori in the reason, so that 

in the particular case we can at once recognise the 

falsity or illegality of a proposed claim (praetensio 

juris), as it were by an experiment of pure reason. 

Having thus, as it were, abstracted from all the 
empirical elements contained in the concept of a 
political and international law, such as, for instance, 
the evil tendency in human nature which makes 
compulsion necessary, we may give the following 
proposition as the transcendental formula of public 
right: "All actions relating to the rights of other 
men are wrong, if the 'maxims from which they 
follow are inconsistent with publicity." 

This principle must be regarded not merely as 
ethical, as belonging to the doctrine of virtue, but 
also as juridical, referring to the rights of men. 
For there is something wrong in a maxim of con- 
duct which I cannot divulge without at once defeating 
my purpose, a maxim which must therefore be 
kept secret, if it is to succeed, and which I could 
not publicly ackowledge without infallibly stirring 
up the opposition of everyone. This necessary 
and universal resistance with which everyone meets 
me, a resistance therefore evident a priori, can be 
due to no other cause than the injustice with which 
such a maxim threatens everyone. Further, this 
testing principle is merely negative; that is, it 
ssrve* only as a means by which we may know 

1 86 Perpetual Peace 

when an action is unjust to others. Like axioms, 
it has a certainty incapable of demonstration ; it is 
besides easy of application as appears from the 
following examples of public right. 

I. Constitutional Law. Let us take in the first 
place the public law of the state (jus civitatis], 
particularly in its application to matters within the 
state. Here a question arises which many think 
difficult to answer, but which the transcendental 
principle of publicity solves quite readily : " Is 
revolution a legitimate means for a people to adopt, 
for the purpose of throwing off the oppressive yoke 
of a so-called tyrant (non titulo, sed ixercitio talis)1" 
The rights of a nation are violated in a government 
of this kind, and no wrong is done to the tyrant 
in dethroning him. Of this there is no doubt. 
None the less, it is in the highest degree wrong of 
the subjects to prosecute their rights in this way ; 
and they would be just as little justified in com- 
plaining, if they happened to be defeated in their 
attempt and had to endure the severest punishment 
in consequence. 

A great many reasons for and against both sides 
of this question may be given, if we seek to settle 
it by a dogmatic deduction of the principles of 
right. But the transcendental principle of the publicity 
of public right can spare itself this diffuse argu- 
mentation. For, according to that principle, the 

Appendix II 187 

people would ask themselves, before the civil con- 
tract was made, whether they could venture to 
publish maxims, proposing insurrection when a 
favourable opportunity should present itself. It is 
quite clear that if, when a constitution is established, 
it were made a condition that force may be exercised 
against the sovereign under certain circumstances, 
the people would be obliged to claim a lawful 
authority higher than his. But in that case, the 
so-called sovereign would be no longer sovereign : 
or, if both powers, that of the sovereign and that 
of the people, were made a condition of the con- 
stitution of the state, then its establishment (which 
was the aim of the people) would be impossible. 
The wrongfulness of revolution is quite obvious 
from the fact that openly to acknowledge maxims 
which justify this step would make attainment of 
the end at which they aim impossible. We are 
obliged to keep them secret. But this secrecy 
would not be necessary on the part of the head 
of the state. He may say quite plainly that the 
ringleaders of every rebellion will be punished by 
death, even although they may hold that it was 
he who first transgressed the fundamental law. For, 
if a ruler is conscious of possessing irresistible 
sovereign power (and this must be assumed in 
every civil constitution, because a sovereign who 
has not power to protect any individual membtr 

1 88 Perpetual Peace 

of the nation against his neighbour has also not 
the right to exercise authority over him), then he 
need have no fear that making known the maxims 
which guide him will cause the defeat of his plans. 
And it is quite consistent with this view to hold 
that, if the people are successful in their insurrec- 
tion, the sovereign must return to the rank of a 
subject, and refrain from inciting rebellion with a 
view to regaining his lost sovereignty. At the same 
time he need have no fear of being called to 
account for his former administration.* 

* " When a king has dethroned himself," says Lock*, (On Civil 
Covet ftmfnt, Ch. XTX. 239) "and put himself in a state of war 
with his people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who 
is no king, as they would any other man, who has put himself into 
a state of war with them?" .... "The legislative being only a 
fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the 
people a supreme power to remove er alter the legislate" (Op. 
fit,. Ch. XIII. 149.) And again, (op. fit., Ch. XI. 134.) we 
find the words, " . . . , over whom [i.e. society] no body can hare 
a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority 
received from them." Cf. also Ch. XIX. 228 seq. 

Hobbes represents the opposite point of view. "How many 
kings," he wrote, (Preface to the Philosophical Rudiments concerning 
Government and Society) "and those good men too, hath this one 
error, that a tyrant king might lawfully be put to death, been the 
slaughter of! How many throats hath this false position cut, that 
a prince for some causes may by some certain men be deposed! And 
what bloodshed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused, that kings 
are not superiors to, but administrators for the multitude ! " This 
" erroneous doctrine " Kant received from Locke through Rousseau. 
He advocated, or at least practised as a citizen, a doctrine of 
passive obedience to the state. A free press, he held, offered the 
only lawful outlet for protest against tyranny. But, in theory, he 
wa% an enemy to aboiute monarchy. [Tr.] 

Appendix II 189 

2. International Law. There can be no ques- 
tion of an international law, except on the assump- 
tion of some kind of a law-governed state of things, 
the external condition under which any right can 
belong to man. For the very idea of interna- 
tional law, as public right, implies the publication of 
a universal will determining the rights and property 
of each individual nation; and this status juridicus 
must spring out of a contract of some sort which 
may not, like the contract to which the state owes 
its origin, be founded upon compulsory laws, but 
may be, at the most, the agreement of a permanent 
free association such as the federation of the differ- 
ent states, to which we have alluded above. For, 
without the control of law to some extent, to serve 
as an active bond of union among different merely 
natural or moral individuals, that is to say, in a 
state of nature, there can only be private law. 
And here we find a disagreement between morals, 
regarded as the science of right, and politics. The 
criterion, obtained by observing the effect of pub- 
licity on maxims, is just as easily applied, but 
only when we understand that this agreement binds 
the contracting states solely^-with the object that 
peace may be preserved among them, and between 
them and other states; in no sense with a view 
to the acquisition of new territory or power. The 
following instances of antinomy occur between 

190 Ptrpetual Peact 

politics and morals, which are given here with the 
solution in each case. 

a. "When either of these states has promised 
something to another, (as, for instance, assistance, 
or a relinquishment of certain territory, or subsidies 
and such like), the question may arise whether, in 
a case where the safety of the state thus bound 
depends on its evading the fulfilment of this pro- 
mise, it can do so by maintaining a right to be 
regarded as a double person : firstly, as sovereign 
and accountable to no one in the state of which that 
sovereign power is head ; and, secondly, merely as the 
highest official in the service of that state, who is 
obliged to answer to the state for every action. And 
the result of this is that the state is acquitted in its 
second capacity of any obligation to which it has 
committed itself in the first." But, if a nation or 
its sovereign proclaimed these maxims, the natural 
consequence would be that every other would flee 
from it, or unite with other states to oppose such 
pretensions. And this is a proof that politics, with 
all its cunning, defeats its own ends, if the test of 
making principles of action public, which we have 
indicated, be applied. Hence the maxim we have 
quoted must be wrong. 

b. "If a state which has increased its power 
to a formidable extent (potentia tremenda) excites 
anxiety in its neighbours, is it right to assume 

Appendix II 191 

that, since it has the means, it will also have the 
will to oppress others; and does that give less 
powerful states a right to unite and attack the 
greater nation without any definite cause of offence?" 
A state which would here answer openly in the 
affirmative would only bring the evil about more 
surely and speedily. For the greater power would 
forestall those smaller nations, and their union 
would be but a weak reed of defence against a 
state which knew how to apply the maxim, 
divide el impera. This maxim of political ex- 
pediency then, when openly acknowledged, neces- 
sarily defeats the end at which it aims, and is 
therefore wrong. 

c. " If a smaller state by its geographical posi- 
tion breaks up the territory of a greater, so as to 
prevent a unity necessary to the preservation of 
that state, is the latter not justified in subjugating 
its less powerful neighbour and uniting the territory 
in question with its own?" We can easily see that 
the greater state dare not publish such a maxim 
beforehand; for either all smaller states would 
without loss of time unite against it, or other powers 
would contend for this booty. ' Hence the im- 
practicability of such a maxim becomes evident under 
the light of publicity. And this is a sign that it 
is wrong, and that in a very great degree; for, 
although the victim of an act of injustice may be 

192 Ptrpttual Peace 

of small account, that does not prevent the injustice 
done from being very great. 

3. Cosmopolitan Law. We may pass over this 
department of right in silence, for, owing to its 
analogy with international law, its maxims arc 
easily specified and estimated. 

In this principle of the incompatibility of the 
maxims of international law with their publicity, 
we have a good indication of the non-agreement 
between politics and morals, regarded as a science 
of right. - Now we require to know under what 
conditions these maxims do agree with the law of 
nations. For we cannot conclude that the converse 
holds, and that all maxims which can bear publicity 
are therefore just. For anyone who has a decided 
supremacy has no need to make any secret about 
his maxims. The condition of a law of nations 
being possible at all is that, in the first place, 
there should be a law-governed state of things. 
If this is not so, there can be no public right, and 
all right which we can think of outside the law- 
governed state, that is to say, in the state of 
nature, is mere private right. Now we have seen 

Appendix II 193 

above that something of the nature of a federation 
between nations, for the sole purpose of doing 
away with war, is the only rightful condition of 
things reconcilable with their individual freedom. 
Hence the agreement of politics and morals is only 
possible in a federative union, a union which is 
necessarily given a priori, according to the prin- 
ciples of right. And the lawful basis of all politics 
can only be the establishment of this union in its 
widest possible extent. Apart from this end, all 
political sophistry is folly and veiled injustice. Now 
this sham politics has a casuistry, not to be ex- 
celled in the best Jesuit school. It has its mental 
reservation (reservatio mentalis] : as in the drawing 
up of a public treaty in such terms as we can, if 
we will, interpret when occasion serves to our 
advantage ; for example, the distinction between 
the status quo in fact (de fait) and in right (de droit). 
Secondly, it has its probabilism; when it pretends 
to discover evil intentions in another, or makes 
the probability of their possible future ascendency 
a lawful reason for bringing about the destruction 
of other peaceful states. Finally, it has its philo- 
sophical sin (pe,-catum phihsophicuin, peccatillutn, 
baggatelle] which is that of holding it a trifle easily 
pardoned that a smaller state should be swallowed 
up, if this be to the gain of a nation much more 
powerful; for such an increase in power is 


IQ4 Perpetual Peace 

supposed to tend to the greater prosperity of the 
whole world. * 

Duplicity gives politics the advantage of using 
one branch or the other of morals, just as suits 
its own ends. The love of our fellowmen is a 
duty: so too is respect for their rights. But the 
former is only conditional : the latter, on the other 
hand, an unconditional, absolutely imperative duty ; 
and anyone who would give himself up to the 
sweet consciousness of well-doing must be first per- 
fectly assured that he has not transgressed its 
commands. Politics has no difficulty in agreeing 
with morals in the first sense of the term, as ethics, 
to secure that men should give to superiors their 
rights. But when it comes to morals, in its second 
aspect, as the science of right before which politics 
must bow the knee, the politician finds it prudent 
to have nothing to do with compacts and rather 
to deny all reality to morals in this sense, and 
reduce all duty to mere benevolence. Philosophy 
could easily frustrate the artifices of a politics like 

We can find the voucher for maxims such as these in Herr 
Hofrichter Garve's essay, On the Connection of Morals with 
Politics, 1788. This worthy scholar confesses at the very beginning 
that he is unable to give a satisfactory answer to this question. 
But his sanction of such maxims, even when coupled with the 
admission that he cannot altogether clear away the arguments 
raised against them, seems to be a greater concession in favour of 
those who shew considerable inclination to abuse them, than it 
might perhaps be wise to admit. 

Appendix II 19$ 

this, which shuns the light of criticism, by publishing 
its maxims, if only statesmen would have the courage to 
grant philosophers the right to ventilate their opinions. 

With this end in view, I propose another prin- 
ciple of public right, which is at once transcendental 
and affirmative. Its formula would be as follows: 
"All maxims which require publicity, in order 
that they may not fail to attain their end, are in 
agreement both with right and politics." 

For, if these maxims can only attain the end at 
which they aim by being published, they must be 
in harmony with the universal end of mankind, 
which is happiness ; and to be in sympathy with 
this (to make the people contented with their lot) 
is the real business of politics. Now, if this end 
should be attainable only by publicity, or in other 
words, through the removal of all distrust of the 
maxims of politics, these must be in harmony with 
the right of the people ; for a union of the ends 
of all is only possible in a harmony with this right. 

I must postpone the further development and 
discussion of this principle till another opportunity. 
That it is a transcendental formula is quite evident 
from the fact that all the empirical conditions of 
a doctrine of happiness, or the matter of law, are 
absent, and that it has regard only to the form 
of universal conformity to law. 

196 Perpetual Peace 

If it is our duty to realise a state of public 
right, if at the same time there are good grounds 
for hope that this ideal may be realised, although 
only by an approximation advancing ad infinitum, 
then perpetual peace, following hitherto falsely 
so-called conclusions of peace, which have been in 
reality mere cessations of hostilities, is no mere 
empty idea. But rather we have here a problem 
which gradually works out its own solution and, 
as the periods in which a given advance takes 
place towards the realisation of the ideal of per- 
petual peace will, we hope, become with the passing 
of time shorter and shorter, we must approach ever 
nearer to this goal. 


Absolutism; of Hobbes, 43, 441 of Schopenhauer, 43; according 

to Kant, 43, 44, 125128; to Locke, 44. 
Alexander I. of Russia; So. 
Alexander the Great; 31, 103. 
Alsace-Lorraine; annexation of, 90; 92, 95. 
Ambrose, Saint; 15. 
Amphictyonic League; 16, 22. 

Aquinas, Thomas; on righting clergy, 18; on war, 18, 19. 
Arbitration; as a substitute for war, 79, 81, 87 ; difficulties settled 

by, 80 ; where it is useless, 82, 83, 86. 
Aristotle; on war, 7, 8; and rights of an enemy, id.-, 31; on the 

relation between politics and ethics, 162. 
Assyrians; war among the, 9. 
Augustine, Saint; 16. 


Balance of power; 26, 95. 
Bentham, Jeremy ; 26, 79, 92. 
Bluntschli, J. K. ; 41, 73, 74, So. 


Caird, Edward; 3, 51. 

Calvin, John; 19. 

Carnegie, Andrew; 100. 

China; a danger to Europe, 92, 93 ; 140, 141, 

198 Index 

Cicero ; on the conduct of war, 22; 41. 

Clement of Alexandria; 15. 

Clergy, fighting; Origen on, 14, 15 ; Wycliffe, 18; Erasmus, if. 

Aquinas, ib. 
Cobclen, Richard ; 64. 
Corvinus, Matthias; 109. 
Cowper, William; 5, 38, 123. 
Crusades, wars of the; 16, 103. 

Dante, Alighieri; on mediation, 46; en universal monarchy, 68, 69. 
Disarmament; 8893; Czar's proposal of, 90; practicability f, 

Dubois, Cardinal ; 36. 

Empire; of Rome, 9, 2O, 68; world-, spiritual, 23, 32, 69; of 
Alexander the Great, 31, 68; Prankish, 69; Holy Roman 69, 
of Napoleon I., 69. 

Erasmus, Desiderius; and European pace, 17; on war, 18, 19; on 
fighting clergy, 18; 32. 


Farrar, J. A. ; 18. 

Federation; Kant's idea f, 60, 68, 69, 128137; 88, 92, 93, 95, 

97; probable results of, 98, 99; 100, 134. 
Fichte, J. G. ; 69, 99. 
Finland; 92, 95. 
Fischer, Kuno ; 62, 67. 
Fleury, Cardinal; 55. 
Frederick the Great; 66, ia6. 

Index 199 

Gentilis, Albericus; 21, 32. 

Golden Age; 3, 41. 

Government; origin of, according to Plato, 5; according to Hnme, 

5, 52; to Cowper, 5, 6; to Hobbes, 40 42, 118, 119; to Kant, 

5154, 152 154; to Rousseau, 52; to Locke, 53; representative, 

65 68, 120, 121, 124128. 
Greeks ; their attitude to other nations, 7 ; to an enemy, ib. \ their 

Sacred Wars, 16; the Amphictyonic League, 16. 
Grotius, Hugo; his DC Jure Belli et Pacts, 24 27; and the fus 

Gentium, 24, 25; and the Law of Nature, 25; on peace, 27 1 

32, 40, 131. 

Hague Conference (1899); 86, 90. 

Hegel, G. W. F. ; 57; on war, 71, 72, 75. 

Henry IV. of France ; 30, 32, 33, 36. 

Hobbes, Thomas; his theory of the state of nature and origin of 

government, 4, 4042, 51, 118, 119, 133; 6, 26, 27, 28, 37; 

his influence on Kaat, 40, 46; his views on revolution, 41, 188; 

of the relations between states, 43 46, 128, 131; on the 

conduct of war, 45; 89, 120, 124, 159. 
Holls, Fred. W. ; 86. 

Hooker, Richard; 52; on the depravity of man, 173. 
Hume, David ; on the origin of government, 5, 52 ; on the state 

of nature, 40, 41; on the original contract, 52; 108, 109, 162. 

International Law; the development of, 20 24; its connection 

with the Reformation, 21, 24; in Greece and Rome, 22, 23. 
Intervention j 64, 93, 94, 112, 113. 

Jews; war among the, 9 II; their dream of peace, 32. 
Justin; 15. 

2OO Index 

Kant, Immanuel ; 26, 37 ; his indebtedness to earlier political 
writers, 40, 46; his theory of human development, 47 49; and 
how this is possible, 49 51, 54; on the foundation of the state, 
51 54, 152 154; the relations between states and individuals, 
54, 55, 117 120, 128, 173, 174; the necessity for reform within 
the state, 55, 56, 168; the political and social conditions of his 
time, 5759; his attitude to war, 58, 133, 135, 136, 137, 149 
151 ; on the growing power of commerce, 59, 65, 142, 157; his 
idea of federation, 60, 68, 69, 128 137, 192; and ideal of 
perpetual peace, 61, 129, 196; the conditions of its realization, 
62 69; on representative and other constitutions, 65 68, 120 
128, 152, 153, 167; his opinion of the English constitution, 66 ; 
his disapproval of universal monarchy, 68, 69, 155, 156; 79, 
83, 89, 100, 105; on the right of way, 137 142; on nature's 
guarantee of a perpetual peace, 143157; on the relation 
between politics and morals, 161 196; on revolution, 167, 168, 

Laveleye, mile dc ; 81. 

Lawrence, T. J. ; 9, 78, 81. 

Leibniz, Gottfried \V. ; 36; his criticism of St. Pierre, 37, 38; 58, 106. 

Locke, John ; and the golden age, 3, 4 ; on the original contract, 

53; on revolution, 53, 188; 67, 133. 
Lorimcr, James ; 34, 80. 
Louis Philippe; 76. 
Luther, Martin; on war, 19. 

Machiavelli, Nicolo; 162. 

Maine, Henry; on Grotius and the Jus Gentium, 24, 25. 

Maistrc, Joseph dc ; 71. 

Martineau, James; IO2. 

Mtanonites; and war, 14. 

Index 201 

Military service; of Christians, 14, 16, 18, 19; compulsory 89; 

voluntary, in. 
Mill, John Stuart; 80. 
Moltke, Graf von ; 71, 73 75. 
Monarchy, universal; the ideal of Dante, 68, 69; disapproved by 

Kant, 68, 69, 155, 156; aud Fichte, 69. 
Montesquieu, Baron de; on self-preservation, 83; on armed peace, 

88; 159. 

More, Thomas ; 32. 
Morley, John; 3. 

Napoleon Bonaparte; Empire of, 69; 71, 72. 76. 77. 

Napoleon, Louis ; 80. 

National Debt; 63, 64, ill, 112. 

Origen; on military service, 14, 15. 

Original Contract; 40-, as understood by Rousseau, 52; by Hobbes, 
52, 53; by Hooker, $2; by Hume, ib. , by Kant, il>.- by T.ocke, 53. 

Paris Congress (1856); 86. 

Faulsen, Friedrich ; 43, 52, 53, 66, 78. 

Peace, perpetual; the dream of, 29 33: projects of, by Penn, 30; 
by Henry IV., 30, 33, 34 : by St. Pierre, 30, 32, 34 37 ; Rousseau's 
attitude to, 38 40; 106; for Kant an ideal, 61, 129; the articles 
of, 6269; 107142, 158160; the guarantee of, 143157. 

Peace Societies; 70, 75, 78, 79, 80, 86, 87; and disarmament, 88 ; 
96, 97, loo, loi, 102. 

Penn, William ; 30. 

Plato ; on the origin of the state, 5 ; on war, 8; 41 j on the relation 
between ethics and politics, 162, 

Poland; 92, 93, 95. 

202 Index 

Politics; and morals, according to Kant, 161 196; to Plato, 162 
to Aristotle, ib. \ to Hume, ib.\ sophistical maxims of, 170 172. 
Pope, Alexander; 4, 127. 
Puffendorf, Samuel; 27; on intervention, 64; 131. 

Quakers ; and war, 14. 

Reformation; and military service, 18; and international law, 11,24 
Religion. Roman, and war, 9-, Jewish, 9 n ; Mohammedan, io ; 

Buddhist, and conversion, 12 ; Christian, and war, 12 20. 
Revolution, right of; according to Hobbes, 41, 53; and Spinoza, 

41; according to Locke, 53; to Rousseau, ib.\ to Kant, 167, 

1 86 1 88. 

Right of \vay ; Vatu-1 on. 65, 138; Kant on, 65, 137142. 
Ritchie, U. G. ; on Rousseau, 3; on Locke and the golden age, 

it.-, 52, 85, 98. 

Robertson, William; 6, 17.. 18, 19. 

Romans; and war, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23; and international law, 22, 23. 
Rousseau, J. J. ; and the state of nature, 2, 3, 52; 26, 28; his 

criticism of St. Pierre, 38 40; his views on militarism, 39; on 

the original contract, 52; on revolution, 53, 188; 61, 67, 100, 

132, 134; on democratic and republican governments, 153; ou 

the depravity of man, 173. 
Russia; Alexander I. of, 8o ; the Czar of, 90; the backward 

civilization of, 92, 93; 94, 95. 


Schiller, Friedrich von; on war and peace, 71, 72, 73, 75. 

Schopenhauer, Arthur; 43. 

Spencer, Herbert; 76. 

Spinoza, Benedict; on the state of nature, 41; and revolution, #. 

Standing armies ; 63, 64, 89, no 

Index 203 

State of nature ; according to Rousseau, t, 3 ; and the golden ae, 
3; Hobbea' theory of, 4, 40, 41, n8; according to Hume a 
philosophical fiction, 41; according to Kant, 117 -120. 

States; transference of, 63, 108, 109; marriage between, 109. 

St. Pierre, Castel de ; 30, 32, 33 ; his Projtt, 3437 ; and Leibnic, 
37, 38; and Rousseau, 3840; 6l, 67, 79, 92, 106. 

Sully. Duke of; 30, 32, 33. 

Tennyson, Lord ; 73, 74, 

Tertullian; 14, 15. 

Treaties of peace; in Greece, 7; 6j> 64, 107, loS. 

Treitschke, H. von ; 75. 

Trendelenburg, F. A.; 7$, 

Vattel, Emerich; hi* Droit da Gent, 28, 99; on intervention, $4, 
113, 114; on the right of way, 65; of self-prettfTfttion, 83 ; ty, 
103; on treaties, 108; 131. 

Voltaire, Francois de ; 33, 37, 38. 

War; religious. 16; private, 17, 2O, 29; dynastic, 38, 57, UJ; 
Kant's attitude to, 58, 133, 135, 136, 137, 149 151; its influence 
on progress, 70, 96, 103; views of Hegel on, 71, 72, 75; of 
Schiller, 71, 72, 73, 7$; of Moltke, 71, 73, 74, 7$; under altered 
conditions, 76, 77, 78; when just, 84, 85-, future probable cause* 
f. 94. 95; honorable conduct of, 114, 115, 

Wycliffe, John; and fighting clergy, 18. 

Zwingli, Huldreich, 19. 

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